

Peace Insurance

by

Richard Stockton, Jr.

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Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war as well for defence as offence, and when a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service.

—GEORGE WASHINGTON

Memorandum.

The policy of being prepared for even
the most remote of emergencies,
while at the same time they are
striving in every direction and in
every possible way to prevent such
emergencies, is inevitably
endorsed by large commercial
organizations. Ans.



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BY
RICHARD STOCKTON, JR.

With Eleven Plates by
Frank N. Thompson

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To
the Officers
of our
Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and National Guard
who, knowing better than
all others the needlessness of the
sacrifice, will willingly go forth to
the deaths which public indifference
and ignorance may require in our
next war; who work unceasingly
and thanklessly to lessen
the probable
calamity

PREFACE

FOR one truly to study the art and science of war, and its political and economic causes and effects, and then to attempt a work thereon with a claim of marked originality, is but to proclaim that one feels that the illustrious men, from the dawn of history to the present day, have been but fools. War and statesmanship are the oldest of great sciences, and while modern inventions have caused some changes, and civilization has lessened the surface causes of international struggles, their essential principles are still the same. When one studies these things and attempts to express one's thoughts, the result is but a repetition of the perhaps forgotten writings of notable men, both ancient and modern, both American and foreign. All that is left, therefore, is to apply these old, undying facts to things as they now exist, and in this case to the United States in particular. Nor is it necessary for me to express vague, unproven theories of my own. The approved authorities, even, in fact, my opponents, support me. I have therefore no apology to make for numerous quotations from great men and authorities — soldiers, statesmen, scholars, and phi-

losophers of the present and the past. I but thank them for expressing what, mayhap, was beyond me.

Similarly, as Professor R. M. Johnston, of Harvard, remarked in a letter to the author, "I oppose not the pacifist, but the pacifimaniac." I wish every success to those who strive to bring about the radical changes necessary for universal peace, but I warn against imaginary things which are not, and, in our life, cannot be.

The statistics used herein have been compiled from the most reliable sources, mainly from official governmental reports. It is believed that they are the most accurate that can, at this time, be obtained. Small errors, however, would have but little bearing on the facts, for the figures selected may in most cases be divided twice and even thrice without affecting the material statements in this work in any appreciable degree.

This book is written, therefore, inviting the opponents of its thesis to study the facts for themselves, and thereby be convinced; asking that but reasonable attention be given to the experts of our army and navy, and to our greatest statesmen.

RICHARD STOCKTON, JR.

Bordentown Military Institute,
New Jersey, *December, 1914.*

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PEACE INSURANCE

CHAPTER I

IS AN ARMY AND NAVY A BURDEN DURING PEACE?

THE United States has been fortunate in not being involved in the world-wide strife of 1914. We are unfortunate, however, in our evident inability to read the true lessons of the greatest war of history. Perhaps that is to be expected, for it has been characteristic of the American citizen to fail to heed the warnings of the military history either of his own nation, or of foreign powers.

After all, it is not so much the present war, as it is war in general, that we must study to reach accurate conclusions. No one thing should ever be studied when it is desired to be informed on a subject, but rather a number of examples must be taken. Hence it is that the European War is of interest, not so much of itself, as because it furnishes another great example. We must not reach our conclusions by studying this war alone, but must study past ones, and take due advantage of the ad-

ditional information which this greatest of struggles may afford.

If the European War enables us to read aright the true lessons of our own history, it will serve our nation well. We have always misread or disregarded the military history of the United States. So great is the present conflict, however, that it is hoped that our eyes may be opened. It seems impossible that we can hear the tramp of the millions of trained soldiers in Europe, or the rumbling of the thousands of cannon, without at last awakening.

If we are to believe the fanatics of many of the various organizations of theorists, women, ministers, and doctors of various sciences which have no bearing on the facts, the day of universal peace is at hand. If we believe a larger and more conservative element, the day of peace, although not at hand, approaches rapidly. Finally, unless we take issue with the great mass of the American public, we must at least believe that the moneys expended for armies and navies, while probably a necessary expense, are an enormous, serious, and total economic waste. A comparatively small group of men in these United States, being largely those making war their life study, lay themselves open to the charge of personal interest when they state that all of these theories are false, and dangerous to the nation which adopts them.

In an attempt conservatively, but thoroughly, to

set forth the facts in regard to armies, navies, their cost and the effects of wars on economic conditions in the world, it is, perhaps, well to consider first the most reasonable contention of the anti-militarists; namely, that the cost of armies and navies, during the many years of peace, is an excessive burden.

Military forces, in which we include both armies and navies, are for the purpose of preventing defeat in war. Ability to accomplish this purpose successfully must depend upon their size, equipment and efficiency as compared with the forces of the enemy. Hence, it is easy to conceive the fact that a sufficiently wealthy and powerful nation, by expending wisely a sufficient sum, could maintain a military force which would make defeat practically impossible. This being the case, war, due to aggression on the part of any other nation, would be extremely improbable. No nation will attack another power if it knows that victory is impossible. When there is a question as to the outcome, a nation hesitates to bring on a war. Even when a power feels that victory is sure, still it hesitates in proportion to the cost involved, in lives and money.

Mexico affords an example of this. Many nations could easily defeat Mexico, but the cost of a Mexican campaign is one factor in preventing intervention, by any nation, without great provocation. Mexico's military force, though strong enough to discourage the powers from entering lightly into war,

was not strong enough to prevent us from seizing Vera Cruz. Even under much greater provocation, we would never have attempted to seize a seaport belonging to England, or Germany, or Japan, for the simple reason that their military forces make such an attempt impracticable. They insure against such acts.

China affords another example; perhaps a better one. Its weak military force can insure nothing, and in consequence troops of all nations camp upon, and control China's territory.

Germany is a notable example of the other kind. That nation, maintaining what is admittedly by far the most efficient military force in the world, previous to 1914 had the largest number of years of unbroken peace which have blessed any great nation.

It is thus that a military force, insuring against defeat in war, insures against any war at all. The fact that Germany has become involved in the greatest of international conflicts affects this truth in no way. If Germany brought on the war, at least German power has delayed the contest until the nation desired it. If, however, the allies are responsible, the only fact proven is that though strong enough to prevent an aggressive war by any one nation, the German army was not formidable enough to prevent an attack by a combination of powers. Insurance is a well recognized, established and paying business proposition. We insure against loss by

fire, theft, burglary, accidents, lawsuits, breakage, explosions, and so on indefinitely. In addition to paying premiums to keep us from loss we attempt to prevent it by fire departments, police departments, etc. These forces, it is needless to say, do not prevent fires, nor crimes, but they lessen their frequency, and afford the best means of protection yet known. Military force bears the same relation to conflicts between nations. It, therefore, seems reasonable that as long as there is a possibility that another nation may make war upon us, we should insure against war.

No business man, and no corporation, will pay more for insurance than it believes it is probable that it may lose in the manner described in their policies. Nor does a corporation or individual pay an amount in premiums that is out of proportion with other expenses, or a burden that threatens the welfare of those to whom the insurance policies are issued. Moreover, no practical business man or well managed corporation will carry insurance in one company, if a rival company of equal or greater stability is issuing equally good or better policies at less cost.

Therefore, in considering whether or not military forces are the best insurance against war, we must determine these principal points:

First, is the money expended for our army and navy more than we may expect to lose in war?

Second, is the amount expended out of proportion to our other expenditures?

Third, is the amount a burden that is harmful to the nation?

Fourth, is there a cheaper form of insurance against war that would be just as effective?

Considering these questions in order, we find that the American Government spends approximately \$95,000,000 annually on the United States Army, and \$140,000,000 annually on the United States Navy. In addition, the various states and the Federal Government spend about \$10,000,000 annually on the National Guard (or organized militia) throughout the country. About \$245,000,000 is, therefore, the annual premium which we pay as an insurance against defeat in war. This is almost exactly the sum that we expend annually for the entire maintenance of all the military forces of the nation. To determine the rate of our insurance, we must first determine what we are insuring and its value.

Insurance against defeat in war insures:

(a) The independence of the United States.

(b) The political and religious freedom of the American citizens.

(c) The use of the wealth of the United States by its own citizens.

Who can place a value upon these things? Yet, if we take what may be considered as least valuable

of these three items, namely, the use of our national wealth by our own citizens, we find that we are insuring what is undervalued at \$117,900,000,000. Assigning only equal values to the remaining two infinitely valuable items, we find that we are insuring \$353,700,000,000 at an annual premium of \$245,000,000, or considerably less than one-fifteenth of one per cent. Disregarding entirely the infinitely valuable items of the independence of our country and our personal freedom, on the unsupportable argument that they are included in our national wealth, we find that our rate is still about one-fifth of one per cent. In consequence, at our present rate of expenditure, it would take over five hundred years without any war before the peace expenditures on our army and navy would have totalled to a sum equal to the amount that these expenditures protect, in which case it would be necessary to assume that our national wealth would remain for five hundred years the same amount. Adding the infinite values of our national and personal independence — priceless to every American — we find it would take infinite years of peace to make our military force a useless insurance.

Brigadier-General H. M. Chittenden, a retired officer of the U. S. Army, with pacifist tendencies, in his *War or Peace* makes use of a peculiar method of computation in order to show that we pay a higher rate for protection than is here stated. He says:

By any reasonable forecast our future losses in war will not amount to more than an average of \$200,000,000 a year, based upon our war record, both domestic and foreign, of the past half-century, or a tenth as much based solely upon our foreign wars. With the growing tendency to resort to peaceful methods for settling international disputes these estimates may be considered liberal. Our annual outlay for war preparation (army and navy) is now about \$240,000,000 with no prospect of decrease in the near future. It appears, therefore, that the premium which we are paying for war prevention, based upon a reasonable estimate of probable financial losses, is really 115 per cent, if we consider only the larger of the estimates of losses just given, and ten times as great if we consider only the smaller. As an insurance against property loss this would be a pretty expensive business—in fact quite unjustifiable. The insurance argument, therefore, if considered from a financial point of view alone, is untenable.*

With due respect to General Chittenden's theories, we would like to know what individual or corporation figures the amount of insurance to be carried in that manner? We would like to know what insurance company figures its rates by that method? If that were the method employed, a million dollar factory which had sustained only \$5,000 loss by fire would need only \$5,000 or less of insurance; and a plant which never had a fire would need no insurance. In determining the risk on the mil-

* *War or Peace*, Brig. Gen'l Hiram M. Chittenden, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

lion dollar plant, which had sustained only \$5,000 loss by fire, the insurance company would charge one-half of one per cent, and in the case of the plant which had never suffered a fire would charge nothing.

In actual practice an owner figures the amount he should carry, and an insurance company figures the rate to be charged, not on what damage may have been done to that particular property in the past, but on what damage may be done in the future. That is estimated, in one case, by taking the total value of the plant, and in the other, by the experience of similar plants with that kind of loss. Therefore, in figuring what our war losses may be and how much we must regard as our principal sum of insurance, we should not average our past losses, but should take into consideration what other nations have lost through war. In doing so, we see that many of them have lost the nation itself, as such, and all that goes therewith. Poland, for instance, certainly lost much through war. The Aztec and North American Indians lost their all through conquest. Spain and France lost their American territory. Mexico lost California, Texas, and other territory through its war with the United States, and almost lost its entire existence, as a nation, in the time of our Civil War. Spain lost Cuba, the Philippines, and Porto Rico. Turkey lost Tripoli. France lost Alsace-Lorraine. Russia lost its hold on Korea.

China has been continually a prey to partition by the great and more powerful military states; and, finally, England lost all that the United States represented at the time of the War of the Revolution. So could an indefinite list be compiled of nations which have become entirely extinct as such, or where they have lost priceless portions of their possessions through conquest — both in ancient and modern times.

To estimate our probable future war losses at \$200,000,000 annually is absurd. In fact, it is absurd to attempt to place any estimate thereon. Rather must we be prepared to defend ourselves, or to lose any portion, or all, of our wealth. We must, moreover, include our right to control our internal affairs, such as what immigrants shall and shall not be admitted, on what terms they shall come here and hold land, and other matters of vital concern to our citizens, including the entire foreign policy of the United States. The very fact that England lost, through war, that which has grown into all the wealth of the United States today, shows that we might lose at least our entire national wealth if we could not defend it. Thus it is that General Chittenden's method of estimating our probable losses is entirely erroneous, and could not be maintained for an instant before any body of business men.

Comparing the amount spent for insurance

against war with other kinds of insurance, we find that for fire insurance alone the people of the United States pay \$406,336,104 per year, or \$161,336,104 more than the combined cost of the army, the navy, and the National Guard. This sum, moreover, is not for insurance against fire, but for insurance against loss by fire, and it does not even fully accomplish the latter end.

To reach a correct estimate of what we spend for insurance, against loss by fire and against fire itself, we must add to the four hundred and six and one-third million dollars spent as premiums for insurance the seventy-five million dollars expended in various forms on fire departments as an insurance against fire itself. Thus we find that in insuring only such portion of our wealth as is destructible by fire, we expend over twice as much as to insure the entire wealth of our nation against war.

For insurance against loss by burglary, the nation expends \$2,850,000 annually; for insurance against crime in the form of municipal, county, and state police we expend \$110,000,000 annually; making a total of \$112,850,000 expended for premiums on crime insurance alone. Hence, a total annual amount on fire and crime insurance combined is \$594,186,104, or about 350 million more than for all our military forces. Considering these figures we may conclude that our military expenditures are by no means greater than the probable loss by a

Is the Army and Navy a Burden?
Would it be better to have a larger army and navy?

war; that they are small compared with the amounts spent for fire and crime insurance, and that the insurance rate is low, compared with that for other kinds of insurance in effect in the business world (Plate 1).

Again, military force can show that for the amounts expended in premiums much return has been given, for under its "Paid to policy holders" column may be placed the birth of the original thirteen colonies as a nation, the saving of that nation in 1812, the accession of Texas and California and adjacent territory in the forties, the retention of almost one-half of our territory in the sixties, the freedom of the negro, the accession of Porto Rico, the freedom of Cuba, etc. Again we have items of infinite value upon which we will attempt to place no price. Who can accurately value these things?

It will be charged that error has been made in figuring the cost of our military force at its present peace strength, and failing to consider the times, notably during the Civil War, when our military establishment's cost increased manifoldly. It should be remembered, however, and will later be proved, that the cost of our wars were due to lack of military force, and not to their existence. It was lack of trained military force on the northern side which permitted the first southern success at Bull Run, thereby compelling the North to stand idle while the South continued its preparations in a manner which

COSTS OF INSURANCE

\$594,186,104

Annual Cost of Insurance Against Fire and Crime

\$245,000,000

Annual Cost of Insurance Against War

PLATE NO. 1

enabled it to prolong the struggle for four years. It was lack of trained forces that prevented our earlier success in all wars, and by prolonging them increased the cost. It was lack of trained forces that was responsible for the excessive amount of preventable diseases, and the thousands of stupid tactical blunders that have swelled the pension rolls of all our wars. These things were not due to military forces, but to their absence. Hence, their cost is an improper charge to our military arm.

Permit us to quote Henry C. Emery, Professor of Economics at Yale University:

I still recall vividly the first lecture which I heard at the University of Berlin when studying political economy as a young man at that institution. I had myself been brought up under the influence of the classical political economy, and rather accepted it at that time as an axiom that military expenditures, although perhaps necessary in some measure, were wasteful and regrettable, and should be reduced to the lowest terms. The first lecture I heard was in a course on public finance by Professor Wagner, recognized as the greatest authority on that subject in the world. The day of my arrival he was lecturing on military expenditures, and I shall never forget my revulsion of feeling as I heard him contrast the policy of Germany with the policy of the United States. Vigorously and skillfully he contrasted our policy in the days before the Civil War with the policy of Prussia in the years preceding the Austrian and French wars, and then showed the economic results of the two policies. We who had complacently congratulated our-

selves on saving our money were plunged into a stupendous conflict at a cost till that time unheard of, while Prussia annihilated Austria in a few weeks, and in a few months after the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War the Germans had every French army subdued or bottled up beyond the possibility of escape, and then was able to secure a huge indemnity to serve as the necessary capitalistic basis of the forward march of German industry.*

The second question for decision is as to whether or not the amount expended on military forces is out of proportion with our other expenditures. This question has called forth a large number of remarkably false statements from those who attempt to show that our military forces are a useless burden.

No matter how low the rate of insurance be, should a business house find that its insurance premiums were out of proportion with all other expenditures, it would be deemed necessary at least to investigate for the purpose of determining whether or not these expenditures were becoming burdensome and injurious to the welfare of the business. Thus, though we have shown that our present military expenditures give us a remarkably low rate of insurance, if we are paying a sum out of proportion to our expenditures for other purposes, the matter will stand investigation.

One of the most absurd and favored expressions

* *Some Economic Aspects of War*, Henry C. Emery, U. S. War Department.

of the peace fanatic is that the United States spends three-fourths of its revenue on military forces. As a matter of fact, the United States, according to the annual appropriation acts, and other Governmental documents, spends about one-quarter of the Federal Government's revenue for military forces, at the utmost. This, however, is beyond the question, for there is no just basis for comparison in these figures. It must be remembered that the \$240,000,000 spent annually by the Federal Government plus about \$5,000,000 expended annually on the National Guard by the various states, is the entire expenditure of this nation for military forces. The balance of the billion of dollars which the Federal Government expends annually is only a part of that spent for other governmental purposes. Every state, county, city, and town has its own source of revenue, and combined they appropriate vast sums for governmental necessities of every kind, but none for military forces. Our military forces cost but a trifling fraction of the amount spent by the city, county, state, and national governments for their governmental needs: and considering expenditures by private citizens for sidewalks and similar public purposes, the military sum becomes infinitesimal. The anti-militarist is fond of stunning his hearers with the stupendous cost of military forces as compared with the sums of money with which the average man is familiar. He neglects to point out the fact that

Governments are stupendous organizations, spending stupendous amounts of money to accomplish stupendous ends. It is thus that the sum spent on military forces must be considered, and not in comparison with one's own annual income.

As an example, we may quote the socialistic, or rather anarchistic, publication *War — What For*,* which in this case gives an excellent example of the comparisons which are favorite arguments with such men as Dr. David Starr Jordan, ex-President of Leland Stanford University:

One new type "Dreadnaught" of the sort now being constructed for the British Navy (which is to be practically duplicated by all other great powers), one of these monsters will cost three times as much as all of the noble buildings of the University of Chicago erected up to June 30, 1905; that is, three times as much as all the beautiful halls constructed during the University's past thirteen years of unparalleled activity in building.

Five per cent interest on the cost of one "Dreadnaught" would pay the combined salaries of 1,500 country school teachers at \$500 a year, or the combined salary of 750 country preachers at \$1,000 a year.

These are interesting statements, no doubt. Until we begin to think them over they seem to show an appalling waste. The comparisons, however, are about as just as it would be to compare the cost of

* *War — What For?* George R. Kirkpatrick, West LaFayette, Ohio.

your house with the cost of an egg. We are unused to thinking in the vast sums spent by our nation, but it is with these sums that we must compare the cost of our army and navy, not with the salary of a school teacher.

Using some interesting statistics presented by Vernon M. Cady in an illustrated lecture in connection with the International Congress on Hygiene and Demography, we find that the American people spend annually \$2,000,000,000 on intoxicating liquor, and \$1,200,000,000 on tobacco. The combined cost of these two items alone is \$3,200,000,000, or about thirteen times the amount spent annually on all of our military forces. Thus by curtailing these semi-vices one-thirteenth (which would be a great benefit to the nation), we could pay for our entire military establishment!

Other annual expenditures of the American people are \$3,000,000,000 for the social evil and diseases of vice (this not including the cost of the care of the sick, blind, insane, paralytics, or the expenses of infant funerals which Mr. Cady attributes to immorality). Jewelry and ornaments cost \$800,000,000, automobiles \$500,000,000, confectionery, and soft drinks, etc., \$452,000,000. All of these are equal or greater than the cost of our military forces. Comparing the cost of our army and navy with these expenditures we find that what was at first a titanic sum becomes lilliputian in comparison.

All of these (mostly vices) cost more annually than the insurance of our total wealth against war. Surely while a nation expends these amounts for pleasure and for evil we have greater fields for economy and for conserving our resources than is presented by the cost of our military protection (Plate 2).

Another favorite and misleading claim of those opposed to military forces, is that we expend more for the army and navy than for education. By referring to the annual appropriation acts of the United States Government, and adding the amount expended on the National Guard, it will be found that the military expenditures are very much less than half of the sum expended by this nation for education, the latter amount being secured from the report of the United States Commissioner of Education. The educational sum, moreover, is probably underestimated, as some of the cities and schools are not covered. Thus is another slander of military force disposed of.

It is because the Federal Government appropriates in one sum, for military force, while other expenditures are divided among states, municipalities or individuals that so many have fallen into the error of these false comparisons. Suppose, for instance, the Government purchased, controlled and distributed tobacco and liquor — an appropriation of \$3,200,000,000, three times the total Federal

SOME ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES



Liquor and Tobacco—\$3,200,000,000



Immorality—\$3,000,000,000



Jewelry—\$800,000,000



Automobiles—\$500,000,000



Soft Drinks, Candy, Etc.—\$152,000,000



Army, Navy and National Guard Combined—\$245,000,000

appropriation for all purposes. Suppose the Federal Government appropriated the hundreds of millions expended by state and municipal governments. This would cause no change in the cost to the citizens of the United States. It would, however, place military expenditures in their relative place and their seeming enormity would disappear.

Still another favorite argument of the anti-militarist is that the nation loses much because the soldier is a non-producer. This argument, however, is no sounder than is that of the "burden" of military expenditure. "Non-producer" is a much abused term. If it means all those who are not actually growing or manufacturing some article, then we must include ministers, teachers, lawyers, bankers, merchants, and certainly those engaged in all sorts of insurance, in which case the fact that a soldier does not continually manufacture or grow things himself is no reproach. He is but one of many useful men who do not actually produce, but who play an important — nay, necessary — part in national affairs. Furthermore, the soldier does produce, to some extent, in his arsenals, his engineering triumphs, his scientific discoveries, etc. Finally, if we include those other men as producers, then the soldier is a producer also.

Furthermore, the soldier, as we show in more detail later, is being educated to the advantage of the community. Says Professor Emery:

Much is frequently said regarding the economic waste which is involved in peace armaments, due to the fact that so large a number of adult young men are taken out of the ranks of industry year by year, thereby reducing the productive capacity of the community, since they might otherwise be employed in increasing the national wealth. The argument hardly applies in any serious way to an army such as ours, which is so small in proportion to our great population, but it is very questionable whether it even applies in a case like Germany, with its half million or more of men continuously under arms.

The same argument might easily be made regarding the number of able-bodied young people in our high schools, technical schools, and colleges. A few narrow-minded people deny the advantages of education altogether, and a still larger number are inclined to think that from the economic point of view education beyond the grammar school at least is a net loss to the community, and that the productivity of labor is not increased by education of this kind. I hope that education will still be advocated, even if it cannot be defended on purely economic ground, but I think that most intelligent people of the present day believe that in the long run the productivity of the people is increased by education, and that the growth of wealth is increased rather than decreased by education through our schools.

If the military training has educational results of the same kind, compulsory army service is nothing more than compulsory education. I think it is now the opinion of the most careful observers of German conditions that the military service of so many of her young men for two years acts exactly in this way. Youngsters are taken from

the quiescent life of the farm, or from the somewhat dangerous life of factory communities and are trained in promptness, diligence, obedience, cleanliness, and fidelity to duty. Furthermore, they are given actual instruction in various lines in the way of increasing their general intelligence, and they of necessity become in some measure familiar with the intricate mechanism of military weapons, which in itself gives a certain training in the knowledge of machinery.*

Germany's proportion of population in actual military service in time of peace is but one and one-tenth per cent. Her total trained strength, including all classes of reserves, is but six per cent of the total number of people, and even today, during the greatest of wars, it is most unlikely that the number of men in military service approaches ten per cent. In the United States only about eighty-five one-thousandths of one per cent (.00085) are in the Regular Army, and only thirteen one-hundredths of one per cent (.0013) in the army and navy combined.

The anti-militarist, defeated in his attempts to show that the cost of armament in America is excessive, turns naturally to the greater armaments of Europe. We are concerned principally with the United States, yet what today affects Europe may tomorrow affect this country, and, therefore, in order to meet those who cry out against the military burdens upon their own ground, we may consider the

* *Some Economic Aspects of War.*

foreign nations. This perhaps may be best done by further quotation from Emery:

Certainly Bloch * is not likely to minimize the extent of such expenditures, as he has been one of the leading writers to show the immensity of this burden, and yet he himself states that the military expenditures of different European countries vary from 2 per cent to 3.8 per cent of the *total* income. Even Germany, with her great organization, takes less than 3 per cent of the actual income for its maintenance, both of army and navy; and when we think of the expenditures for luxuries, many of them harmful in themselves, the extent of military expenditures appears even less. In Germany, for instance, three times as much is spent for intoxicating drinks as for the support of military and naval establishments. One-third less consumption of beer and liquor on the part of the German people would take care of this part of the budget altogether.†

If we can accept the standard reports and other publications of governments and of authorities of high repute, the figures in the foregoing chapter are in all essentials correct.

In the face of such clear and numerous statements only prejudice or ignorance, or a deliberate desire to attract the attention of the populace by an outcry against military forces can be responsible for the attitude of a person who claims that our military establishment in time of peace is an ex-

* *Future of War*, Jean de Bloch, World Peace Foundation, Boston.

† *Some Economic Aspects of War*.

pense disproportionate with the wealth of our nation.

We may conclude that, as long as wars are probable, military forces are a reasonable insurance.

CHAPTER II

A LESS EXPENSIVE SUBSTITUTE FOR TRAINED FORCES

IN THE foregoing chapter it has been assumed that wars are still possible, if not probable. For the present we will continue the assumption that nations will continue to resort to force from time to time, as occasion may offer or seem to offer a sufficient *casus belli*. The correctness of this assumption will be discussed in full in a further chapter. We have seen that under the above assumption military force is a comparatively inexpensive protection for the nation. To return, however, to our business comparison, our fourth point for determination is, in effect, Is there a cheaper protection that would be just as effective? In other words, can we find a less expensive but equally good insurance against defeat in war?

It is true that the cost of military force is small compared with other expenditures of the American nation. Yet this is no reason for spending even a comparatively small sum if we can attain the same results at less cost.

The favorite substitute for trained military forces, in so far as the United States is concerned,

is an "aroused citizenship"—the substitution of an army of untrained and inexperienced volunteers for the trained soldier. If this substitution is "just as good," then, as it is admittedly cheaper during peace, it is the more desirable form of defense.

The United States has, throughout its history, always experimented with the volunteer army, or its equivalent, the untrained militia. This country, better than any other, affords proof that the substitution of citizens *en masse* for a trained soldier is not an economy but a tremendous expense. The school boy—and the man growing from such a boy—would state that the successes of this country are conclusive proof of the practicability of the volunteer system. Such has been the American citizens' interpretation of the wars of the United States, their battles and the results thereof, as these things are shown in the historical textbooks used in our schools and colleges. It is thus that the American citizen, attributing false efficiency to the volunteer of the past, becomes converted to a belief that even the present small army, navy, and national guard are an unnecessary expense, and might well be greatly reduced, if not abolished. History, they believe, has shown the practical efficiency of the volunteer.

It is not our purpose to discuss the military needs of the United States at this point. We merely desire to show that the conclusions of those who believe in the efficiency of the volunteer are formed

on a totally erroneous presentation of the facts of history concerned.

At one time, it is true, armies fought with the same weapons with which the members thereof hunted, worked, and secured their dinner. Every man was familiar with the soldier's weapon, and there were as many, and more, of such weapons as there were men in the land. Even then, however, those who fought as unorganized individuals were no match for those who were organized, disciplined, and, to some extent, trained. Gradually as civilization progressed, the art of war, like all other arts and sciences, became one of specialization. Less and less did the weapon of the soldier resemble the tools or the arms of the civilian, until today the soldier's weapons are strange implements to all other trades and professions. Witness the early club, the battle axe, the bow and arrow, useful and used alike in domestic affairs and war. Witness the muzzle loading flint locks of the Colonial Wars and the Revolution — an implement hanging on every man's wall, used in the protection of the home against beast and man, for support and for subsistence — and witness the modern United States magazine rifle, model 1903, a high-powered weapon throwing a bullet over three miles, but with which the average civilian can hardly hit a six foot target 200 yards off. Again, witness the complex modern three-inch field piece of our field artillery, or the big caliber

rifles of our coast artillery and navy, both requiring the most skillful preparation in various sciences and in the art of their use. No civilian can learn to use these weapons in a short time, and no untrained mob as a mass of such civilians would be, can compete with any army previously trained, disciplined, and practiced in the use of modern implements of war.

Not only have the weapons of the modern soldier progressed in a manner which makes their effective use by civilians impossible, but the entire science of warfare has advanced to a degree that makes a lifetime of study insufficient for a complete mastery. No modern soldier will seriously claim that he has mastered the intricacies of this most complex science. Yet an officer of the United States Army studies four years at the United States Military Academy at West Point; graduating he joins his regiment and studies at the Garrison Schools; presumably, he continues his study in order to pass the examinations required for each promotion, and probably he is detailed at one of the Service Schools, including The Army School of the Line, The Army Staff College, The Army Signal School, The Army Field Engineer School at Fort Leavenworth, The Coast Artillery School at Fort Monroe, The Engineer School, Washington Barracks, D. C., The Army Medical School at Washington, D. C., The School of Fire for Field Artillery, or the School of Musketry at

Fort Sill, Okla., The Mounted Service School at Fort Riley, Kansas, or the Signal Corps Aviation School at San Diego, Cal. For enlisted men there are at every post schools of instruction. There are two schools for bakers and cooks at Washington Barracks and at San Francisco, and numerous other temporary provisions for the éducation of the military man. An officer also usually joins the Infantry, Cavalry, or Artillery Associations, the Military Service Institution of the United States, and similar organizations — all being associations for the purpose of increasing military knowledge. Finally, those who are fortunate and skillful enough are detailed to the Army War College at Washington. In the navy the science of war is equally complex, the officers study equally hard. Yet, none will claim that they have mastered this science.

It is thus that the officers of all foreign armies are trained, in similar schools and colleges — similar, but more complete. Foreign nations train sufficient men to completely officer the largest army that they would probably place in the field, but the United States, at present and in the past, has relied on the untrained citizen, not only as enlisted men but, as officers, to take the great responsibility of training and leading other men in war.

Not only is it impossible for the civilian to use the weapons of the modern soldier with effect, but, more important, it is impossible for the civilian to

assume the functions of the officer — the brains of an army — with success. Even an army of trained soldiers, lead by untrained officers, is doomed to defeat. And again, mere drill and mere knowledge of the use of the weapons and the tactics do not make an army; nor does the mere skill in tactics and mastery of the science of war make an efficient officer. It is the training which is necessary, and the training includes all these things and more. An army must be trained to work with the smoothness of a machine, with the skill and cunning of the greatest human minds, and with the firmness of the ever undismayed.

The psychology of war is one of the most important of the studies of the modern officer, and it is found that the behavior of the ordinary human being on the battle field is one of the strangest and most indeterminable of matters. It is only when the civilian has been trained to the soldier and when the officers, with the aid of the training which the men have received, have mastered the art of commanding the natural impulses of the men, that an army can obtain "the firmness requisite for the real business of fighting." Thus it is that the infantryman, whom the average American believes can be made in a few months, requires, rather, years of careful training.

Our statements, moreover, need not be left as such. Although the advances of the science of war

have tremendously strengthened the truths which we have stated, these were, nevertheless, established in our early history. They are truths which are by no means new, but which have merely become more and more evident with the lapse of time.

In a subsequent chapter on the history of our wars we shall show that in each of these wars we have been compelled to use a large number of raw troops against an enemy numerically much inferior. This, of course, is a source of much expense. We shall also demonstrate that all of these wars were unduly prolonged, due to the inability of the untrained troops to stand against the trained enemy, until, through time and experience, the citizen finally became a soldier. These facts have many times increased the cost of every war in which the United States has participated.

The volunteer, in the United States, is but a citizen without training. The militiaman, in the true sense of the word, is the same; the legal militia consisting of all able-bodied males between eighteen and forty-five years of age. When one of the citizens between these ages volunteers it is but a change of name, for the act of enlisting is not a training and cannot make a soldier. Only after the war is prolonged owing to their inability to defeat the trained enemy, does either volunteer or militiaman become a finished soldier. The words of Washington apply equally to both kinds of untrained troops:

Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offence, and when a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. . . . The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence.

Again,

If I were called upon to declare under oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or most harmful, upon the whole, I should subscribe to the latter.

These utterances by the immortal Washington, if altered slightly in form, become axioms. A careful study of our military history leaves no doubt of their truth. *The United States Infantry Journal* quotes Professor Charles S. Spooner, President of the Vermont Peace Society, and one of its active founders, as having made the following statement in this respect:

It is absolutely true that had enough been spent on our military establishment to make it an effective force in 1860 — only a moiety of the cost of the war — there would have been no war. . . . It still remains that the cost was and is far greater than necessary if proper expenditures had

been made before the fact instead of during and after it. Insurance of life and property, by preventing the loss thereof, is worth all the "premiums" expended in that prevention.

In 1860 we relied, to all practical purposes, on the rise of the citizens *en masse*. The regular army numbered only 17,000 men. The balance were militia or volunteers, and the first battle of Bull Run is an example of their effectiveness — an example of an attempt to substitute the citizen, *en masse*, for the trained soldier.

Fortunate indeed it was that the South itself was only slightly better prepared; that it had not a trained army such as Germany, France, or Japan have today.

R. M. Johnston, Assistant Professor of History at Harvard University, and the chairman of the Military History Committee of the American Historical Association, has recently published some excellent articles in this connection, from one of which we take the liberty of quoting at length, by Professor Johnston's permission:

The United States have never suffered one of those great military reverses, like Jena or Sedan, that shake the foundations of national existence, that modify national thought, and that generations later still bring a blush to the face and a qualm to the heart of the lover of his country. Bull Run has been, as yet, our nearest approach to anything of the kind. It was more discreditable to us than Jena was

to Prussia, than Sedan was to France, and it revealed dangers commensurate with those which those two disasters revealed; but it was a family affair, it was an incident in a political program, and it did not bring ruin to the state. Steadily minimized by all who were responsible for it, and not understood by the general public, it was quickly set aside as one of the disagreeable occurrences about which the least said is the soonest mended.

But to turn over once more to the reports of those who fought there, to jog along the Warrenton turnpike where the fugitives scurried in mad retreat under the spur of Kemper's shells, to reconnoiter the ford of that ditch-like stream that cost McDowell so many efforts to cross, all this makes one's mind vividly alive to the hideous mistakes, the wanton throwing away of human life, all the military inefficiency and political inaptitude that marked the first battle of the Civil War. Let us see how its significance may fairly be estimated as we look back upon it at the present day.

What in military terms was the value of those two armies of 30,000 men each that met at Bull Run: as to mobility; the higher command; staff; organization; discipline and cohesion; material; tactics? The percentage of efficiency under each one of these heads was extraordinarily low, under some of them almost nil. In other words, a small force, properly efficient in every respect, say one brigade with one battery, under a general trained to maneuver a brigade, could have done almost anything it pleased on the field of Bull Run. Such, at all events, is the impression that a study of the battle creates.

Assuming this or something like to have been the case, an

important deduction inevitably follows. When the Civil War broke out, the so-called army of the United States amounted to less than 17,000 men. These troops were dispersed, a company here and a company there, mostly in the western territories, holding distant outposts against the Indians and policing the plains. In fact, for purposes of war, there was then, very much as today, no army; all the regular infantry that could be scraped together for McDowell, on three months' notice, amounting to two battalions only. Of these one consisted of three hundred marines who were enlisted on the 1st of July and sent into battle twenty days later. Napoleon in his most furious moments would have hesitated at spilling blood and spoiling regiments in such a way as that!

Have we ever sufficiently considered what would have happened in 1861 had the United States possessed not a bloated military establishment but a little army in the real sense of the word, say 60,000 to 100,000 men? In the latter case it is clear that we would have possessed a safe and cheap insurance against a civil war, against the loss of hundreds of millions of property, against economic depression, almost bankruptcy, against what some modern writers argue was an actual reduction of the national vitality. For with 100,000 men enrolled, it is probable that from 25,000 to 30,000 regulars could have been collected with some promptness and sent to Richmond, to New Orleans, and to such other southern cities where conditions seemed more dangerous. Any seditious tendencies would have been stamped out long before effective military resistance could have been organized. With a total of no more than 60,000 men, this might not have been possible, but at all events

the administration would have been able to give McDowell a division of 8,000 to 10,000 regulars; and that might have made of Bull Run and of the Civil War a very different story.*

General Chittenden, referring to this, takes the ground that Bull Run affords no proof of our contention owing to the fact that, had there been a larger, efficient regular army, it would have divided between North and South. The general, however, points out the fallacy of his own argument when he says:

The North at this time was backward and irresolute, for it dreaded the irrevocable step of coercion and sought reconciliation until the rupture actually came. It carefully avoided even the appearance of a purpose to use force.†

If we ask why the North "dreaded coercion" we see the effect of lack of military power. The North realized that it was weak — and therefore hesitated. The South, realizing the National Government's weakness, was encouraged and became resolute. The Government, moreover, accepted, almost with haste, every resignation from an officer which was offered, knowing full well that these men were retiring to enter service with the South. It almost encouraged such resignations.

* *The Significance of Bull Run*, The U. S. Infantry Journal, Sept.-Oct., 1913.

† *War or Peace*.

General Emory Upton, in his book *The Military Policy of the United States* (U. S. War Department), says:

This unfortunate policy deprived many officers of their last plea for remaining true to their country. Beset by the importunities of their kindred, reproached for forsaking them, left alone to decide the momentous question, whether it was to their states or to the Union that they owed a paramount allegiance, many at last with bitter regret cast in their lot with secession.

The responsibility for accepting the resignations rests with no particular individual. The policy was begun by a Secretary of War notoriously disloyal, but was continued by his successors, with the sanction presumably of two presidents and their cabinets.

General Joseph E. Johnston, who was Quartermaster General of the United States Army, before resigning to become a general officer of the Confederacy, shows Upton's theories to be correct, saying:

An officer *is bound** by that oath of allegiance to the United States and obedience to the officers they may set over him. When the contract between the Government and himself is dissolved by mutual consent, as in the cases in question, he is no more bound under his oath to allegiance to the Government than to obedience to his former commander. These two obligations are in force only during tenure of office. The individual who was an officer has,

* Italics are ours.

when he becomes a citizen, exactly the same obligations to the United States as other citizens.*

Even, however, with this lack of foresight, which is to be expected in a government, which prepares so illy for war, Upton's statistics show that seventy-seven per cent of the graduates of the United States Military Academy remained loyal, including fifty per cent of those of southern birth. Only twenty-six enlisted men of the United States Army are known to have joined the South, and out of an aggregate of 16,367 officers and enlisted men in the Regular Army, only 339, or less than three per cent were shown to have been disloyal. This hardly indicates that a larger trained force would have divided.

Moreover, had General Chittenden's contention, that a larger army would have benefited the South and North equally, been a sound one, it would, in no sense, affect our main argument. We do not anticipate another Civil War — though it is not impossible — but we consider a foreign war more likely. It is against such a possibility that we are warning, and we but use Bull Run as an illustration. We could easily discard Bull Run and place a highly trained German or French or Japanese Army on the one side, and an army composed of a few Regulars, a few Guardsmen, and a host of raw volunteers on

* *Narrative of Military Operations*, J. E. Johnston, D. Appleton & Company.

the other. Such a condition would afford us a much more convincing, if more horrible, example — which we can but pray God will never come.

Citizens *en masse* are not soldiers. Courageous and hardy though they be, they cannot afford the same protection as a trained military force, and hence do not afford an equally good insurance against war.

CHAPTER III

THE LIKELIHOOD OF WAR TODAY

HAVING assumed that wars are probable in order to reach our conclusion that military force is but a proper insurance, it becomes desirable to prove our assumption. We have two great classes of men who feel that war can be abolished, both dreamers varying rather more in methods than in their danger to the nation, and both classes having certain elemental truths as a foundation upon which they base widely-distorted theories; theories as different as are the entirely opposite classes of men belonging to each school. We refer to the socialists and the pacifists.

Many writers ignore the doctrine of the socialist as ridiculous anarchistic rot, which is the proper designation of the most widely circulated publications of this class. Yet these are writings whose effect is too great to permit their being entirely ignored by those who have the interests of their nation at heart. It is not because the arguments of the socialist will bear investigation and thought, but because their writings are circulated among men who are sufficiently well educated to read, but not learned enough to refute the incorrect statements or to

discern the fallacies which the socialist sets forth. Thus the socialist parasite lives by distributing his skillfully worded writings among those sufficiently ignorant to purchase and read the work, but unable to comprehend the viciousness of the thought.

The socialist argues that war is for capital alone; that the working man does the fighting, bears the brunt of the loss, and gains nothing; while the capitalist does no fighting, suffers no loss, but gains all that is gained in the war. As a means of preventing the wars which they oppose so bitterly, the socialist suggests that the working man refuse to fight at what they term, the "bid of their superiors." Many wars, however, are due to the outcry of the public. Many of them are for the benefit of labor; and labor, which the socialist doctrine counts upon for its strength, is oftentimes the first to demand war. Nor are these mere arbitrary statements, as we will shortly demonstrate. It is because of this fact that the socialist's hopes of persuading the "common people" to refuse to fight are vain. They will not refuse it; they will rather demand the armed struggle in protection of their interests.

The pacifists may be divided into two main classes — those who favor arbitration as a settlement, and the few who cry for peace at any price. A third class growing in number and presenting the most conservative, reasonable, and forceful arguments, are those who are of the school of Norman Angell,

the author of *The Great Illusion*. This school studies the question from a strictly economic, businesslike viewpoint, and the errors and omissions are few, though important. Their arguments are well summed up in the following illustrative questions which Mr. Angell asks, and in one sentence, answers:

Is it true that the wealth, prosperity and welfare of a nation depend upon its military power, or have necessarily anything whatever to do therewith?

Can one civilized nation gain moral or material advantage by the military conquest of another?

Does conquered territory add to the wealth of the conquering nation?

Is it possible for a nation to "own" the territory of another in the way that a person or corporation would "own" an estate?

Could Germany "take" English trade and colonies by military force?

Could she turn English colonies into German ones, and win an overseas empire by the sword as England won hers in the past?

Does a modern nation need to expand its political boundaries in order to provide for increasing population?

If England could conquer Germany tomorrow, completely conquer her, reduce her nationality to so much dust, would the ordinary British subject be the better for it?

If Germany could conquer England would any ordinary German subject be the better for it?

The fact that all these questions have to be answered in the negative and that a negative answer seems to outrage

common sense, shows how much our political axioms are in need of revision.*

The one great fact, that which all of these schools (with the partial exception of Mr. Angell) either overlook or minimize, is that there are questions arising which involve absolutely vital interests, and yet which are so finely balanced that each party may be absolutely sincere and, in his own mind, positive in the belief that his is the side of right. Under these conditions, each party believing that there is nothing questionable in the case, will refuse to risk what it holds to be a vital point in arbitration or otherwise.

Should it ever occur that the total wealth, or the sweetheart, or the wife of a giant be claimed by a man of much smaller stature and inferior strength; should both men appeal to an arbiter who had no means of enforcing his decision, and should it be that the giant would willingly give up his all — the possessions beyond price — merely at the word of the third party; should this be the attitude of all human beings; should all human beings be so constituted morally and intellectually that they will in this manner surrender their own absolute convictions, and thereby their most prized earthly possessions and attachments willingly and without force, at the mere statement of some tribunal that they are

* *The Great Illusion*, Norman Angell, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York.

in the wrong, then it may be that nations will do likewise, but until this be so, it will require force to compel any nation to surrender in vital questions of this kind.

Neither are the majority of arbitrationists, some socialists, or the pacifists of Mr. Angell's school either fools or ignoramuses. Neither do the majority or the true leaders of these movements support the absurd theories that the day of war is past, though, as has apparently always been the case, there are those impractical men who will support any theory. Hence we hear today the statement "This is the last war." It has been said that the earliest histories show that there were those who clung to the belief that the dawn of the era of peace was at hand. Surrounded by strife and war both actual and threatened, these men saw only peace. Certain it is that just before our Civil War members of the United States Senate asserted with conviction that there would never be another great war, and a bill was introduced in Congress to abolish the navy. In his *History of Civilization* Buckle made the same claim. Yet while Buckle was writing his book the Crimean struggle was at its height.

A few months ago Dr. David Starr Jordan, ex-President of Leland Stanford University, took the same point of view when he said: "It is apparently not possible for another real war among the nations of Europe to take place."

So will men continue to dream until the end of time, and likewise, no doubt, wars will come regularly in so far as any who read this book may be on earth to witness. Since the prophecies of such men that war was at an end, we have had some of the greatest international struggles in the history of the world, as examples of which we need only give the more modern, such as the present European War, the American Civil, Franco-Prussian, Chino-Japanese, Russo-Japanese, Anglo-Boer, Spanish-American, Turko-Italian, Balkan wars, and revolutions and minor struggles too numerous for us to mention. Those alive today have seen sufficient of these struggles to at least discredit somewhat these dreamers both in the past and in the present.

No doubt Doctor Jordan is in many subjects a most learned man. His views on the possibilities of a war in which the United States would be a participant as written in letters to *The Army and Navy Journal*, dated August 25, and October 24, 1912, are in part as follows:

If it be true that "Army experts of the highest standing have asserted that one Oriental Power could land a large army on our Pacific coast before we could properly make arrangements for the defense of a single big California seaport if we did not hear of the proposed movement of the invading troops until they had really embarked," then Army experts are indulging in flights of fancy at our expense. They speak from "the military point of view," and in this

case the "military point of view," has little in common with reality.

There is not "one Oriental Power" which would send an army against us if it could. The interests of Oriental Powers all lie in Asia. There is not one Oriental Power which could send "a large army" against us if it would. The war with Russia has exhausted the financial resources of Japan, both as to possible borrowing and as to possible taxation. Wars today must mostly be fought with money, a weapon which great armaments rapidly exhausts. The war in Manchuria cost Japan a million and a half a day for nearly a year and a half. There are no more millions and a half to be had from her loyal, patient, but debt-crushed people.

As to the predicament of having violated a treaty, if such a thing has really occurred, we are reasonable enough to mend our ways or rich enough to bluff it through without the use of the Navy.

And again:

The nation is in no danger whatever from any quarter by land or by sea. There is not a conceivable enemy unless we create it by direct attack; not a nation which would fight us if it could, not one which could fight us if it would, for the sinews of war are not soldiers, nor warships. They consist of reserves of money, of commerce and of friendships. This is the only great nation that possesses such reserves.

In this we find that Doctor Jordan is apparently better acquainted with the military possibilities of

various nations than are the men who, as professional soldiers, make these matters their life study. He takes the attitude that they cannot fight us — that no nation has the power, the strength, the resources. To him, it means nothing that our War College, all our various secretaries of war, all army officers, as well as all civilians who have studied the question express exactly the opposite view. Doctor Jordan would perhaps resent as impertinent a soldier's essay on the proper way to conduct Leland Stanford University, and the probable usefulness of the money expended thereon. He would do so rightly, for it is probable that the soldier would be entirely ignorant of his subject. We will assume that our inference in this case is obvious.

To make statements of this kind when one must, or, at least, should know that there are three great nations with practically equal or greater navies than our own, and other nations whose navies have strategical advantages, that every one of the great foreign powers has a land force from five to twenty times more powerful, and when (as we will later prove) the majority of these countries have at least the necessary wealth and resources or borrowing power to carry on a war, is to invite the ridicule which Doctor Jordan has met in many quarters. To continue such statements in the face of the European War is incomprehensible.

We have stated, however, that the greater num-

ber of those in favor of peace are in no sense ignoramuses. We have previously quoted the President of Norwich University, an ardent peace advocate. Another peace advocate who has taken the trouble to study his subject and thereby reach an intelligent conclusion as to the present possibility of war, is Dr. Charles W. Eliot, president emeritus of Harvard University, and trustee of the Carnegie Peace Foundation. *The Army and Navy Journal* quotes Doctor Eliot as having said:

I would not be willing to come out and state broadly that the nations are taking seriously the idea of universal peace. There is a strong sentiment for it everywhere, of course, but such a sentiment is as old as the hills and has been found more or less in all times and climes.

I regret to say that international or national disarmament is not taken seriously by the leaders and thinking men of the more important peoples, and I fear that for one reason or another neither the classes nor the masses have much admiration for the idea or would be willing to do their share to bring it about.

But I cannot honestly say that I found evidences of sincere governmental desire for widespread peace. Some of the leaders in various countries are sincerely devoted to the splendid principle of arbitration and are opposed to war on various unselfish grounds, but I fear that the time is not yet here when the truly strong men — the men who are in power or who may be in power tomorrow — are unequivocally on the side of reason and humanity as opposed to the sword and savagery.

Probably the most conservative, accurate and advanced thought in the subject of present day armament comes from one whom no one can charge with prejudice in favor of military force. Angell, in his anti-war book, makes the following statement, which at once eliminates all of the excellent arguments of his own work, *The Great Illusion*, as far as peace in the present day is concerned:

I do not expose the folly of "defense in nations." I do not object to spending money on armament at this juncture. On the contrary, I am particularly emphatic in declaring that *while the present philosophy is what it is,** we are bound to maintain our relative position with other powers. . . . What I do attempt to make plain is that the necessity for defense measures (which I completely recognize and emphatically counsel) implies on the part of some one a motive for aggression, and the motive arises from the (at present) universal belief in the social and economic advantage accruing from successful conquests.

Sentiments of this kind expressed by a peace advocate in his writings, cause a soldier to wish the publication a wide circulation. They are reasonable, conservative, and true.

Thus it is. Casting aside for the present all question as to the possible feasibility of abolishing war at some future day, it remains a fact that wars are not only possible but probable at the present time.

* The italics are ours.

The United States far from being so situated that it is likely to avoid all international complications, is equally if not more apt, to find itself embroiled with other powers than are many of the nations of Europe. Almost all writers agree that our Monroe Doctrine, if maintained at all, may be regarded as having the greatest possibilities for war of any policy of a modern nation. Not only do we protect our own nation, but also almost the entire Western Hemisphere. Whenever any of the vast foreign interests in this territory, or the desire of a foreign nation to acquire greater interests, cause controversy, then does a complication arise that may cause war. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Columbia, Mexico, Honduras and other South American nations have afforded many examples of this fact. Not only in the grave matter of foreign colonization in America, but in the protection of foreign capital, foreign subjects and their interests on this hemisphere, do questions involving possible war arise. The essentials of the Monroe Doctrine read:

The occasion has been deemed proper for asserting, as a principle in which rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers

to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.

How is this *extension of systems* that is considered "dangerous to our peace and safety" to be prevented? Obviously by military force or by threatened military force. Hence we have a cause for possible war whenever a foreign nation, knowing its superior military strength, may consider that the advantages of colonization in America outweigh the possible disadvantages of the war.

Homer Lea's *The Valor of Ignorance*, in many respects one of the most remarkable of politico-military writings, is correct in all absolute essentials, and the most frequent criticism, that of exaggeration, can only be held true in regard to details or figures which in no way affect the general excellence of the work, as a presentation of the militarist's case for war. In regard to the Monroe Doctrine, General Lea says:

How unreasonable it is, therefore, to expect that the combined nations of Europe, with all their military strength, shall remain restricted to one-twelfth of this world's land, burrowed into and hewn over for the last thousand years, while this Republic, without armies, shall maintain dominion over one-half the unexploited lands of the world! Or that Japan, possessed of two-thirds the population of this nation and a military organization fifty-fold greater, shall continue to exist on her rocky isles that are, inclusive of Korea, but one-two-hundred-and-fiftieth of the earth's lands, while an undefended one-half lies under the guns of her battleships!

What prevents the occupation of this vast and rich continent by powers having military capacity? The defensive ability of the Latin republic is, proportionately, no greater against European or future Asiatic military aggression than was the defensive capacity of the aborigines against the first European conquerors. Ordinarily, it is believed that the dictum of this Republic, the Monroe Doctrine, has been responsible for their immunity against foreign aggressions. Nothing could be further from the truth.

There have been five separate causes productive of Mexican, Central and South American exemption from foreign conquest:

- (1) Inadequacy of transportation and communication.
- (2) Adjustment of European political conditions.
- (3) Duration of the pre-inventive or non-mechanical period.
- (4) A correspondingly low demand for natural resources.
- (5) The seclusion of the Oriental races.

One by one we have seen these sources of immunity vanish and antithetic conditions imperceptibly take their

place, increasing each year in cumulative intensity. Herein lies the inevitability of war between this Republic and European as well as Asiatic nations, or a complete repudiation of the Monroe Doctrine. In the history of mankind never before has one nation attempted to support so comprehensive a doctrine as to extend its political suzerainty over two continents comprising a fourth of the habitable earth and one-half of its unexploited wealth, in direct defiance of the whole world, and without the slightest semblance of military power, nor possessing any right to regulate the domestic or foreign policy of numerous and irresponsible political entities that simmer and sweat within two-thirds of its suzerainty.

The Monroe Doctrine is Promethean in conception, but not so in execution. It was proclaimed in order to avoid wars: now it invites them.*

During the debates on the fortification of the Panama Canal, and upon the tolls question, numerous issues, which may some day bring on war, were shown to exist. This canal, furthermore, will cause questions to arise in the future, possibly of a much graver nature and still more provocative of war. Making as we will the regulations under which much of the maritime commerce between the Atlantic and the Pacific will pass, we will find the flag of every nation passing through that canal, and the controversies that can arise therefrom are innumerable. A nation taking a responsibility of this kind and bringing itself

* *The Valor of Ignorance*, Homer Lea, Harper & Brothers, New York.

into the most intimate relations with all other powers of the world is surely liable to find itself involved in war as long as wars continue upon this earth.

Referring to the canal, Lewis Nixon, one of the greatest marine authorities, says:

We shall have to fight some day for the canal, unless we are willing to give up most of our rights in it without fighting, and adopt the policy of acquiring property, developing it, and giving it away to foreigners.*

Furthermore, between Japan and the United States there are numerous and serious questions which will not be decided for years to come, unless it be by force of arms. All of these are matters so delicate as to be classed among those questions most provocative of war. Large among these looms the question of the relations with Japanese emigrants in the United States, and, in addition, those desirous of coming to this country. These persons acquire land, they underbid American labor, and secure the positions of American laborers; they secure white mistresses, their male adults demand admission to American public schools. The American looks upon the proud Japanese as of an inferior race; he does not want him as a neighbor; he is jealous of the positions which the Japanese may secure; he will not have his child-daughter brought up with a Japanese male adult. These controversies, due to difference

* *New York Herald.*

of race, religion, characteristics, and morals, as well as to agricultural and commercial rivalry, are the kind that arouse the passions of man. Hatred, jealousy, fear, pride, contempt, all powerful agencies indeed, are stirred up by these matters, and these are the agencies that may at any time precipitate conflict between nations.

Only a few years ago, an incident reported widely in the press of both countries occurred at Pasadena, California. The accounts stated that a certain hotel had planned a grand ball in honor of Admiral Yashiro and his officers — a Japanese squadron at that time being nearby. American society girls, however, remarked that they would “just as soon dance with niggers,” and in consequence the ball was postponed. Said the *New York Herald*, shortly after :

When the school children of North Beach, in their best bib and tucker, accepting what was supposed to be an invitation to go aboard the Japanese war ships, were about to take the cars for San Pedro a curt telegram from Rear Admiral Yashiro informed them that they would not be received.

True or not, that is a question which makes no difference. The fact that the dispatches telling of this seemingly trivial incident were published all through the United States and Japan is what counts. Americans have forgotten the incident, but do you think that the Japanese have done so? Would

America have forgotten had the insult or fancied insult been reversed? It was perhaps too trivial to warrant an official explanation, but it is the kind of thing that rankles in the breast of the patriotic citizen of any country. These little incidents occurring frequently in our western states are brooders for the passions that can bring on war.

Nor can financial and commercial consideration act as a strong preventive of war, either now or in the future, Doctor Jordan excepting. This we shall consider at length in a succeeding chapter. General Chittenden, the pacifist, sees and admits all these possible war causes in his work *War or Peace*, as do all other careful students of our international relations.

Surely, as eminent peace advocates state, the era of universal peace is not yet at hand. Certainly the United States enjoys no special dispensation which will excuse it from the wars which are common to all nations.

CHAPTER IV

WILL WAR EVER BE ABOLISHED?

WHETHER or not arbitration, disarmament, socialism, finance, commerce, new economic theories or some hitherto unknown agency may some day entirely abolish war, we cannot pretend to state. Certain it is that but little progress has as yet been made toward that end; and equally certain is it that neither history of the past, present day facts, or arguments of the pacifists afford much encouragement for the future. It is too much, however, for one to state that facts, convincing though they be today, will not be altered with the passing of time. We cannot foresee accurately the world of the future because one unforeseen change may upset all calculations. We can, however, consider facts both past and present and determine what the future must be until the present essential facts or laws are changed.

Thus it is that we are limited in considering the probability of perpetual peace in future years. We can determine its possibilities under existing laws of nature, but none is so wise as to know positively that these laws may not some day change. We cannot foresee these changes — to our human mind they

seem impossible — and we must, therefore, apply laws and facts as they exist today. By so doing we will find that neither arbitration, socialism, economy, or philosophy are likely to bring peace — that disarmament or limitation of armament appear to be as far off as ever, and that wars will probably continue till the end of mankind. The arbitrationist hopes to end war by a tribunal of justice; the socialist by convincing the masses that it is in their interest not to fight; the school of Angell by convincing the world that the victor gains nought through war; disarmamists (feeling that military force causes war) by doing away with that force.

For the purpose of illustration of the impracticability of any of these methods under the laws of nature as they are today, we will present an imaginary situation arising between the United States and Japan, and attempt to apply the various methods for peace thereto. We do not say that such a situation will ever arise, yet it is one that is by no means improbable. We are not desirous of selecting any nation as our probable enemy and, therefore, we do not express, herein, our opinions as to the imminence of the Japanese question; merely do we present an imaginary condition of affairs which might well be the outgrowth of matters as they now stand.

Let us assume that Japan with a population of sixty-seven million, or two-thirds of that of the United States, and an area only one-third larger than

our state of California, shall find it absolutely necessary to secure additional territory. Let us assume that the Japanese — not as a nation perhaps, but as individuals — shall turn their eyes towards America; that it is America that offers the greatest advantages. Assume that because of this, Japanese population in the United States shall increase, and as has been found the case, the Japanese through cheap labor, low necessities, and thriftiness, shall oust the white man from positions; from ownership of farms, and so on indefinitely.

It will be said that such a matter is not pressing; that the Japanese could go elsewhere. Possibly, but possibly they would not be welcome elsewhere. Possibly at some time in the future the yellow races may find all their territory so crowded that they must expand on territory occupied by the white man. Possibly it will be that conditions Oriental will be such as to make imperative their emigration to the Occident. We must remember that we are considering the possibility of absolutely abolishing war. Hence, we are justified in considering these possible conditions in order to determine whether or not all questions may in the future be settled without recurring to arms.

Mr. Angell, whom we have said to be the most practical of pacifists, maintains that neither vanquished nor victor as nations nor as individuals gain by war. He would, if we understand his theories,

urge the admission of the yellow man. Suppose we do so. The white man is underbid in labor, is forced from his ownership of land, etc., at this day in our Pacific coast states. Should the yellow population increase and spread throughout this country, what would the result be? Would not these conditions increase on our Pacific coast? Would they not spread throughout the country? And from thence would it not be but a step to finding the yellow man in actual control of the nation?

We can see today the remnant of a once mighty race herded like cattle on reservations, wards of the nation, mere traces of the vast Indian tribes that once roamed the North American continent, mere degenerates of the strong characters which belonged to the red men of the fifteenth century. What Indian Chief of four hundred years ago would have acknowledged the possibility of such conditions? What man of today, knowing the intelligence, the skill, the craftiness, the thriftiness, the strength and the endurance of the wiry Japanese — knowing the manner in which they have already commenced to supplant the white man on the Pacific coast — would say that actual Asiatic domination is impossible in case unlimited yellow immigration should be permitted? The Japanese are not an inferior race, but they are a vastly different one, and their peopling the same country with Americans is a matter which will not stand the test of time. Nor can the nation retain its glory

which attempts to assimilate such a characteristically different people. Mexico and other South American countries afford an excellent example of nations peopled by mixed bloods of this character. Their kind are those who retard their nation.

No American expects that the yellow man will ever control this country, no American expects to see the country peopled by a mixture of the yellow and the white blood. This for the simple reason that as long as may be necessary we expect to see that yellow immigration is stopped, whether it be by the so-called "gentleman's agreement" of the present, by compliance with future American laws, or by military force.

Can it be that nothing would be gained by American citizens in a successful war to prevent such incursions of foreigners of such an aggressive but different race? And can it be that there are those who cannot see that in the future as in the past nations will find it necessary to secure new territory for their surplus population? And it cannot be, we are sure, that there are men who will maintain that individual Japanese citizens, as well as the Japanese nation, would gain nothing were their crowded conditions relieved and their citizens permitted to gain such a foothold in a new and rich country.

Thus it is that any nation finding its territory and national resources insufficient for its natural growth of population may be compelled to insist that its

citizens be permitted to emigrate. Thus it is that any nation may find it necessary to go to war to secure the necessary relief. Thus it is that any nation may gain materially by a war, which gives it at the same time relief from its crowded conditions and the control of a vast new territory. Here at least is a case where, Mr. Angell to the contrary, a nation may gain by war. There are still other similar conditions; we have selected but one almost self-evident example. Not always do we find the element of radical racial difference, but in a lesser degree the same is true whenever one nation comes in conflict with another.

Shall we submit a question of this kind to arbitration? Would America do so? Would Japan do so? If so, to whom? America, feeling that its national existence was threatened, would certainly never consent to a tribunal predominated by the Orient. Japan, knowing that new territory and new resources were essential as an outlet for her increasing population, would not consent to a tribunal predominated by the Occident. Equality would mean a deadlock.

Assuming, however, that either government were unwise enough to submit such a question to arbitration, assuming that a decision were reached, could the tribunal, even if supported by the American government, enforce an adverse decision on the American people? Could arbitration, even if supported by the Japanese government, confine the yellow man to

the area that had been found cramped and incapable of supporting the population? Not in either case without civil war. Nor in either case would it be attempted.

It is thus in determining the fallacy of arbitration as a preventive for war under such conditions that we find the fallacy of the socialist propaganda for the education of the masses to refuse to fight. From whence would come the demand for war to exclude the yellow man under the conditions which we have quoted? From whom, among the crowded yellow race, would come the demand to fight for the privilege of expansion? From the masses in both cases. They as the sufferers would be the first to cry for war, and no amount of socialist literature could convince them that it was capital that was forcing the struggle. In this and in most other cases it will be the masses that will cry for war, and even the converted socialist will cry "but this is different!"

That finance and commerce can prevent war, and that the United States in particular through financial and commercial power is, therefore, supreme, is one of the most easily disposed of arguments of the pacifist. We could quote history at length to show the fallacy of these contentions, but it is unnecessary, for within the memory of living men there is sufficient proof.

There are two ways in which finance is supposed to prevent war. First, through the inability of nations

to borrow the money to carry on the conflict, and, second, by the financial interdependence of the various nations. As for the first, we saw General Huerta losing steadily. We read daily dispatches from Washington to the effect that he was bankrupt and could hold out no longer, and still we saw his fighting capacity diminished only by defeat and not by lack of money. We have seen the Balkan allies — probably the poorest nations on earth — finance a modern war which cannot be classed as small, and we have seen the poorest of South American Republics constantly financing wars and revolutions. If we care to glance into history, we would find that never has there been a war, no matter how unequal the struggle at its incipency, but that both sides were able to secure money at the start. This has been so with nations where victory seemed impossible.

The nation most often pointed out as one which could not again make war on account of its poverty, is Japan. Yet Japan, not as well prepared financially as Russia at the beginning of the war, was victorious. When money was desired for this war, recourse was made to loans, the first being an inner loan of \$50,000,000, five per cent, at 95. This loan was four times oversubscribed. The second loan, an outer loan of \$50,000,000, six per cent, at 93½, repayable at par in 1911, was oversubscribed thirty times. Next an inner loan of seven-year treasury bonds at 92 was issued, also for \$50,000,000, this being three

times oversubscribed, and shortly after, a similar issue of \$40,000,000 of these bonds was two and one-half times oversubscribed. Just before the conclusion of the war, another inner loan of \$150,000,000 was oversubscribed. In fact, a complete story of Japan's finances throughout the war would be but a repetition of facts similar to the above. The Japanese war loans caused the national debt to be increased by only twenty-two per cent, and there is no reason why an increase of less than one-quarter in the national debt should destroy the great capacity which Japan showed for raising money. As a matter of fact, Japan, since the Russian War, has been spending money on military establishments in a manner that is in itself no trifle and which indicates that her future expenses in war will be at a minimum, owing to much of the preparation having previously been made (Plate 3).


How absurd, then, to suppose that Japan, with everything pointing to victory, with the possible exception of money, could not borrow the funds for the war with the United States. By no means is the United States so sure of its position that it could count on foreign friendship, and, in fact, such friendship plays but little part in such loans. It would be logical for financiers to reason as follows: Japan, at present, has the naval strategical advantage on the Pacific Ocean; Japan has many times more powerful and efficient an army; Japan lacks nought but money;

JAPANESE FINANCIAL COMPARISONS

SHOWING—(1) COMPARATIVE SIZE OF JAPANESE NATIONAL DEBT BEFORE AND AFTER RUSSIAN WAR.

(2) EXCESS OF BORROWING POWER OVER AMOUNT NEEDED AS SHOWN BY OVER SUBSCRIPTION OF BOND ISSUES DURING RUSSIAN WAR.

(3) REDUCED BORROWING POWER DUE TO INCREASED DEBT, COMPARED TO COST OF A WAR FOUR TIMES AS COSTLY AS RUSSIAN WAR.



that supplied and Japan will win. When one looks at the unequal struggles that have been financed in the past, such a reasoning seems comparatively sound. It has always been only when a nation was facing final and hopeless defeat that it became absolutely impossible to raise funds, and many nations, in the midst of war, when the outlook seemed darkest, have been able to secure finances for a last attempt, in some almost unaccountable manner.

Hamilton-Grace in his book *Finance and War* concludes:

That no nation will be stopped from plunging into war by dearth of money. War loans contracted by a people who are thoroughly prepared for war are a sound national investment (*vide* 1870).

That loans will always be forthcoming to provide the sinews of war.*

Not only is this so, but the expense of war is not the same in different nations. Japan, for instance, subsists her soldiers at much less cost than does the United States, and Japan pays them but a fraction of the pay of the United States soldier. This is also true of Germany, of England, France, and other European nations. Exactly as Japanese laborers can underbid the American laborer in California, so can a Japanese soldier serve his nation for much less than can an American soldier serve the United

* *Finance and War*, Hamilton-Grace, Hugh Rees, Ltd., London.

States. It is an easily discernible fact that practically all the foreign armies are supported at a cost per soldier much less than that of the United States. Thus, including every possible cost, the United States expends about \$800 per soldier per year. In England, the soldier costs about \$500 annually; in Germany, \$300; in France, \$250; in Japan, \$240; in Russia, \$230. For this reason it would naturally cost the United States a great deal more to place a force in the field than it would any of the other nations.

One of the chief sources of additional expense to the United States would be our immensely expensive volunteer and militia system. This, as is shown elsewhere in this work, has been a source of tremendous expense in every war, and has many times almost cost us our nation. Lea, in his *The Valor of Ignorance*, states that if the United States should be compelled to place an army of the same size in the field for the same length of time as did Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, the salaries alone of our army would nearly equal the entire expense of the Japanese, "while the total expense would equal a sum as proportionately greater as is the wealth of this Republic greater than that of Japan." On this basis, it would be no greater financial strain for Japan to carry on a war than it would be for the United States to oppose it.

As for financial interdependence, that may, on oc-

casion, prevent a war for which there was never any need; on the other hand, it may cause a war which would not otherwise occur. This — assuming that the pacifist is correct when he says that the financiers control war — would depend entirely on the interests of the particular group of financiers in control of the nation concerned. Just as financiers frequently desire a “bear” stock market for their own interest and their business opponents’ ruin, so may a group of financiers, feeling that they are well prepared personally, be not averse to a temporary financial stringency. Moreover, Hamilton-Grace shows that war does not necessarily cause money to become “very dear,” and that, while the stock market will rise and fall with victory and defeat in the field, money after a few weeks finds its proper level.

However, financiers are greatly overestimated by those who give them the making and preventing of war and the building or ruin of nations. Some of the greatest of wars have been in spite of financial and economic efforts. When the New York Stock Exchange was closed we did not notice that Wall Street seemed pleased at the prospect of European war, but that fact influenced the great powers in no way. A government may so inflame the public as to make a governmentally-desired war popular among the people, but neither a government nor financiers can prevent an aroused populace from bringing on a war in defense of what they believe to

be their essential interests. No amount of financial pressure will ever induce the American people to permit the yellow man to overrun this continent. In spite of all that is said by the pacifist, moreover, wars are continuing, and finance, suffer though it may, does not prevent them in any case where there is any real underlying cause for the contest.

The same is true of commerce. Commerce, through rivalry, may cause war; it cannot prevent it. For example, no nation is dependent, today, upon the exports of the United States, and if it were, such a nation would receive them throughout the struggle with this country. Should we, for instance, be engaged in a war with Germany, it might possibly be that direct exportation to Germany would entirely cease; but we would still export to England and France, and the markets of those nations would still be open to the German buyers. Only after one nation should completely surround the other with ships or men or both, would commerce cease, and at present no nation has the military force to effectually blockade even the insular kingdoms of England and Japan in that manner.

Thus do we find that there are cases when the logician and philosopher, the arbiter and the socialist, the commercialist and financier, fail utterly to afford either present or future hopes for the elimination of war. In fact, it is with the accumulation of years that conditions of which we have given an ex-

ample become extremely probable, and in consequence, the likelihood of such a war increases in the future.

As for disarmament or limitation of armament these are impractical as long as it is admitted that wars may come. To expect a nation to admit the possibility of war over some vital question, and yet to agree that it will limit its armament — limit its power to protect itself — and so afford the other and possibly weaker nation an equal chance for victory, is ridiculous. So much for limitation of armament.

There are those who believe that the present European War, especially if Germany is defeated, will mean a general reduction of armament. In the United States there is considerable belief that German defeat will permit us to still further reduce our military preparation. We cannot understand such reasoning. What effect can German defeat, or even German annihilation have, while Russia retains a standing army of over 1,200,000 men, and a total trained force of almost six million; while England retains its great navy; while France and Italy retain their large armies and their powerful navies. We will shortly show that Germany is by no means the "most military" in many respects, for Germany has not the largest army or navy, the largest total of trained men or the largest percentage of population under arms. We can not charge Germany with forcing the other great nations to arm, when we know

that Germany has had smaller land and naval forces, and merely challenged the other powers' lead. Russia, England, Italy, and France are leaders in certain kinds of militarism and are by no means so closely bound together that they will cease to look upon one another as possible enemies. No one nation will be the leader in a reduction of military force, and should it be that the greater number did reduce their armies and navies, there would surely be at least one European power which would take advantage of that fact by an increase. Moreover, neither Europe, nor America, can afford to make a reduction of their defensive powers while Japan retains its efficient land force of almost a million and a quarter men, and continues to improve its already powerful navy. The history of Japan is one of gain by aggression, and it is unlikely that that nation will relinquish its growing power. Already many great statesmen see in the antagonism of the yellow and the white race the next great world war.

Disarmament means a return to the day when every man was a soldier. The abolishing of the comparatively small trained force of the nation means that it must be replaced by numbers. It would mean that the victory would go to the nation with the greatest available male population, not to strength and power. Thus would such a nation as China become mistress of the world.

Would the United States agree to limit the forces

to be used to prevent the yellow immigration? Would they abolish armed force and place their one hundred million of disarmed population against the five hundred million of China and Japan? Certainly not! Both Chittenden and Angell, the pacifists, urge adequate armament for their respective nations.

Not only do all of these visionary schemes of peace by the reduction or limitation of armament fail of practicability today, but according to all laws of nature our great-great-grandchildren will find them increasingly improbable and absurd.

CHAPTER V

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF WAR

THERE are various schools of economists, but all agree that society consists of the struggle of one element versus another. Some believe that it is a struggle of individual against individual, the socialist maintains that it is class against class; while others argue that it is nation against nation.

Says Professor Emery:

I shall start far from the immediate subject by suggesting to you that, disregarding the theories of individual philosophers, there are three, and only three, general theories of society, or theories of historical development, which have been held in modern times by large numbers of men, and which have directly influenced the policies of nations. These I shall call individualism, socialism, and nationalism. To the individualist the activities of the present day and the whole course of history are to be interpreted as a struggle between individuals, each seeking his own welfare under the guidance of enlightened self-interest. To the socialist the history of mankind presents itself as primarily a struggle between classes within a given society, each class attempting to secure for itself privileges, prerogatives, and the lion's share of power and material comfort, and each class in turn being overthrown through the rise of a new and more

powerful class. Finally, the nationalist reads history as a record of struggle between political groups, races, or nations, and looks upon the problem of national survival, expansion, and supremacy as the vital concern of mankind.

All of these theories have an element of truth and each in turn is likely to be disregarding of the significance of the others! *

In the same manner, we have various schools attributing widely different causes of war: We have the school which places conquest and gain as the chief cause; the socialist who lays all wars to the desire of capital to amass greater wealth; the anti-militarist who charges that the soldier is responsible; the moralist, claiming all wars are due to the desire of nations to enforce the right, or a similar inclination toward the wrong; the commercialist who attributes all wars to commerce, and so on almost indefinitely.

Many of these men, wrapped largely in their own theories, fail to admit that as the struggles between men are not individual, class, or national struggles alone, but a combination of all, so are wars caused not alone by desire for conquest, by commercial rivalry, to enforce right or wrong, by selfish capital, or by popular passion, but by a combination of several or all of these various causes.

These questions are closely related; wars being the outcome of the struggle of individual, class, and nation for existence. Individuals struggle against

* *Some Economic Aspects of War.*

each other and combine in the family, families struggle and combine as classes and parties, classes and parties struggle but combine as nations. It is the socialistic and anarchistic parties alone that attempt a world-wide party, and even here occasions arise where they find that in spite of themselves they are divided as nations. For instance, witness our recent example of the yellow versus the white man; witness the present European War.

The struggles of individuals or of families are of too little import to be called wars; they are restricted by governments. The struggles of classes or parties when intensified become civil wars, but these in turn are restricted by governments. The struggles of nations become wars uncontrolled by any higher organizations.

Each of these units assumes part of the obligations of the smaller, protecting it and forwarding its ends. Thus states are brought to war through either individual, class, or national questions, and all weaknesses, all passions, and all misunderstandings of individual beings play their part in bringing about the struggles of nations.

The anti-militarists urge that military force, or "militarism," is the cause of war. They point to the present European conflict as an example. The contention of the anti-militarists that armaments cause war has never been sustained in argument. It is admitted that there may be occasions when a war

is hastened by the fact that some power's military strength has encouraged it in ambition, but that fact goes back of military strength and must be charged to weakness in human nature. Were there to be no military forces among the nations, it would merely mean that the nation with the greatest number of available males would be encouraged in its desires by its superior numbers, and the resulting conflict would be the same.

In their reasoning, those who attribute the European War to militarism, couple the words "militarism" and "Germany" in a way that would indicate that Germany is the sole advocate of strong military force. No explanation is given of just what is meant by militarism, and it is, therefore, interesting to attempt to determine just what militarism is. If militarism means having the largest standing army, we must take Russia as our example, for Russia's regular land force consists of about 1,200,000 men, to about 634,000 in the next largest, that of Germany. If militarism means maintaining the fighting force farthest in advance of all others, we must turn to England, whose navy is so much greater than the next largest that a "two-power standard," i. e., a force equal to any other two combined, has been one of the nation's ambitions and policies. Should militarism mean having the largest proportion of population trained for military service, we find that France, with a population of 39,600,500, has avail-

able about 3,000,000 trained men, while Germany, with a population of 64,925,993 has but between 4,000,000 and 4,610,000 trained soldiers, including all reserves. Thus France has a trained force of about ten per cent of the population, while Germany's force amounts to only about six or seven per cent. If by militarism, we mean the largest total number of trained men in land forces, we must again turn to Russia, with about 5,000,000 as the latest estimate of the American General Staff. If we mean the nations which fight the most wars, we may take almost any power, excepting Germany, which has enjoyed forty odd years of peace. If we mean the nation of the most belligerent, boastful and aggressive policies, we are justified in taking the United States.

Should militarism be indicated by compulsory military service, we may take any great power in the world, excepting the United States and Great Britain. If the term means rapid preparation for war in recent years, Russia has made by far the greatest efforts and improvement since the Japanese war. If the greatest sacrifices for military purposes are meant, we may well take Japan as our example. If, however, militarism means having the land forces which come nearest to the perfection which all Europe seeks to obtain, then Germany is apparently guilty.

We are not maintaining the neutral attitude which

the President of the United States has requested if we fail to recognize that in many respects Germany is not the most military nation. We cannot be neutral if we are unjust, and to be just we must admit that Germany has not the largest standing army, has not the largest navy, has not the largest total of trained men, has not the largest percentage of population trained, but has had the longest peace. England, and Germany, for instance, are differently situated. One needs a good navy, the other a good army. Each has what its people have needed. Were the locations, and colonial conditions reversed, so would be the military forces.

On a careful examination it becomes quite apparent that "militarism" is too indefinite a term to be charged with this, or any other war. Furthermore, history will not admit of such reasoning. If militarism is the cause of war, how can we account for the fact that that foremost example of a non-military nation, the United States, has had its full share of conflict, while the so-called "military" nation, Germany, presents the example of the state enjoying the longest peace?

Lea, in his *The Valor of Ignorance*, truly states the laws which are responsible for the class of war to which the European conflict belongs — a class which cannot be removed until human nature shall eliminate all self-interest, all jealousy, all hatred, all pride, all weakness — until the standards, morals

and customs of all men shall be alike, until good only shall dominate all human beings:

Investigation shows that whenever two nations have become engaged in warfare they have been for decades, and perhaps centuries, advancing on converging lines of self-interest and aggrandizement. When the contact takes place, the struggle for supremacy, or even survival, is at hand. As these lines approach one another, difficulties due to increasing proximity of interests arise between the countries and result in disagreements, the seriousness and frequency of which stand in inverse ratio to the distance at which they take place from the point of contact. When these lines meet, war ensues. This inevitable hour is approximately fixed and determined by the angles of convergence plus the sum of the relative speed by which the nations are moving along their respective lines. Thus it is that, when the angle of convergence of both or even one of the nations is acute and the speed of progress along one or both of the converging lines correspondingly great, war results in a few years or decades. If, on the other hand, the angles of convergence are obtuse and the speed correspondingly slow, centuries may pass before the nations are involved in a struggle for domination or survival.

No two nations or tribes of men move on parallel lines, though they may for centuries have the appearance of so doing.*

When this meeting between nations occurs, not only is it commercial rivalry that causes wars but

* *The Valor of Ignorance.*

racial or national antipathy, pride, hatred, and all other passions common to all mankind. It is not sufficient to point out that the victor may gain nothing in dollars and cents by his conquest. For, though convergence of economic and political interests may be the underlying cause, and the passions of man but the symptoms of the disease, yet at the time that war is near, the symptoms reach an acuteness that overshadows the real cause. At this time the nations will repudiate with scorn the element of gain or loss, and will fight on a principle, for what they believe to be right versus wrong.

Mr. Angell scoffs at the militarists because one attributes wars to commercialism, while another attributes them to moral motives. Actually, however, either or both may be foremost among the symptoms of the approaching conflict. When two radically different nations have reached a point of convergence they are in conflict commercially and morally, and both are elements which may precipitate the contest.

Mr. Angell bases his book on the ground that as the conqueror loses, economically, in all wars there is no advantage in such struggles. Commenting upon this, Professor R. M. Johnston of Yale says:

Doubtless the reason for the welcome the book received in pacifist quarters is its uncompromisingly materialistic argument: War doesn't pay, war is constantly becoming more expensive, therefore war is futile, and must soon be ended by general consent; the theory is a conveniently easy one for

the unreflecting to grasp. As a problem of arithmetic, it may be admitted that the thesis is irreproachable, yet it could not be sustained for five minutes before an audience of schoolboys. A schoolboy would perhaps not be able to demonstrate to Mr. "Angell" that some of the greatest and most justified wars have been waged in spite of economic considerations; he might be unable to foresee that in the future, while great and complex modern communities will feel the military burden more and more intensely, smaller and less civilized communities will not, and will continue to wage war just as in the past unless they are prevented by force of arms — which brings us back to the same thing; but he could tell Mr. "Angell," with vigorous schoolboy emphasis and scorn, that profit or loss is not the sole test of conduct, that to fight in spite of loss, to value generosity beyond cash, courage beyond profit, has always and will always win the hearts of nineteen well constituted boys [or men, R. S.] out of twenty. He could dismiss Mr. "Angell's" ultra-economic thesis if not as childish, certainly as middle-aged.*

Not only do we have to consider the fact that both commercial and moral conflicts precipitate war, but as Mr. Angell himself sums up the case:

The whole case may be summarized thus:

1. Nations fight for opposing conceptions of right; it is the moral conflict of men.

2. They fight from non-rational causes of a lower kind: from vanity, rivalry, pride of place, the desire to occupy a great situation in the world, or from sheer hostility to dissimilar people — the blind strife of mutually hating men.

* *The United States Infantry Journal*, Jan.-Feb., 1914.

3. These causes justify war, or render it inevitable. The first is admirable in itself, the second is inevitable.*

To which we must add in justice to our cause:
4. Nations fight for their existence as nations.

The theory that we can prevent wars by showing the victor that nought is gained through victory; by making defense unnecessary through removing aggression is condensed in the following extract from Mr. Angell's book:

This does not imply, as some critics allege, the conclusion that an Englishman is to say: "Since I might be just as well off under the Germans, let them come"; but that the German will say: "Since I shall be no better off for the going, I will not go."

Indeed, the case of the authorities cited in the preceding chapter is marked by a false form of statement. Those who plead for war on moral grounds say: "War will go on because men will defend their ideals, moral, political, social, and religious." It should be stated thus: "War will go on because men will always attack the spiritual possessions of other men," because, of course, the necessity for defense arises from the fact that these possessions are in danger of attack.

Put in the second form, however, the case breaks down almost of itself. The least informed of us realizes that the whole trend of history is against the tendency for men to attack the ideals and the beliefs of other men. In the religious domain that tendency is plain, so much so that the imposition of religious ideals or beliefs by force has prac-

* *The Great Illusion.*

tically been abandoned in Europe, and the causes which have wrought this change of attitude in the European mind are just as operative in the field of politics.*

Here, as in all his writings, Mr. Angell seems to take the attitude that it is by war alone that one nation or race can conquer another. It is upon this fallacy that this writer has based all his theories. When he says that the Germans say: "Since I will be no better off for the going, I will go" he refers to the military invasion of England by Germany, not to an industrial invasion. When he says that men have ceased to force their religious ideas upon others, he refers to actual physical force, not to the persistent, non-physical inroads by which the Christian forces his theories upon the worshippers of other gods. We have said that not alone national acts, but individual or class actions may bring on war. As the nations converge, the individual German may see the gain by emigrating to England or to England's possessions, or the individual Japanese the gain that would be had by emigrating to the United States or its possessions. Especially is this true should conditions in their home countries be such that men of their class would not have the same opportunities as are afforded in the country selected as their new field.

This kind of an invasion, more even than war, can

* *The Great Illusion.*

quietly destroy a state; grasp control from its citizens; seal the eventual doom of the original inhabitants as a nation. The Indians of North America have declined more rapidly in peace than in war, and afford a striking modern example of this fact. There is no need to turn to the numerous examples of history to bear us out.

Such an invasion, commencing peacefully, will result in war whenever the invader is of a nation sufficiently intelligent and thrifty to oust inhabitants from their ordinary occupations, and sufficiently different in characteristics to emphasize the inroads on the native population. It will at first be marked by personal encounter — pride, jealousy, hatred and similar passions — and finally by the attempted forceful expulsion of the invaders. Should the invaders have retained citizenship in their own country, the war will be an international one. Should they have been abandoned by their native land, it might be civil. Certain it is, however, that these conditions bring on war.

Here we find man protecting his right without the necessity of the deliberate military aggression, which Angell assumes to be the forerunner of all wars for the defense of "ideals, moral, political, social, and religious."

Frequently it is not a case of the German saying: "I shall not go," but it is the case of the oppressor, or otherwise undesirable alien being already there.

Mr. Angell goes further; saying in illustration of his view:

If Russia does England an injury — sinks a fishing fleet in time of peace, for instance — it is no satisfaction to Englishmen to go out and kill a lot of Frenchmen or Irishmen. They want to kill Russians. If, however, they knew a little less geography — if, for instance, they were Chinese Boxers — it would not matter in the least which they killed, because to the Chinaman all alike are “foreign devils”; his knowledge of the case does not enable him to differentiate between the various nationalities of Europeans. In the case of a wronged negro in the Congo the collective responsibility is still wider; for a wrong inflicted by one white man he will avenge himself on any other — American, German, English, French, Dutch, Belgian, or Chinese. As our knowledge increases, our sense of the collective responsibility of outside groups narrows. But immediately we start on this differentiation there is no stoppage. The English yokel is satisfied if he can “get a whack at them foreigners” — Germans will do if Russians are not available. The more educated man wants Russians; but if he stops a moment longer, he will see that in killing Russian peasants he might as well be killing so many Hindoos, for all they had to do with the matter. He then wants to get at the Russian Government. But so do a great many Russians — Liberals, Reformers, etc. He then sees that the real conflict is not English against Russians at all, but the interest of all law-abiding folk — Russian and English alike — against oppression, corruption, and incompetence.*

* *The Great Illusion.*

We were not aware that the desire of Englishmen in such cases was "to kill Russians." But if such instances are repeated and if they have the support of the majority of Russians; if Russia as a nation does nothing to prevent such matters then it is time for England to take a hand.

Mr. Angell would have this done by giving assistance to the Russian party out of power, to enable the Russian Liberals to hang a few Russian admirals and establish a Russian Liberal Government. How is this to be done? By war in assisting the Russian Liberals? "Oh No!" says Mr. Angell; "by taking every means which the social and economic relationship of the two states afford!" It would be found, however, that these means were slow and unsatisfactory, and that while the English Government was thus "watchfully waiting," the occurrences could be repeated. Also the Russian party in power, if it believed that its existence was threatened, would soon go to war to prevent England's "economic and social" assistance to the Liberals, and (here is the human nature element) the public of England would grow impatient of the slow results of the "economic and social" annihilation of the Russian Government, and would demand war if Russia did not. Furthermore (here we have the human element again) it is extremely likely that the Russian Liberal Party would resent most heartily England's intrusion, and would join those in power in an attempt to teach England

to "mind her own business, and not interfere with a sovereign nation."

Still another source of war which no pacifist has yet been able to argue away, lies in the fact that some nations are far inferior to others, either morally, intellectually or both. Thus nations, like individuals, cannot be relied upon to keep their promise to abide by arbitration; to refrain from evil. Angell sees this changing. He says:

With very great courtesy, one is impelled to ask those who argue that human nature in all its manifestations must remain unchanged, how they interpret history. We have seen man progress from the mere animal fighting with other animals, seizing his food by force, seizing also by force his females, eating his own kind, the sons of the family struggling with the father for the possession of the father's wives; we have seen this incoherent welter of animal struggle at least partly surviving as a more organized tribal warfare or a more ordered pillaging, like that of the Vikings and the Huns; we have seen even these pillagers abandon in part their pillaging for ordered industry, and in part for the more ceremonial conflict of feudal struggle; we have seen even the feudal conflict abandoned in favor of dynastic and religious and territorial conflict, and then dynastic and religious conflict abandoned. There remains now only the conflict of states, and that, too, at a time when the character and conception of the state are being profoundly modified.

Human nature may not change, whatever that vague phrase may mean; but human nature is a complex factor. It includes numberless motives, many of which are modified

in relation to the rest as circumstances change; so that the manifestations of human nature change out of all recognition. Do we mean by the phrase that "human nature does not change" that the feelings of the paleolithic man who ate the bodies of his enemies and of his own children are the same as those of a Herbert Spencer, or even of the modern New Yorker who catches his subway train to business in the morning? If human nature does not change, may we therefore expect the city clerk to brain his mother and serve her up for dinner, or suppose that Lord Roberts or Lord Kitchener is in the habit, while on campaign, of catching the babies of his enemies on spear-heads, or driving his motor-car over the bodies of young girls, like the leaders of the old Northmen in the ox-wagons.

What *do* these phrases mean? These, and many like them, are repeated in a knowing way with an air of great wisdom and profundity by journalists and writers of repute, and one may find them blatant any day in our newspapers and reviews; yet the most cursory examination proves them to be neither wise nor profound, but simply parrot-like catch-phrases which lack common sense, and fly in the face of facts of everyday experience.*

The fallacy of all this, however, is that there are no really good men compared with the ideal man, Jesus Christ. There are no nations which can compare with the Kingdom of God. As some men, more than others, attempt to pattern their lives after that of Christ, so do some nations become better morally than others; and as no man has reached perfection,

* *The Great Illusion.*

and as all men at times fall from grace, so will nations from time to time do evil. Not a single power exists today free from a comparatively recent charge of oppression of a weaker state. As long as evil remains in man, and as long as there is individual conflict (for we must refute Mr. Angell's statement that "there remains now only the conflict of states"), so long will there be national conflict. We do not state that there is not some refinement in the methods of the human being. That, however, is vastly different from an actual change of nature, and it is a more difficult question to determine whether it is a change of nature or a change of methods that is taking place. May it not be merely that science and education have replaced brute force with cunning? Admitting, moreover, and hoping, that human nature is changing for the better, the fact remains that the change is so slow that no reader of this work will live to see the day when man, convinced of the righteousness of an important cause, will surrender without compulsion. Mr. Angell neglects to remind us that no inconsiderable period has elapsed between the "paleolithic man who ate the bodies of his enemies and of his own children" and his modern example "a Herbert Spencer." He neglects to state that, in spite of the passing of these ages, cannibalism is not yet entirely extinct, and that the human being still varies from the cannibal, through the less barbarous and semi-civilized tribes and nations,

through the modern New York gunmen, the rapist, the common murderer, the burglar, the sneak thief, the embezzler, the cheat, the grafting politician, the usurer, the drunkard, and the ordinary business man, until at last it reaches the best living type of "New Yorker" or "Herbert Spencer," who would admit his sinfulness and weakness, though he be at the top rung of the ladder of mankind.

Lea, in his *The Valor of Ignorance*, says:

Only when arbitration is able to unravel the tangled skein of crime and hypocrisy among individuals can it be extended to communities and nations. Thence will international arbitration come of its own accord as the natural outgrowth of national evolution through the individual. As nations are only man in the aggregate, they are the aggregate of his crimes and deception and depravity, and so long as these constitute the basis of individual impulse, so long will they control the acts of nations.

When, therefore, the merchant arbitrates with the customer he is about to cheat; when trusts arbitrate with the people they are about to fleece, . . . or the murderer with his victim, and so on throughout the category of crime, then will communities be able to dispense with laws, and international thievery and deception, shearing and murder, and resort to arbitration.

As we have continually sinful men, so we have continually sinful nations. As good men occasionally sin, so will good nations. Only with the far off perfection of all mankind will these things stop.

CHAPTER VI

THE COST OF WAR AND ITS HORRORS

IN SPITE of the fact that we can see no probability of universal peace either now or within the time of our immediate descendants, we have no desire to hinder in any way sane efforts toward that end. There is no desire to combat the pacifist, who confines his efforts toward peace in the future, and, who, for the present, says with Angell:

I am particularly emphatic in declaring that while the present philosophy is what it is, we are bound to maintain our relative positions with other powers.

We encourage men like Angell in so far as they are merely attempting to bring about that perfect condition of man morally and intellectually which will be reflected in the perfect nations, and thereby eliminate all strife. We do, however, oppose the misstatements which appear in every pacifist book, the slandering of military men, exaggerations of the cost and horror of war, and minimization of equivalent conditions of peace. While, as we have shown in our preceding chapter, we believe that the day of peace is far off, we are eager to welcome it, and we

do not say positively that there may not be the unforeseen change in the laws of nature and of human character that will make peace possible. What we do insist upon is that today wars are both possible and probable to any nation on earth and that we must be prepared to meet them.

We have shown this to be so. We have shown that preparation for possible and probable wars is but a cheap insurance, that the armament of nations during peace is not an economic burden, as the pacifist would have us believe, and we have shown that both a nation and the individual citizens thereof may gain what is priceless to man through war.

"But the cost of the war!" says the pacifist, "its horrors, its destruction!" Said Professor William James in *McClure's Magazine*:

The military party denies neither the bestiality, nor the horror, nor the expense; it only says that these things tell but half the story. It only says that war is worth these things; that, taking human nature as a whole, war is its best protection against its weaker and more cowardly self, and that mankind cannot afford to adopt a peace economy.

We do, however, deny the bestiality, the horror and the expense. At least we deny its existence to the extent that the pacifist proclaims and exaggerates. That there is some bestiality, some horror, some expense, may be true; that in some wars they may outweigh the good is undeniable. In many

cases, however, the good far outweighs the bad, and in many cases, the bestiality, the horror, and the expense of peace is even greater than that of war.

The horror of death is a strong card of the pacifist. He plays upon one's imagination by figures showing the dead in war. He tells us that the nation never recovers from the blow struck when thousands of its men die upon the battlefield; that this results in the lowering of the race; in tremendous economic loss. He dwells upon the sorrowing family at home, the sweetheart, the wife, the mother, who, he tells us, are the real sufferers of the war. Because war is something of which the average man knows little, the pacifist is believed. Because the ends of war admittedly necessitate deaths, the horror is seemingly incomparable, and the average man knows of nothing with which to compare it excepting hell. Says the socialist, G. R. Kirkpatrick, in his book *War — What For?*

What is war?

They say "War is Hell."

Well, then, let those who want hell, go to hell.

We need not, however, go to hell to find a comparison for war. The pacifist and the socialist, though on different planes, understand neither the conditions of war nor of hell, and consequently, selecting two things of which they know little, they compare these two. A more proper comparison,

however, is war and peace. If war is hell, what shall we say of peace, taking a few of the facts given below into account?

To avoid exaggeration we shall quote first Mr. Kirkpatrick, who attempts to show the horrors of war in his book, *War — What For?* by extracts from the *New York Independent* of March 14, 1907:

It is the common consensus of opinion among investigators that industrial casualties in this nation number more than 500,000 yearly. Dr. Josiah Strong estimates the number at 564,000. As there are 525,600 minutes in a year, it may readily be seen that every minute (day and night) our industrial system sends to the graveyard or to the hospital a human being, the victim of some accident inseparable from his toil. We cry out against the horrors of war. . . . But the ravages . . . of industrial warfare are far greater than those of armed conflict. The number of killed or mortally wounded (including deaths from accidents, suicides and murders, but excluding deaths from disease) in the Philippine War from February 4, 1899, to April 30, 1902, was 1,573. These fatal casualties were spread over a period of three years and three months. But one coal mine alone in one year furnishes a mortality more than 38 per cent in excess of this.

The Japanese War is commonly looked upon as the bloodiest of modern wars. According to the official statement of the Japanese Government, 46,180 Japanese were killed, and 10,970 died of wounds. Our industrial war shows a greater mortality year by year.

But we are all of us more familiar with the Civil War, and we know what frightful devastation it caused in households North and South. It was, however, but a tame conflict compared with that which rages today, and which we call "peace." The slaughter of its greatest battles are thrown in the shade by the slaughter which particular industries inflict today. Ask any schoolboy to name three of the bloodiest battles of that war, and he will probably name Gettysburg, Chancellorsville, and Chickamauga. The loss on both sides was:

	Killed.	Wounded.
Gettysburg	5,662	27,203
Chancellorsville	3,271	18,843
Chickamauga	3,924	23,362
Total	12,857	69,408

But our railroads, state and interstate, and our trolleys in one year equal this record in the number of killings and double it in the number of woundings.

Said Dr. Josiah Strong in the *North American Review* for November, 1906:

We might carry on a half dozen Philippine wars for three-quarters of a century with no larger number of total casualties than take place yearly in our peaceful industries.

Taking the lowest of our three estimates of industrial accidents, the total number of casualties suffered by our industrial army in one year is equal to the average annual casualties of our Civil War, plus those of the Philippine War, plus those of the Russian-Japanese War,

Think of carrying on three wars at the same time, world without end.

Said President Roosevelt in his Annual Message for 1907:

Industry in the United States now exacts . . . a far heavier toll of death than all of our wars put together. . . . The number of deaths in battle in all the foreign wars put together for the last century and a quarter, aggregate considerably less than one year's death record for our industries.

Glancing over these comparisons between war and peace, we find that much of the horror of war dwindles away. Comparing those actually killed in industry and accident with those killed or dying from wounds in various wars, we find that the annual peace rate is approximately two and a half times that of the average annual Japanese loss, three times that of the Union loss in the Civil War, five times the Russian loss in the Japanese War, six times the Confederate loss in the Civil War, twenty-eight times the English loss in the Anglo-Boer War and ninety times the American loss in the Spanish War. In other words, it would take the average annual deaths of the English and French in the Crimea, the Americans in the Mexican War, the North in the Civil War, the Americans in the Spanish War, the English in the Boer War, and the Japanese in the Russian War to approach the annual United States peace rate

War takes the
wealth and the
most brilliant of men
(Plate 4). Assuming the burden of all these wars, at once, and without ceasing, would be no more a drain than our peace death rate! Need we say more as to the cost in lives, as to the sorrowing mother, sweetheart and wife? Think of these things. Where now is the bestiality and horror? Does it belong more to war where comparatively few die for their country willingly and nobly, or to peace where the multitudes die for sordid gain — for dollars and cents? Would it not be meet for the pacifists, assuming that they have the best interest of the country at heart, to turn first to the horrors of peace, and lastly to the horrors of war?

No satisfactory answer can be made to this. General Chittenden, in his *War or Peace*, makes the best effort to tear down these facts. He starts by his statement that "more definitely, we know that since Napoleon began his campaign fourteen million people have died as a result of war." Here we have another effort to stun the reader by stupendous figures — without proper comparisons. Less horrible may seem the facts as given by General Chittenden when we consider that Napoleon's campaigns began in 1795, or one hundred and nineteen years ago, and that the General is including both deaths through action and by disease. In one hundred and nineteen years almost the same number would be killed in the United States *alone, not including disease*, at our present industrial and accident death rate.

AVERAGE ANNUAL NUMBER

KILLED OR DYING FROM WOUNDS IN WAR—VS
NUMBER KILLED IN PEACE ACCIDENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES.

Note—Peace Accidents 79,000

U. S. Loss—Spanish War—862
U. S. Loss—Mexican War—725
English Loss Crimea 2,387
French Loss Crimea 8,160
English Loss—Boer War 2,990

Average Annual Union Loss
Civil War
27,518

Average Annual Japanese Loss
Russian War
33,340

Note—Combined Wars 75,982

*It would take the killed and dying from wounds in all
these seven wars to equal our annual peace
rate in accidents.*

The present great war will undoubtedly cause thousands of deaths. We must, however, be conservative in accepting figures in the newspapers. Those who remember the Spanish-American battles with "thousands killed," and those who noticed the recent Mexican battles where armies "lost" more than were present, will realize the desirability of pointing off a few decimal places in the statements of the number killed in this greatest war of history. It is useless to estimate the death rate at this time. That can be done only when the war is over.

When we consider, carefully, disease in war, we find the older records are not so favorable compared with modern ideas. In the past wars, however, but little was known of sanitation — nor was much known of it in civil life. Today our wars will see much less loss from disease. The Japanese, for instance, in the Russo-Japanese War lost 27,142 men from disease; a death rate of 25 per 1,000. The United States lost 5,438 men from disease in the Spanish-American War; a death rate of 25 per 1,000. Had these armies suffered the regular death rate of the City of New Orleans for the years from 1900 to 1909, the Japanese would have lost 17,550, and the Americans 4,522 men. The official Russian figures for the Japanese War show a loss of 12,198, or a rate of 13.5 per 1,000. Had the Russians suffered the New Orleans rate, they would have lost

study New Orleans?

14,500 men, or 1,302 more than their official figures show. Thus it is that the death rate from disease in modern war is only slightly more than the death rate in our cities. It is certainly no greater than is the death rate in many occupations which place men in circumstances similar to those of men in the field.

General Chittenden continues:

It is impossible to make a rational comparison of the suffering from loss of life in war with that in peace. The situations are totally different. Death in the one case ordinarily comes in the midst of friends with such solacement as love and kindness can bestow; in the other it comes in the depths of bestial strife, in noisome camp or foul prison, in the absence of all that the heart craves in the hour of its extremity. The sacrifice of life in war involves every detail of cruelty, misery, and suffering that the mind of man can conceive. It is needless to depict its oft described horrors. No description, no portrayal can do justice to the reality—a reality so terrible that even the great masters of war have been loudest in its denunciation.*

Is this a fact? Do those killed in industrial action “die in the midst of friends”? Does the miner trapped hundreds of feet under ground? Does the railway passenger packed between blazing timbers or twisted steel? Does the girl machine operator drawn into life-crushing machinery? Does the track laborer, hurled through the air by tons of onrushing

* *War or Peace.*

iron and steel? Did the men of the Titanic who had sent their loved ones on to safety? Did the girls of the Triangle Shirt Factory who perished miserably in flames, or jumped from the inferno only to be horribly mangled on the hard pavements below? We may be pardoned for quoting Angell, the peace advocate, in this respect:

The virile man doubts whether he ought to be moved by the plea of the "inhumanity" of war. The masculine mind accepts suffering, death itself, as a risk which we are all prepared to run even in the most unheroic forms of money-making; none of us refuses to use the railway train because of the occasional smash, to travel because of the occasional shipwreck, and so on. Indeed, peaceful industry demands a heavier toll even in blood than does a war, a fact which the casualty statistics in railroading, fishing, mining and seaman-ship, eloquently attest; while such peaceful industries as fishing and shipping are the cause of as much brutality. The peaceful administration of the tropics takes as heavy a toll in the health and lives of good men, and much of it, as in the west of Africa, involves, unhappily, a moral deterioration of human character as great as that which can be put to the account of war.

Besides these peace sacrifices the "price of war" is trivial, and it is felt that the trustees of a nation's interests ought not to shrink from paying that price should the efficient protection of those interests demand it. If the common man is prepared, as we know he is, to risk his life in a dozen dangerous trades and professions for no object higher than that of improving his position or increasing his income, why should

the statesman shrink from such sacrifices as the average war demands, if thereby the great interests which have been confided to him can be advanced? If it be true, as even the pacifist admits that it may be true, that the tangible material interests of a nation can be advanced by warfare; if, in other words, warfare can play some large part in the protection of the interests of humanity, the rulers of a courageous people are justified in disregarding the suffering and the sacrifice that it may involve. [And add also Mr. Angell's footnote.] The *Matin*, newspaper, recently made a series of revelations, in which it was shown that the master of a French cod-fishing vessel had, for some trivial insubordination, disembowelled his cabin-boy alive, and put salt into the intestines, and then thrown the quivering body into the hold with the cod-fish. So inured were the crew to brutality that they did not effectively protest, and the incident was only brought to light months later by wine-shop chatter. The *Matin* quotes this as the sort of brutality that marks the Newfoundland cod-fishing industry in French ships.*

Without the slightest desire to minimize the heroes of industrial disasters — of train wrecks, mine horrors, or the super-heroes of Titanic disasters — we ask in which is the nobler death, in peace or war? Compared with the number dying in peace, the number having an *opportunity* to die an heroic death (note, we do not say that the number of those who are made of hero-stuff are less, but, the number who have the *opportunity* to die a hero's death) are few. Those who die on Titanics are the

* *The Great Illusion.*

exception. More often is the peace death the sudden snapping off of the thread of life in some filthy, health-destroying mill, or the snuffing of life's flame suddenly and without warning on some railroad. Again, in industrial strife we see women, mothers, children, dying through the criminal carelessness of some dollar-crazed employer.

On the battlefield we see men cry out, fall, and lie moaning or mangled in death, and we see their fellows advancing willingly to the same possibilities for the sake of their country. Not that these soldiers do not fear the horrors of death, not that they do not pity the dying, not that they do not themselves fear a similar fate; but because they set aside these things and, trusting in God, do their duty.

Which is the more horrible, the death of the soldier, a strong man dying *for his country*, in battle or in foul prison, or the death of the poor girls dying in flames, or crushed and mangled on hard pavements, for the greed of some soulless employer, who fails to provide common safety for his toilers?

General Chittenden's final argument is that "the losses from peaceful occupations are far less than those of war compared with the number and length of time engaged."

As for the time engaged, we have shown that were the Civil War to be continuous and its average death rate continued, still it would be only one-third of our annual industrial death rate. Similarly the Russo-

Japanese War, if continued indefinitely, would be but one-third of our annual rate. In fact, we find that it would be necessary to have the Civil, the Russo-Japanese, and the Philippine Wars, all going on at once, never ceasing, and take the total losses from *both* sides in all these wars in order to equal our industrial death rate.


As for the fact that lesser numbers are engaged, here General Chittenden's arguments at first glance seem stronger, for admittedly there are fewer engaged; but a little thought will convince us of the error of these comparisons.

The pacifist in his arguments decries, first, the loss to the nation by the death of her soldiers; and, second, the sorrow imposed upon individual families — mothers, wives, and sweethearts. Therefore the number engaged does not enter into the question. In any case, it is the nation that sends out an army and it is the nation that suffers the industrial death rate. This is the proper comparison; it is the way we have compared it. Furthermore, the sorrow of mother, wife, or sweetheart is not changed in the slightest on account of the enormity or triviality of the per cent dying. Their sorrow is for their own dead — who else dies matters little. The only way in which the number engaged is properly considered is in determining the riskiness of war as a profession, in which case it should not be compared with industrialism as a whole, but should be compared with

the more risky professions and trades, such as aviation, daredevil trick performers, railroading, bridge building, iron structural work, etc. Then we would have an interesting and just comparison, but it would have no bearing whatever on the effect of war losses on the nation or sorrowing relatives.

In all these comparisons we have not considered the losses sustained in industrialism through unsanitary conditions, through occupational diseases. Should we turn to those who make matches, to the glass-blower, to those who work in the dusty wire drawing plant, to those who work in unsanitary mills and factories, we would find that here was a condition of peace which breaks down the health of those engaged therein, and that the deaths and crippling of the productive energy of the nation more than made up for the diseases in war. Yet we have omitted all this in our comparison, for the simple reason that the comparison of accidents in peace to total death rates in war is so conclusive as to make any further effort entirely superfluous.

The anti-militarist makes much of the so-called "atrocities" of war; particularly those of the present great conflict. These atrocities, however, largely originate in the brains of correspondents who are short of copy, through careless but imaginative persons, or through the repeating of the story of an occasional crime until it seems to become the rule rather than the exception. It should be



remembered that many horrible crimes are frequent in a city like New York or London or Paris, where inhabitants are in peace, and under control of large police forces. In the field today there are as many men as there are in about eight such great cities, each man well armed, more or less inflamed with the passions of war, and clothed with varying degrees of arbitrary power. Occasional outrages are therefore to be expected, for we cannot expect armies, under such conditions, to be better than the inhabitants of our great cities. It is also to be expected that each side will exaggerate stories of atrocities committed by the enemy. The better writers of the day are commencing to realize these facts, and papers and magazines now frequently deplore the leeway which some writers have given their imagination. It is beginning to be realized that the striking fact is that the atrocities are so few.

As for the cost of war in money, we have shown that where wars are prepared for in advance the expense of the war is reduced — that it is lack of military force that causes wars to be prolonged. The Civil War cost \$6,189,929,908, till then, an unheard of expense for war. Since then, it has cost \$4,586,966,346.09 in pensions. Pension administration has cost over \$125,871,965. A total of \$10,902,768,219.09. The war lasted four years, therefore costing \$2,725,642,054.77 per year. But we expend \$3,200,000,000 a year for tobacco and liquor alone,

and \$3,000,000,000 incident to the social evil. If we can expend these amounts on vice, then the occasional war, even though it would be as great as our Civil War, will not bankrupt the nation.

The biggest and most absurd estimate of the total cost of the Civil War is that of the socialist, Kirkpatrick, who places it at \$31,521,815,321.60. In this, Mr. Kirkpatrick includes such items as \$12,500,000,000, as "lost labor power of 1,000,000 selected men for twenty-five years." * The total killed or dying of disease on both sides was only 559,928 men, and the real cost of the war, including pensions to date, is, as has been stated, probably about \$10,902,768,219.09. For argument, however, let us take the highest estimate, that given by the socialist. We have found that in one year the United States spends \$2,000,000,000 for liquor and beer, \$1,200,000,000 for tobacco, \$3,000,000,000 through the social evil, \$800,000,000 on jewelry, \$500,000,000 on automobiles, and \$452,000,000 on candy and soft drinks. A grand total of \$7,952,000,000 for one year on a half-dozen of the many pleasures and vices indulged in by the people of this country. The socialist estimates as given above cover fifty-three years — four of actual war and forty-nine of interest and debt, loss of productive power and pensions. Thus the cost of but six of our thousands of vices and pleasures in four years

* *War — What For?*

would equal the absurdly exaggerated estimate of the cost of the Civil War during its four years' duration, and during the forty-nine years of pensioning, debt paying, and so-called losing productive energy.

Even the present European war — the war of wars — the most stupendous military struggle of all this world's history, does not cost so much! Does that sound like the statement of a lunatic? Perhaps so, yet, viewed from certain standards, it is undoubtedly true. It has been estimated that the war is costing the nations involved \$40,000,000 a day. That would be about \$1,200,000,000 a month, or \$14,400,000,000 a year. That vast sum does not include the damage to property or the loss of productive energy. The latter, according to economists, cannot be accurately figured out, but is not so large owing to the utilization of the reserve energy of the nation. The damage to property is also difficult to estimate. No value can be placed on some objects, valuable for sentimental reasons alone. It is doubtful, however, if the actual cash value of the property destroyed will average a million dollars a day for an entire year. Surely two million dollars a day for the period of a year is a liberal estimate. That would amount to \$730,000,000 per annum and give a total cost of \$15,130,000,000.

This estimate of cost, which seems vast enough, is for all the nations. If, however, in order to give those who cry out against "militarism's burden"

every advantage, we divide the total among only the great European nations — England, Germany, France, Russia, and Austria — the cost is about \$3,026,000,000 each per year. If we averaged the cost among Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, Japan and Turkey in addition, the average would of course be greatly reduced, but as these nations are undoubtedly bearing the smaller part of the cost it is, perhaps, just as well to exclude them.

Glancing back we find that the above is practically the same amount spent in the United States annually for liquor and tobacco. If we should consider the total cost of liquor, tobacco, and white slavery in the United States we would have a sum almost twice the average cost of the war to any European nation. Of course, these are vague estimates of the cost of the present war. They are probably not very accurate, but as they are from pacifist sources they are probably none too small.

Again we find that in comparison with other stupendous things war becomes lilliputian.

Furthermore, though Mr. Angell by rather doubtful reasoning attempts to show that when France was compelled to pay an indemnity of one billion dollars to Germany, France gained and Germany lost, it is believed that he will have a hard time getting any financier or student of economy to agree with him. An indemnity to a victor may not pay all the cost of a war, but it is a great offset to such cost, and a

country which can compel the payment of a billion dollars from a defeated enemy will find it a material help. We hardly believe that Germans would agree with Mr. Angell, and if victors in the present war would offer to pay rather than receive indemnity — though we are sure that France, if defeated, will be glad to adopt Mr. Angell's ideas and willingly receive, rather than pay. Says Hamilton-Grace in his *Finance and War*:

The Germans have never ceased regretting that they imposed a war indemnity on France only of £200,000,000 (\$1,000,000,000). It is probable that, were the chance to recur, this indemnity would be nearer £1,000,000,000 (\$5,000,000,000).

Thus, not only is the cost of war exaggerated, but a well prepared nation may lessen it by an indemnity.

CHAPTER VII

SOME ADVANTAGES OF MILITARY FORCE AND OF WAR

NOT only is military force in peace a paying proposition and war less of a horrible burden than is generally supposed, but there is actually much to be said in favor of both military force and of war. It would be unjust to the soldier and unjust to the militarist, did we fail to give these facts.

One of the strongest arguments of those who state that military force during peace is an advantage, lies in the claim that the army and navy form immense educational institutions, and that the entire nation benefits industrially, commercially, and otherwise by the training which its citizens receive as soldiers. Germany is given as the great example of this fact. Many militarists attribute much of Germany's success to the training which her citizens receive in the army. To this General Chittenden objects that it is in spite of, and not because of, military training that Germany is successful commercially; that on the contrary it is because of the fact that Germany succeeds in everything that her military force is so successful. A reasonable view seems to be that both of these conditions may be partially correct. Certain

it is that military training has an important value entirely apart from its actual military value. This is conclusively proven in the numerous military schools of the United States. The majority of these schools disclaim any attempt to train soldiers, but include military training merely to make better citizens. They find that the man trained militarily learns obedience, promptness, cleanliness, orderliness, coolness, and secures that priceless asset known as executive ability — the ability to make others obey. Such schools form a stronger character and make better men.

If this is true in a military school, it must be equally so with similar training received elsewhere. If thousands of parents pay from \$500 to \$1,500 per year to secure this training for their boys, surely there is some gain to the nation in the men who receive this training in the army. The fact is too well attested by educators throughout the world to admit of serious questioning.

Recently a number of officers were reviewing the cadets of the John Wanamaker Commercial Institute, a regiment composed exclusively of boys and young men employed in the great Wanamaker store in Philadelphia. These boys are not trained as professional soldiers, but are drilled and disciplined. They absorb through the military drill the military virtues. At this drill an officer was heard to ask the commandant of cadets why the organization was

maintained, and why all the boys of the store were compelled to take the drill. "Because," said the commandant, "when we have trained a boy successfully in this military work we find that we have trained a future department head."

Says Professor Emery of Yale:

Personally, I believe that the efficiency of factory labor in Germany has been greatly increased through this military education, and that the young men who have been through this training become much more efficient in the field of production in later years than they would have been had they not been obliged to undergo this training at all. In other words, the compulsory service might be justified as economically self-supporting on purely educational grounds.

General Chittenden objects to this, however, largely on the ground that camp and barrack life is immoral. Mr. Angell does so on similar grounds, adding some satirical but ridiculous comments by George Bernard Shaw.

Armies are composed largely of young men. The ground for the arguments of General Chittenden and Mr. Angell are that the association of so many unmarried men and the absence of women has a lowering tendency. If so, the same must be true of our colleges where conditions of many men living together are similar, and at the least responsible time of life. Yet we have no great outcry against the value of these educational institutions on that

account. Probably neither barrack, camp, nor campus life do more than attract attention to the faults of mankind through concentration.

Added to this item of education are many great national and international benefits due to strategical needs, to war, and often to the actual work of the soldier. The military roads of Europe were the great forerunner of modern road systems. The Panama Canal is a result largely of military need, and has been brought to perfection, by a soldier, in a manner which is an excellent example of military efficiency. Where others failed the American soldier succeeded. Without delay or confusion this stupendous feat was rapidly accomplished; without graft, or scandal, surmounting the great difficulties of engineering and sanitation. Those who are acquainted with great works of the kind will agree that in other hands the canal would probably have given rise to scandal and graft, cost more, and, today, be far from completion.

Much other great engineering work is being done by soldiers as a regular part of their duty. The Army Medical Corps is largely responsible for the great advances made in the elimination and treatment of yellow fever. By the army has the greatest result been secured, and most valuable lessons been given in the prevention and treatment of typhoid fever; and so on, indefinitely. Again, there can be no doubt whatever that the ideal soldier presents

much for the ordinary mortal, be he civilian or soldier, to emulate. The deeds in battle are often those of noble men. The glory of a nation in its military forces is a thing well worth while.

Said Professor James, whom we have previously quoted, in reference to the Civil War:

Those ancestors, those efforts, those memories and legends are the most ideal part of what we now own together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood poured out.

To all of which, the anti-militarist protests that the success against disease, the engineering feats, the deeds of heroism, the legends, and all that the army and navy have given mankind would have come anyhow sooner or later because man is the same. Here again he is but partially right; though man is the same in some degree, yet the environment and circumstances in training affect him greatly.

Still another item which may be placed on the credit side in war's ledger is the rather astonishing fact that in many ways it has been proved actually to be of aid to industry, commerce, and the nation — even sometimes in defeat.

We have previously in this work inferred that a certain learned professor, in his attempt to criticize armies and navies, was displaying the fact that he had ventured from his proper field. Hence we may be pardoned if, to avoid a similar charge, we again

invoke the assistance of Henry C. Emery, Professor of Economics at Yale University, and quote him at length in support of this rather radical statement.

Professor Emery prefaced his lecture before the Army War College at Washington with the following remark:

Some joking remarks were made on the assumption that, as a political economist, I would be, naturally, opposed to any program for an increased military organization, which was the topic of conversation. To justify myself in such company, I began to give some of the economic arguments in favor of a strong military organization, and some days afterwards I was invited by General Wood to address the officers of the military college.

I was so flattered by the invitation that I accepted without much thought, and now feel much embarrassment at having done so. It is hardly possible that there is any problem regarding war or military armaments with which you are not much more familiar than I am myself, and I am not here this morning with any idea that I can tell you anything new. On the other hand, I try to justify myself for taking your time in this way, because it is often interesting to have familiar facts approached from a different angle, and to have one's own ideas in some measure supported by an outsider, who cannot be charged with any personal or professional prejudice in his expression of views.

He continued:

In the first place it should be stated that the growth of industry and trade does not depend solely on the growth of

capital and the quantity of labor, as was commonly assumed by the writers of the peace and free trade era. Equally important is the character of leadership in the industrial field, and by this I do not mean only the ability to organize and coordinate by the forces of production on the part of the captains of industry; I mean also the more subtle qualities of confidence, faith in the future, and speculative daring. These are vital elements in commercial progress, but they are of peculiar psychological character and are affected by many influences which are not at all economic in their nature. Is it not to be expected that under the impetus of a great war, when national fervor is at its highest point and the spirit of daring and sacrifice pervades the community, that these influences should also be felt in the field of business, and that men should confidently undertake enterprises which in calmer times would have seemed staggering and impossible in their nature? I believe that on this point ample evidence could be found.

I recall a conversation at the outbreak of the Spanish War between two able men of the old school who agreed that that war would put the United States back morally and economically a full quarter of a century. This prophecy was scarcely fulfilled. The period before the outbreak of the Spanish War had been a period of great stagnation and hard times. Nobody cared to borrow capital to develop new enterprises or to expand old ones, while the half-dozen years following the war were perhaps the most extraordinarily prosperous in our whole history. I do not mean to say that hard times would have continued without the war, or that the war was the fundamental cause of business revival, but I do think it played a distinct part. We had come to the point where the

evils of excessive industrial expansion had worked themselves out, supplies had been greatly diminished, and an increased demand was bound to come, working toward improved conditions. But a demand has to be started by somebody. A break had to be made at some point in the business timidity which has prevailed for so long, and the war came at the psychological minute to start the upward movement.

This was partly due to the fillip given to trade by Government contracts, but much more, I think, through the psychological change which resulted from getting our minds away from the industrial hardships of the preceding years and the stimulating feeling that at last there was "something doing." In other words, the war came as a trumpet call, not only to the military spirit of the country but to the industrial spirit as well.

Certainly this psychological influence played a marked role in the extraordinary industrial development of Germany immediately after the Franco-Prussian War. Again, I cannot stop to attempt any analysis of the many factors which contributed to this development, but I am confident that a primary one was the increased confidence in their own capacity which this signal triumph gave to the German people. Again I wish to urge the fact that courage and daring are as essential elements in the field of industry as in the field of war. One reason why the Germans began to beat their rivals in the economic field was that they had at last realized that they could beat their rivals, and this realization came to them largely as the result of the fact that they had beaten them in the field of war.

Our Civil War offers many examples of the same kind.

The vigor of business life in the North throughout that great conflict is still a matter of amazement for the economic historian. Here again the influence was two-fold. The huge Government contracts acted as an extraordinary degree of protection and encouragement, but equally important was the fact that the same spirit of forward endeavor which animated the armies in the field also animated the leaders and the rank and file in the domain of business.

I would only suggest one other theoretical result of war in this connection, but that an all-important one on the credit side of the ledger and more perfectly illustrated during our Civil War than at any other period in history. Again note the ordinary assumption of the writer of the old school that capital and labor are always employed to their full extent. No allowance was ever made for the enormous reserve productive force which can be called out in time of emergency. And yet should we not expect theoretically that a time of great stress (as a result of armed conflict and depletion of the ranks of labor for military purposes) would be in large measure, at least, offset by the utilization of this reserve force? Workmen who had already been employed would work harder and longer. The very necessity of the situation would demand better organization and the utilization of the most economic methods of production, while there is a vast reserve fund of labor which, under ordinary circumstances is not employed, can be called upon at such a period. In other words, the destructive influence of war on industry, which would seem to be a patent fact due to so large a proportion of the population being removed from the ranks of industry, proves not to be a net loss at all, but is largely made up from the industrial reserve force.

Prof. E. D. Fite has recently published a book entitled, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War*.^{*} We have already been familiar with the extraordinary fact that production in most lines did increase during this period, but he has here collected a large amount of interesting evidence to show how general this condition was. Certain industries were, of course, seriously crippled, especially the cotton industry, due to lack of the supply of the raw material, and the serious effect of this situation on European industry is well-known. Such disturbances as this must always stand on the debit side of the ledger as real destructive effects, but in the main manufactures were not only flourishing from the financial point of view, but the actual output was increased. We produced in 1864 fifty per cent more iron rails than in any year before the war. Much the same was true of many other lines of manufacture.

Even more surprising, perhaps, was the agricultural situation. Here the reserve forces of labor made themselves most apparent. In 1864 Indiana, for example, with ten per cent of her total population in the Union ranks, produced more wheat than she had produced in any year before the war.

Here, as before, the pacifist cries that it was in spite of war, not because of it; that the industrial, commercial, and agricultural booms would have come anyhow; and they are able to give us several examples where industrial revival did not follow war. Here, as before, we would suggest that the pacifist may be partly right. We have, however, shown that

^{*} *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War*, E. D. Fite, The Macmillan Company.

eminent authority which "cannot be charged with any personal or professional prejudice," gives much credit to war. We quote an economist, not a soldier.

Some of the greatest men of peace have recognized the advantage of war. Among these may be mentioned John Ruskin and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Said Ruskin:

All the pure and noble arts of peace are founded on war; no great art ever rose on earth but among a nation of soldiers. There is no great art possible to a nation but that which is based on battle. When I tell you that war is the foundation of all the arts, I mean also that it is the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men. It was very strange for me to discover this, and very dreadful, but I saw it to be quite an undeniable fact. The common notion that peace and the virtues of civil life flourished together I found to be utterly untenable. Peace and the vices of civil life only flourish together. We talk of peace and learning, of peace and plenty, of peace and civilization; but I found that these are not the words that the Muse of History coupled together: that on her lips the words were peace and sensuality, peace and selfishness, peace and death. I found in brief that all great nations learned their truth of word and strength of thought in war; that they were nourished in war and wasted in peace; taught by war and deceived by peace; trained by war and betrayed by peace; in a word, that they were born in war and expired in peace.

Emerson's views on war are similar:

Our culture must, therefore, not omit the arming of the

man. Let him hear in season that he is born into a state of war, and that the commonwealth and his own well-being require that she should not go dancing in the weeds of peace; but warned, self-collected and neither defying nor dreading the thunder, let him take both reputation and life in his hands, and with perfect urbanity dare the gibbet and the mob by the absolute truth of his speech and rectitude of his behavior.

To the credit of war we must assert, flatly, Mr. Angell to the contrary, notwithstanding, that both nations and individuals do, in many cases, gain by war. We have shown in our preceding chapters that this is so under certain conditions. We may add that war gave the citizens of the thirteen colonies independence. We will not belittle that one great fact by adding others. It is sufficient.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SLANDERING OF THE SOLDIER

ONE of the worst examples that we have seen of sensational exaggeration and slandering of the army, over the name of a person of prominence, is the following, generally attributed to Jack London, though Mr. London has since denied the authorship. It is similar to other anti-militarist literature, and is used by the socialist to prevent enlistment.

Young men: The lowest aim in your life is to be a soldier. The good soldier never tries to distinguish right from wrong. He never thinks, never reasons; he only obeys. If he is ordered to fire on his fellow citizens, on his friends, on his neighbors, on his relatives, he obeys without hesitation. If he is ordered to fire down a crowded street when the poor are clamoring for bread, he obeys, and sees the gray hairs of age stained with red and the life tide gushing from the breasts of women, feeling neither remorse nor sympathy. If he is ordered off as a firing squad to execute a hero or benefactor, he fires without hesitation, though he knows the bullet will pierce the noblest heart that ever beat in human breast.

A good soldier is a blind, heartless, soulless, murderous machine. He is not a man. He is not even a brute, for brutes only kill in self-defense. All that is human in him,

all that is divine in him, all that constitutes the man has been sworn away when he took the enlistment roll. His mind, his conscience, aye, his very soul, are in the keeping of his officer.

No man can fall lower than a soldier — it is a depth beneath which we cannot go. Keep the boys out of the army. It is hell.

Down with the army and navy. We don't need killing institutions.

We need life giving institutions.

We have seen some similar literature from the pen of less prominent anarchists and socialists.

Some readers may have noticed, that throughout our entire work one important omission has been made — one that to some extent affects the main thought of the book. Showing that wars are probable, we have shown that military force as an insurance against defeat in war is but a paying business proposition. We have failed, however, to show whether or not the United States is adequately protected by such insurance.

Positively, it is not.

“And if not, why not?” is the natural query of the citizens. “Do we not spend sufficient money on military forces?”

To which we may answer, “Yes, you do, *almost*.”

Contrary to the belief of many, it is not greatly increased expenditures that the army and navy need, but a comparatively small additional sum and laws

which will permit the proper and wise handling of what we now expend. Under these conditions, the United States could have a strong and ample protective force. One of the needs of the military forces that is really pressing, however, is the removal of public apathy and antagonism, due in no small part to such writers as London.

There is a certain class of pacifists who join the socialist in defaming the army at every opportunity, regardless of truth, caring nothing for facts as they really are. They are joined by many citizens who are either actively antagonistic or indifferent to the welfare of the nation, who know nothing of the military needs of the country, and can see no need whatever for the soldier or sailor. To them, he is but a parasite, living, as they believe, on the fat of the land at the expense of the taxpayer.

No one is better acquainted with these facts than an officer who has been fortunate enough to command a company of the National Guard of one of the states. Such an officer, being a citizen himself three-quarters of his time, is thoroughly acquainted with the civilian's theories. Should he attempt to recruit his organization by appealing to the patriotism of the community, he would have but a small command indeed. When an American youth asks why he should join such an organization and is told that it is his duty to be prepared to defend his country, his answer is either actual derision or evasion; but if it

is possible to promise him a certain amount of good fellowship, of social amusement and enjoyment, the matter assumes an entirely different turn.

In so far as the criticisms attributed to Mr. London are concerned, they are almost too ridiculous to invite reply, but as there are those who know nothing of the facts who might believe such statements, it may be well to devote a small amount of space in answer thereto. An officer or non-commissioned officer, and, in many cases, a private in the United States service who could never think and never reason but only obey, would find himself liable to court martial in the first campaign in which he took part. The officers and the men of the United States Army are trained to think and to accept responsibility. An officer who obeyed the command of a superior, given previously, when conditions had greatly changed so as to make it disastrous to obey that order, would be as liable to censure and would receive as much censure as one who failed to obey when he should do so. Here is a fine point for an officer to decide, for many a case will arise when an officer will feel that by disobeying, he may be court-martialled for doing so, and that if he obeys he may be censured for doing that. He certainly must think. Our non-commissioned officers and privates are taught to lead patrols, to scout, to command men. They are required to attend schools at the post where they are stationed. They are taught

to think. They are trained in thinking, and the enlisted man who cannot use his head to advantage, has an exceedingly hard time in the army.

We know of cases where American troops have stood in crowded streets and been fired upon, where they have stood and been stoned and cursed and jeered without using the great power at their command; but we know of no cases where they have "fired down a crowded street when the poor are clamoring for bread" and watched "the gray hairs of age stained with red and the life tide gushing from the breasts of women, feeling neither remorse nor sympathy." If the author of the passage quoted knows when American troops have done these things, we should be glad to have him inform us. We fear, however, that he allowed his dramatic instinct to run away with his knowledge of facts.

The most common slander of the soldier is an accusation of habitual drunkenness, immorality, and laziness, while, as a matter of fact, the men of the army and navy are generally above civilians of equal standing in these respects.

Recently, we learned of an occasion where about 5,000 troops were in camp for a short time near a small town. An officer was standing nearby when he heard two citizens of the village discussing the fact that an intoxicated soldier had broken a window in one of the town stores. The man telling of the incident was inclined to attribute this to the moral

degeneracy of the soldier as a class, but the other citizen scornfully remarked:

"Maybe so, but thank God it's not 5,000 college boys camping out there, or we would have *no* town."

Similarly, we believe that the citizen might have substituted for college boys, coachmen, doctors, lawyers, certainly legislators, and not improbably ministers, for who has seen a large convention of any of these classes of men who does not know that among all large bodies of males, there are those who cannot be relied upon to maintain good order?

A sample of the sort of criticism which the army receives as drunkards and degenerates is that appearing in *The Christian Work and Evangelist* a few years ago, as follows:

Soldiers, as a class, are men who have disregarded the civil standard of morality altogether. They simply ignore it. Civilians fight shy of soldiers because in the game of life soldiers do not play the game according to the commonly accepted rules. In soldiers' eyes lying, thieving, drunkenness, bad language are not evils at all. To "lie like a trooper" is a sound metaphor. The soldier invents all sorts of elaborate lies for the mere pleasure of inventing them. Looting, again, is one of his joys; destroying property, not for profit, but for the sheer fun of the destruction.

This criticism was stated to have come from "A British Military Officer," though the British authorities can locate no such officer. It was amply answered

in *The Army and Navy Journal* a short time afterwards. The fallacies of the statements of the so-called officer being made apparent to everyone.

This probably has never been true of the soldier any more than any other body of men. It has been pointed out that any officer or soldier who answered to the description of soldiers above would be promptly court-martialled, and dismissed from the service. Every one of the offenses mentioned by this "officer" is subject to severe punishment in the United States Army, even to the lying, which is not so frequently punished in civil life.

Said *The Army and Navy Journal* in its issue of October 26, 1912:

If you go back to the time when children were hung in England for robbing an orchard, when John Bunyan was imprisoned for fourteen years in Bedford jail for preaching the Gospel, when the conditions of the prisons and insane asylums as revealed by the missionary work of Mrs. Elizabeth Fry were too horrible to contemplate, you may possibly find conditions in armies in some measure justifying the characterization of your anonymous British Officer. But these conditions, so far as they may have once existed, certainly exist no longer, and it is cruel injustice to judge by them the Army of the United States, which is governed by as high a standard of honor, truthfulness, and respect for the rights of others as any class in the community, clergy not excepted.

In support of this, we may invite your attention to General Orders of the War Department, pub-


lishing the proceedings of a general court-martial of a cadet of the United States Military Academy. This cadet was charged with making a false official statement, and for this offense was dismissed from the service of the United States. This is the regular standard of the United States Naval and Military Academies, where lying, cheating, or any dishonorable actions are absolutely not tolerated. In view of this fact it hardly seems reasonable to expect that an officer trained in this manner will become the kind of man described above, or that an army under the training and direction of officers of this kind would be composed of enlisted men fitting that description.

A more correct idea of the attitude of the army on matters of intemperance and immorality may be gained from a news item copied from *The Portland Oregonian*, reporting a meeting held in the assembly hall, Vancouver Barracks, on March 15, 1914, in the interest of temperance. Chaplain James Ossewaarde, of the Twenty-first United States Infantry, spoke for about an hour to an audience that is said to have taxed the capacity of the hall, his subject being "The Saloon, the Nation's Costliest Encumbrance." The members of the Women's Christian Temperance Union of Vancouver were present in a body, and had distributed cards which contained the following statement: "I hereby declare that I am opposed to the saloon and the liquor

traffic, and that I am in favor of abolishing the evil from the state and the nation." At the close of the meeting, Chaplain Ossewaarde announced that 472 men in uniform had signed these cards, and thereby declared their opposition to the liquor traffic and their favor of its abolition. Among those signing there were twenty-eight commissioned officers, including all the officers of the Medical Corps. In addition, among the signers there were a large number of non-commissioned officers. Chaplain Ossewaarde stated that he believed that at least three-fourths of the Twenty-first United States Infantry would be glad to see the saloon abolished from the entire nation.

The objection may be made that this regiment is not representative of the entire United States Army, and that may possibly have some foundation, as Chaplain Ossewaarde stated that the Twenty-first Infantry had a reputation as a temperance organization. However, a careful investigation would disclose the fact that there is a very similar sentiment among other regiments in the service, and that the army as a whole is as temperate as any other organization of men.

One of the facts which is partially responsible for the bad reputation of the army is the prominence which the uniform gives to the few who disgrace it. Whenever an enlisted man becomes intoxicated his uniform attracts attention; whenever an officer com-



mits an indiscretion, the press gives undue prominence to the fact, and hence it is that the army's entire reputation suffers. The army, however, can invite investigation in this matter, and if those who defame it would become intimately acquainted with the soldiers' lives, they would find that there is no cleaner body of men than in the regular service of the United States.

Another form of slander has been the charge of abuse of the enlisted men by officers, unfair attitude of courts-martial and the consequent increase in desertion. The facts as they are in regard to courts-martial are well summed up by Robert A. Doremus, a civilian:

I have reported as stenographer over one thousand cases, and in only one instance have I felt that perhaps the court erred, and this only on account of facts developing after the conviction. I have never seen a case where the court took snap judgment and where absolute fairness was not accorded the accused during the trial. I am, perhaps, as familiar with general courts-martial and the procedure followed as any individual outside of the United States Army, and more so than a great many in it, and I believe I can sum the whole proposition up in the following language: "If I am innocent I would like to be tried by a general court-martial; if I am guilty give me a jury in a civil court." *

As for the attitude of the enlisted men, witness the following crude, but effective, statement from

* *The Army and Navy Journal*.

the leading non-commissioned officers of the Fifth United States Infantry. Non-commissioned officers — and especially the non-commissioned staff and first sergeants — are *enlisted men* (not officers) generally with long service to their credit. They know.

Whereas, That the articles appearing in *Harper's Weekly* [early in 1914] criticizing the system in the Army are inaccurate and do not show the conditions as they actually exist.

Whereas, That the undersigned non-commissioned officers know from long service and personal knowledge that enlisted men are not required to polish officers' shoes and that the picture drawn by James Montgomery Flagg as shown in the first number of the above mentioned magazine on "The Honor of the Army" is not true. That we have never heard an officer order an enlisted man to do work of this kind.

Whereas, That officers exercise military authority with firmness, kindness and justice and do not injure those under their authority by tyrannical conduct, and that the authority exercised compares favorably with that accorded employees by employers of labor in civil life.

Whereas, That the interests of discipline would not be subserved if any greater leniency was shown those who fail to obey the orders of their superiors, and that all well conducted mercantile establishments and corporations maintain a system of discipline which is considered in some instances more severe than that of the Army.

Resolved, That no specific cause can be found for desertion in time of peace other than that young men enlist in a

spirit of adventure, become dissatisfied when this wish is not realized and desert for the same reason they would leave any position they may have in civil life in which they are required to perform certain duties where others were placed over them. It is also thought that the aspersion cast on the uniform of a soldier in certain communities and in public places of amusement are causes that make them dissatisfied and wish to return to civil life.

Resolved, That a copy of the above be sent to *Harper's Weekly*, *The Army and Navy Journal* and *The Army and Navy Register* with the request that the same be published.

The resolutions are signed by Frank C. Reilly, sergeant major; Fred W. Kenny, quartermaster sergeant; Frank Mayer, commissary sergeant; Fred S. Scoble, battalion sergeant major; Anderson W. Sharp, color sergeant; William G. Sams, color sergeant; Andrew Gibson, first sergeant, Co. G; Henry T. Hyde, first sergeant, Co. H; Harry Kleine, first sergeant, Co. F; Benjamin C. Fink, first sergeant, Co. L; John H. Lucas, first sergeant, Co. I; Harry H. Curtis, first sergeant, Co. K; Theodore Schoge, first sergeant, Co. A; George Moore, first sergeant, Co. M; John Trush, first sergeant, Co. E; Bernard F. Kahn, first sergeant, Co. D; Arthur Harris, first sergeant, Co. B; Clayton Sandoe, first sergeant, Co. C; Andrew Lindstrom, acting first sergeant, Reg. Det.

Desertions are not due to the army, but to the American public. The fault lies neither in undue

severity nor in unfairness in the service, but to the fact that the modern American youth is brought up without restraint, without discipline, without training. When he enlists he receives these beneficial things and he chafes under the restraint — becomes “homesick” and deserts. The same reasons may be given for desertion as any principal of a strict educational institution could tell you influence spoiled and pampered boys to run away from school.

CHAPTER IX

"COMMON PEOPLE" AND MILITARY FORCE

NEXT, if not equal, in importance, to the slanderous attacks made upon the character of the personnel of the army and navy, is the insidious attempt of anti-militarists of a certain class to convince the so-called "common people" that military force is opposed to the interest of the plain citizen.

The most successful form which this campaign has taken has been in antagonizing union labor against military force. In this particular body of men there appears to be a natural tendency to regard military force as their enemy, and this tendency receives much assistance from some of the anti-militarists. It is a regrettable fact that at the present time organized labor has been unable to see the errors of its reasoning.

Labor unions are, as a whole, patriotic organizations. Many of them are composed of intelligent men, and it has been found in more than one instance that when conditions were properly explained, they favored rather than opposed military force. The opposition of labor lies, of course, in the fact that troops are frequently used to preserve order during

riots growing out of labor trouble. According to the agitators, the soldiers are the tools of the employer. Such, however, is far from the case. A soldier, in the first place, would rather perform any other duty than riot duty during a strike; and, in the second place, when compelled to do so he stands for order alone. Union labor men are not anarchists; they are not lawless; they are not dishonest; and they do not oppose a government that insures good order. In fact, such men give a strong, high-class vote in favor of what they believe will be for the protection and interest of their homes. They desire the protection of police for their own homes and privileges, and would under no circumstances vote to have the police protection done away with. Due to agitators, however, in many cases they fail to recognize that troops when called out are merely performing the duty which the police have been unable to do.

As for the attitude of the soldier in labor disturbances, we quote from one of the military manuals for riot duty; a book which has been adopted by the War Department for study in all officers' schools in the National Guard, and which is in use in many of the states:

The attitude of the troops should be strictly impartial, especially in labor disturbances. They should absolutely prevent all disorder, no matter from what source, but should take extreme care to show no favors to any side of the con-

troversy. Furthermore, after preventing disorder, damage to property or possible injury to person, no action should be taken which will aid or hinder either party in their lawful attempts to further their purposes.

In addition to the legal and military aspects, there is another point to be considered in regard to the use of force in riot duty. Both officers and men should take into consideration the great difference between the classes of riots and rioters in determining the amount of force to be used. Riots may be divided as follows: First, those partaken in by citizens, usually law abiding, but temporarily crazed through real or fancied wrongs; second, those in which the participants are entirely vicious and criminal; and third, those assuming the nature of a rebellion against the lawful government, whether the participants be of the lawful or criminal classes. Though, from a military viewpoint, all may be the same, and, from a legal viewpoint, the first two may be the same, it is obvious that every effort should be made to refrain from wounding or killing participants in the first class of rioters, while in the second and third cases greater force may be advisable and necessary.*

Time and time again it has been shown that troops not only take the above attitude, but are more careful not to use unnecessary force than are forces composed of undisciplined deputies sworn in for the occasion, and certainly very much more careful than the private guards employed by some of the large corporations. We know of no instance when troops have ever fired unnecessarily or continued their fire

* *Troops on Riot Duty*, Military Publishing Co., Trenton, N. J.

to an excessive point in riots; but we do know of many cases where they have withheld their full power in spite of personal injury sustained by missiles and even shots coming from a crowd.

The better class of union labor — and this constitutes the majority — is in favor of a stable government, of one that will be strong enough to prevent disorder and anarchy from occurring at the will of any body or organization. The Government accomplishes this through police and troops, both bodies being men whose duty it is to keep all sides of an argument in good order, but *not* to investigate the matter, form their own opinions, and help one side or the other. The labor man would not desire to have the police or the soldier investigate strike conditions and take active action, using offensive force against one side or the other. Such decisions should be made by other men than soldiers; for instance, boards of arbitration. In the meantime, the soldier must keep his opinions to himself, and confine his efforts to maintaining order. Such an attitude is the only possible way of securing justice and maintaining good government.

Should they give the matter a little thought the union men would realize thoroughly that, in keeping order during strikes, the soldier is doing exactly what the laboring man himself would vote for at a time when he was not impassioned by his own grievances. Moreover, labor has already, in some instances,

offered to furnish deputies from the ranks of strikers to keep good order during labor disturbances. This was a wise and logical move. Similarly the unions could do no better than to fill the National Guard, which is the force usually called in strike duty, with union men. It would be an insurance of justice to labor on the part of each individual Guardsman, in addition to the present just attitude of the Guard as a whole. This attitude may now be spoiled, on occasion, by the act of someone or some few members of the National Guard — exactly, for instance, as some union men occasionally fail to stand for the principles advocated by their organizations. It is not fair, for instance, to charge all union labor with the acts of dynamiters, nor to charge the Guard with the acts which may occur through a small proportion of its members.

When the unions realize the truth about the soldier, we will secure most of our citizen soldiers from their ranks, and the unions themselves will be greatly strengthened by gaining the support of those who now look upon them as advocates of disorder and anarchy.

Furthermore, we have already pointed out one of the many instances where it is in defense of the rights of the laboring classes that we may be involved in war. We refer to the prevention of the importation of cheap yellow labor — a case where it is certain that, socialists to the contrary, the soldier would be

fighting for labor and not for capital. The claim that the "plain people" fight the wars and gain nothing through them affords the pacifists, the anti-militarists, and the socialists one of their main, though by no means their strongest, arguments. For instance, intervention in Mexico, to them, would mean saving some corporation from financial loss or enabling it to secure some financial advantage; but to the soldier it means the saving of the lives of the clerks and laborers of that corporation, and of other Americans, and the honor of their wives and daughters. To the soldier the fact that counts is that these men, with their families, went into Mexico in time of peace, just as any other working man would have done, to retain his position or to get a better one. He knows also that in the past the Government has allowed Americans to believe that they would be protected while on foreign soil. From the military man's viewpoint these are sufficient cause for intervention, regardless of the corporation's gains or losses thereby. If those in charge of the Civil Government at Washington act on other grounds than these, that is the fault of the civilians in charge of the Government and of those who elected them, and not of the soldier.

Similarly, the soldier sees in the Revolution a war to free America, and to give the plainest American citizen political rights equal to those of any other man, be he civilian or soldier, nobleman or com-

moner. He believes such a war is to insure representation of all in our government and to uphold the principles of the Declaration of Independence, which states :


That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Again, the soldier sees in the Civil War not a struggle to meet the desires of capital, but one growing largely out of the oppression of the negro — the commonest of the so-called "common people." If there have been wars waged solely in the interest of capital, that in no way affects the justice or the desirability of these great wars waged in the interests of the rights and privileges of humanity, and in no way affects the likelihood of similar wars in the future in the interest of no one except the "common people."

Nor do the "common people" fail to obtain their share of glory and honor. As has been pointed out in service publications time and time again, the

"common people" secured the greatest honors in the time of the Civil War. Lincoln and his lowly origin need not be called to the attention of any American citizen. Grant, a plain man, secured a full share of the honors growing out of that war; and Sherman, Sheridan, and others who reaped the greatest rewards of the struggle, were men of the plain people.

Our army, furthermore, is a democratic organization. Today there is no institution more democratic than West Point — a school where merit alone can secure distinction. The cadet who is the son of a general, or a senator, or of the President, probably would wish many times that he could have passed through the academy in the guise of the son of a less distinguished individual. Certain it is that any tendency in such a cadet to assume superiority on account of such paternity would be eliminated, more rapidly than politely, by his fellow students. Every enlisted man has an opportunity to rise from the ranks of our army and become a commissioned officer. Every civilian has a similar chance and no "pull" can make lieutenants of those who do not win their commission in fair and impartial examinations. In the National Guard, in many cases, this is actually carried too far. In the majority of states, officers are elected by the men, and frequently when there is no enlisted man in a company who is capable of becoming an officer, the men refuse to elect capa-



ble candidates from other organizations, or from civilian life, and the service suffers accordingly.

As we see it, the only ground which the anti-militarist has on which to base his ridiculous claims that war is opposed to the interest of the plain people is the fact that there are more of that class than there are capitalists, or members of the "four hundred," in the various armies. Those bringing out this fact, however, conveniently forget to state that about nine hundred and ninety-nine out of one thousand are "common" men. Under the circumstances, an equal representation can hardly be expected.

Neither are the interests of the labor nor of any other class of "common people" in conflict with adequate military protection.

CHAPTER X

THE MILITARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

THE pacifist and the anti-militarist are devotees of untrained militia or volunteers, as being the proper means of defense in case of war. They believe that if, owing to some unforeseen miscalculation in their ideas for perpetual peace, a war should happen to break out, the sixteen million militia of the United States would be more than a match for any armies which a foreign nation might send against us. That sixteen million, which we have actually heard well-known pacifists state was the number of men in the National Guard, is the total number of males in the United States who are available for military service. They are the constitutional militia, which includes every able-bodied male citizen between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. We have previously shown that, from a viewpoint of economy of expenditure, reliance on raw militia or untrained volunteers is a serious error. Equally is this so in regard to the undesirability of trusting the defense of the nation in the hands of such troops.

When an army officer or an officer of our navy makes a statement of this kind, the anti-militarist

immediately cries that he is influenced by personal or professional prejudice. It is a peculiar trait in the nature of Americans that although in case of sickness they call for the advice of a doctor, and in case of legal trouble they consult a lawyer, in military matters they think that the soldier is influenced only by personal or professional interest. It may, of course, be true that the doctor is to some extent more careful in matters of health and hygiene than the average layman, that the lawyer is more particular to have his ordinary business actions strictly legal than is a business man not of that profession, and, in the same manner, it is possible that many soldiers are a trifle over-zealous in advocating military preparation. However, the doctor is probably absolutely correct in the steps which he takes to preserve health, the lawyer is probably equally so in his care to have everything technically perfect, and similarly the soldier, from a military point of view, probably never asks any more than is proper for the military welfare of the nation.

Either the soldier is correct and the things which he advocates are not only desirable, but essential, to this country, or else the civilian bodies which, unfortunately, control our military establishment, and which have been responsible for our past lack of policy, are alone correct, among all the bodies, civil or military, which control the military forces of the great nations of the world. If we are to assume that

the civilians who are responsible for our military policy — or lack of it — have been correct, then we must, conversely, reach a decision that the governing powers of all other great nations, the military experts of such nations, and our own military experts, as well, are in error.

Such a decision, in favor of military weakness, is tenable only if supported by some special conditions which would permit the existence in this one nation of grounds for an irrefutable argument against the military policy of all other nations. As yet, no such conditions have been shown to exist. Also, if we admit the possibility of the existence of such conditions, then we must conclude that our military experts, from the time of Washington until today, either have been incapable of recognizing the needs of the nation, or sufficiently unprincipled to advocate unnecessary military measures for the sole purpose of supposed personal gain. On such conclusions no comment is necessary.

Among the fallacies that are responsible for a state of the public mind, which is reflected in our governing bodies to the detriment of military efficiency, are three of especial prominence. First among these may be placed the idea that every American citizen is a born soldier, needing only to don a suitable uniform to become an efficient general officer, or drummer boy, as the case may be. Second, is the idea that the United States is so isolated by

the waters of two oceans that no foreign nation can attack us in force. Last may be placed ideas due to victories in past wars, in which the works of historians show only the ultimate victory, minimize or eliminate the shameful conditions which were caused in each by our military weakness, and belittle the corresponding weakness, or the more important military operations of our enemy, which, as much as our own forces, have won our victories. Who among us cannot remember, after our schoolboy studies of American History, the boastful statement, "The United States could lick the world?"

? It is upon the third item — the misleading histories, or the misreading of the more accurate histories — that the anti-militarist bases his arguments in favor of little, if any, military preparation. It is upon this item that the idea of the great martial qualities of the American civilian is founded; and it is largely upon the conditions of transportation, etc., which existed during our wars with England that the idea of our isolation is based. It is, therefore, well for us to consider briefly the actions of our raw volunteers and untrained militia as they actually were in our various wars.

Practically the first step for the organized defense of the Thirteen Colonies was taken on April 22, 1775, when the Congress of Massachusetts resolved to raise, at once, 13,000 men, this to be done by commissioning as captain anyone who could raise

a company, and as colonel any man who raised ten such companies. This was the beginning of the extraordinary and unique method of appointing officers which prevails to a great extent to this day in the volunteers and in the National Guard.

As early as November, 1775, General Washington began to complain of the inefficiency of the raw troops. Under that date he wrote to Congress:

Instead of pressing to be engaged in the cause of their country, which I vainly flattered myself would be the case, I find we are likely to be deserted in a most critical time. Those that have enlisted must have a furlough, which I have been obliged to grant to fifty at a time, from each regiment. The Connecticut troops, upon whom I reckoned, are as backward, indeed, if possible, more so than the people of this colony. Our situation is truly alarming.

On December 2, in a letter to Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, he added:

Connecticut troops were requested and ordered to remain here, as the time of most of them would not be out before the 10th, when they would be relieved. Notwithstanding this, yesterday morning most of them resolved to leave the camp. Many went off, and the utmost vigilance and industry were used to apprehend them. Several got away with their arms and ammunition.

Desertion, even at this early stage of the war, became the rule rather than the exception. Discipline was but a farce, and homesick soldiers took every

action to get away. According to a report of General Schuyler :

Near three hundred of them arrived a few days ago, unable to do any duty ; but as soon as I administered that grand specific, a discharge, they instantly acquired health, and rather than be detained a few days to cross Lake George, they undertook a march from here of two hundred miles with the greatest alacrity.


All through the year 1775 the American troops, numbering 37,683 men, lay inactive through want of discipline and training, through failure of supply officers, and through the inability of the higher officers to be sure of the presence of their troops when wanted. The British numbered but 11,500 men, of whom but 6,500 were fit for duty. This condition continued with various attempts to raise troops until August 29, when Washington was defeated in the Battle of Long Island, after which the militia deserted " almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time." It was in his report of this that Washington said :

All of these circumstances fully confirm the opinion I ever entertain, and which I more than once in my letters took the liberty of mentioning to Congress, that no dependence could be put in a militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded, and as fully convinced as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties


WAR OF THE REVOLUTION

SHOWING EXTRAVAGANCE OF MILITIA SYSTEM—SMALL ARMIES BUT
MANY PENSIONERS


Total Number Enlisted—395,858. Almost all Eligible for Pensions




Number of Actual Pensioners—95,753



Largest Army Under Washington in any one Battle—17,000



Number of Soldiers with Washington at Trenton and Princeton—4,000



must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing army. Nor would the expense incident to the support of such a body of troops as would be competent to almost every exigency far exceed that which is daily incurred by calling in succor and new enlistments, which when effected are not attended with any good consequences.

On September 15, the same raw troops, including the firing line and Parson's and Fellow's brigades, ran, without firing a shot, from sixty or seventy British soldiers — this in spite of their officers' efforts to prevent it. Thus, throughout the entire Revolution, the militia continued to run, desert, mutiny, and generally imperil the welfare of the Thirteen Colonies.

At Cowpens, Morgan's injunction to the militia was "Just hold up your heads, boys; three fires and you are free." At Guilford Court House, the same moderate demand was made upon the militia, but as soon as the enemy came in sight they gave way. Although a total of 395,858 men were called out during the war and thereby became eligible for pensions, the largest force that Washington was able to muster for battle at any one time, was 17,000. At Trenton and at Princeton, when he needed men most, he had an effective strength of but 4,000 (Plate 5).

The late Brevet Major-General Emory Upton, United States Army, in what is undoubtedly the most valuable and accurate contribution to America's

military history — his *Military Policy of the United States*, says :

Looking back at the whole Revolutionary struggle, notwithstanding our employment from first to last of almost 400,000 men, we find that but two military events had a direct bearing upon the expulsion of the British. One of these was the capture of Burgoyne; the other that of Cornwallis — an event which was only made possible by the co-operation of a French army and a French fleet.

This certainly is somewhat different from the school boy's conception of our raw troops in the Revolution. It certainly affords the anti-militarist but little ground for faith in untrained or in raw volunteers.

When the War of 1812 broke out, conditions were no better. Again militia showed its worthlessness. The first serious matter in this connection grew out of the refusal of the Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut to furnish militia at the call of the President — an evil not yet entirely removed, as was but recently shown in the tendency of a number of states to oppose certain military requirements which the Federal War Department believed to be for the best interest of the nation.

The invasion of Canada gave excellent example of the militia's worth — or rather worthlessness. In July, 1812, General Hull with about 300 regulars and 1,500 militia and volunteers crossed from De-

troit to Canada. General Hull, who was an experienced officer of the Revolution, and in whom Washington had placed great confidence, retreated without battle on August 8. His militia had been found mutinous, and on one occasion they refused to march until the Fourth United States Regiment, under Colonel Miller, compelled them to do so with fixed bayonets. On August 16, General Hull's whole force, then in Detroit, surrendered to an invading force of only 720 English and 600 Indians. Not a shot was fired.

Shortly after, General Hopkins' expedition of 4,000 mounted militia from Kentucky, marched against the Indians. On the fourth day of their march, a fire being seen on the prairie, they thought that it might be the enemy, their ardor cooled, and totally ignoring their officers, they turned about and soon after dispersed to their homes. Three other columns of militia from Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, amounting to 10,000 men, were organized about the same time for service against the hostile Indians. The column from Kentucky mutinied within a few days, but was pacified by its officers. That from Virginia, having had a slight engagement with the enemy, refused to obey orders for a pursuit, returned to camp and shortly afterward the entire force suffered defeat. At Queenstown the militia under General Van Rensselaer refused to obey orders for battle. General

Dearborn's 3,000 militia, organized to invade Canada, nearly all refused to cross the line — and thus the war continued, affording throughout nought but proof of the fact that raw troops are indeed a "broken staff" to lean upon.

Our burned Capital was the crowning humiliation of the war. This occurred on August 24, 1814, when the American defending force "suddenly assembled without organization or discipline or officers of the least knowledge of the service" numbered 5,401, consisting of 400 regulars, 600 marines, 20 sailors, and the balance militia or volunteers. The British force numbered 3,500, only a portion of the advance guard, which consisted of 1,500 men, being engaged. The Americans retired with so little resistance that there were but eight killed and eleven wounded, and the enemy, without opposition, marched into Washington, set fire to "The President's Palace, the Treasury, and the War Office," and on the next day they completed the destruction of all the American public buildings.

Upton, commenting upon this campaign, says:

The conduct of the regular troops on several occasions, gave abundant proof that the officers, just appointed from civil life, were little better than officers of militia, and that with no standard of discipline fixed in their minds, many of them were incapable of imparting to their soldiers the firmness expected of regulars in the hour of battle.

Nevertheless, a few young officers like Brown, Scott, and

Ripley were slowly acquiring, in the sure but expensive school of war, the military knowledge that was destined in some degree to retrieve the honor of our arms.

During the Mexican War this same fact — the necessity for trained troops — was amply borne out. Fortunately, however, by the wisdom of our generals and the good fortune of the campaigns, we were able to train our raw volunteers before they went into serious action. The result was victory. Such discredit as there was in this war was largely due to mismanagement at Washington, rather than to the troops in the field.

The Civil War found us with but 17,000 men in the regular army. At the first battle of Bull Run there were but 800 regulars, the balance of the Union Army consisting of 28,000 militia and volunteers. These 800 soldiers covered the retreat of the thousands of brave but disorganized civilians who had imagined that they were an army. Had the United States had a trained army on the field instead of an untrained mass of civilians, Bull Run would have been the end of the Civil War — not the beginning. It was only when our volunteers, through experience and training, became practically regulars that they were an effective fighting force. Had not the South been almost equally unprepared, it would have meant disaster to the Union. A trained foreign army at that time would have marched victoriously throughout the North.

Finally, in the Spanish-American War we did our fighting with regulars, there being but three volunteer regiments in Shafter's original expedition. Our volunteers with a few exceptions were unfit to embark at the time that Shafter's expedition set out, and in fact most of them were unfit to enter a campaign on the date that they were mustered out of the service at the conclusion of the war. Had the Spanish commander in Cuba used but ordinary military judgment, he would have placed Shafter's army in a most perilous position, for it was shown that, properly led, the Spaniards were brave fighters. It would have been necessary to reenforce our army of occupation with raw volunteers, and we fear for the result had this been the case. Moreover, it was not necessary for us to place the volunteers in active service in order to prove the worthlessness of the system which depends on untrained troops. The confusion, lack of discipline, illness, deaths from disease, failure of supply departments, and a hundred other proofs in our peaceful southern camps were sufficient (Plate 6).


Our militia and volunteers were not, are not, cowards. They are brave men, but not soldiers.


Says Upton, referring to a defeat of raw troops:


The disaster that ensued demands that the causes leading to it be carefully considered. First among them was the popular but mistaken belief that because our citizens individually possess courage, fortitude, and self-reliance, they must nec-


SHOWING THE NUMBER OF TROOPS WHICH
INEFFICIENCY COMPELLED THE U. S. TO USE
IN VARIOUS WARS, ALSO NUMBER OF TROOPS
USED BY ENEMY.


AN EXPLANATION OF OUR PENSION EXPENSES.


 *American—395,858*
British—150,000 REVOLUTION


 *American—527,652*
British—55,000 WAR OF 1812

 *American—44,521*
Creek—2,000 CREEK

 *American—68,784*
Indians—2,000 FLORIDA

 *American—104,556*
Mexican—46,000 MEXICAN

Union—2,672,341
 CIVIL
Confederate—1,000,000

 *American—281,503*
Spanish—200,000 SPANISH

essarily possess the same qualities when aggregated as soldiers. And next to this error was the fatal delusion, that an army animated by patriotism needed neither instruction nor discipline to prepare it for battle.

The fallacy of a system depending upon raw troops is attested by soldiers, of all time, too great and too noble to permit us to disregard their warnings. Washington, Taylor, Scott, Grant, Sherman, and the leading officers of today all agree on this point.

Washington, summing up the campaign of 1780, expressed his views in a manner that, should every American read them, would be of great benefit to our country:

Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us; we should not have been under the necessity of fighting Brandywine, with an unequal number of raw troops, and afterwards of seeing Philadelphia fall a prey to a victorious army; we should not have been at Valley Forge with less than half the force of the enemy, destitute of everything, in a situation neither to

resist nor to retire; we should not have seen New York left with a handful of men, yet an overmatch for the main army of these States, while the principal part of their force was detached for the reduction of two of them; we should not have found ourselves this spring so weak as to be insulted by 5,000 men, unable to protect our baggage and magazines, their security depending on a good countenance and a want of enterprise in the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity, enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause.

Nor have the ill effects been confined to the military line. A great part of the embarrassments in the civil departments flow from the same source. The derangement of our finances is essentially to be ascribed to it.

Nor is the cost in money, or the cost to the nation all that is to be considered. A moral question enters strongly. In civil life we recognize criminal negligence clearly as both a moral and a legal offense. The motorman who runs down a child, the chauffeur who kills a pedestrian, and other men who, failing to take proper precaution, cause death, are not infrequently convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to long terms in prison. Our legal system clearly recognizes the guilt of those who know of crime before the act is committed and aid or fail to attempt to prevent it. Thus those responsible

for the needless deaths among untrained troops are morally guilty of murder. Homer Lea dramatically expresses this view when he says:

In civil life a butcher is not called upon to exercise the skill of an oculist nor to remove a cataract from the dulled eye; barbers do not perform the operation of laparotomy; nor farmers navigate sea-going vessels, nor stone-masons try cases at the bar, nor sailors determine the value of mines, nor clerks perform the functions of civil-engineers. Yet, in the time of war in this Republic, these same men, together with all other varieties of humanity, go forth in the capacity of volunteer officers to be learned by the end of one-and-thirty days in the most varied of all sciences, the science of war.

The most promiscuous murderer in the world is an ignorant military officer. He slaughters his men by bullets, by disease, by neglect; he starves them, he makes cowards of them and deserters and criminals. The dead are hecatombs of his ignorance; the survivors, melancholy specters of his incompetence.*

More correctly does the celebrated "Light Horse Harry" Lee of cavalry fame in the Revolution place the blame when he rebukes not the green officer, serving to the best of his ability, but the government which sends him, saying:

Convinced as I am that a government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle,

* *The Valor of Ignorance.*

I cannot withhold my denunciation of its wickedness and folly.

All of which we respectfully modify, for it is the pacifist, the anti-militarist, the politician, the clergyman, the magazine writer, the editor, and similar men of prominence and position, who, without the slightest knowledge of the facts, without study, and perhaps without thought, are accessories before the fact — nay the instigators — of the wholesale murders which will occur in our next great war, if we rely on untrained troops. It is these men whose utterances and writings sway popular opinion. It is popular opinion which in turn sways the government to the detriment of a sane military policy. It is to be hoped that these men may be persuaded some day to reflect as to their responsibility, to study the facts, and then to spread broadcast their conclusions. There is no doubt of their change of mind under such conditions of fair investigation. In the meantime we can but hope that now, as in the past, "God takes care of babes, fools, and the United States."

CHAPTER XI

ECONOMY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF

THE great objection to the so-called militarist's ideas which many persons — otherwise undecided in their attitude — put forth is due to the fact that, as the military experts state we are now utterly unprepared for war, it will be necessary not only to continue to spend the present amounts of money, but also to increase our national defense expenditures manyfold. This idea, of course, is carefully nourished by the anti-militarists until the military authorities' requests grow, by exaggeration, out of all proportion to the truthful needs of the nation. Furthermore, one of the objections made by pacifists and others to the writings of military authors lies in the fact that, while they expose the weakness of our present system, no adequate, and at the same time, reasonable, remedy is suggested.

It is for this reason that we will undertake to demonstrate that the requests of the military authorities are reasonable, will not entail tremendous expense, and yet will place the United States on a firm military basis. In doing this, we are considering

the decisions of the best military authorities of the United States Army.

These authorities, and in fact all military officers, are a unit in stating that the United States is utterly unprepared for war. They echo the solemn warnings of the great soldiers and statesmen of the past, and point out that we may not always be fortunate enough to engage a first-class nation in war while it is occupied with other enemies, elsewhere, and that some day, as has never been the case in the past, we may find ourselves in a struggle against one of the great powers which is adequately prepared for war, and which is giving its full attention to defeating the military forces of the United States. Such a contest, we are warned, would probably mean defeat for this country. Nor is it only American officers, or others who are open to the charge of prejudice, who utter these warnings. Foreign officers, pacifists, and all who have studied the facts agree in this respect. The German General Staff has made an official statement to the effect that it could place 200,000 men around New York City within ten days. English military officers have openly expressed their belief that the United States will be defeated in its next great war; and the pacifist, General Chittenden, devotes a large portion of his book to a warning of the inadequacy of the military system of the United States. Angell, in his pacifist book, *The Great Illusion*, is strongly and plainly in favor of adequate

military strength for his own nation, as has been shown in our previous quotations from that work.

In an attempt to present these matters in a manner readily comprehended by the average civilian, there are numerous difficulties and it is, therefore, possibly advisable first to invite attention to some important facts relating to the determining factors in any attempt of either European or Asiatic powers to invade the United States, as well as to attack our colonial possessions.

To insure the successful operation of an invading army, an enemy must control the sea. This, however, does not necessarily mean that it must first defeat its opponent's fleet; what it does mean is that it must have a strategic advantage which will insure the safe movement of troops in transports. For instance, we had not defeated the Spanish fleet at the time that Shafter's expedition sailed for Cuba, but we had located it, and so placed our own fleet that it was extremely improbable that the Spaniards could secure the necessary freedom to damage or annoy our convoy. Again, should our navy ever be on one ocean and the enemy in the other, it is not impossible that they could prevent our passage through the Canal or around the Horn, and in that manner retain control of the ocean; also political pressure or mistaken statesmanship might cause a disposition of our navy that would be strategically fatal; the mighty elements might disable our fleet and be more kind

to our opponents; and, furthermore, should the harbors used as naval bases be suddenly captured by an enemy, the navy would be helpless — for without a base no navy can operate. In the present-day impossibility of forecasting just when a nation will strike, this is not at all an impossible situation for an unprepared nation. Finally, as two nations, England and Germany, already have navies superior to our entire naval force, with France, Japan, and Russia pushing us so hard that without a change in our program, we will soon fall to fifth or sixth place, it becomes evident that, in a war with a first-class power, the United States cannot rely on control of the sea, nor, for that matter, can any nation do so, so perverse is the fortune of war.

The recent report of the General Staff, United States Army, on the organization of the land forces of the United States, opens with the following statement:

A general consideration of our responsibilities and our geographical position indicates that the maintenance of our policies and interests at home and abroad demand an adequate fleet and a well-organized and sufficient army. The function of the navy is to secure and maintain the command of the sea. To accomplish this it must be free to seek and defeat the enemy. The use of any part of the fleet for local defense, therefore, defeats the chief object of naval power. The principal role of the navy is offensive, and the requirements of local defense must be met by other means. A fleet

unsupported by an army is unable to secure the fruits of naval victory; a fleet defeated at sea is powerless to prevent invasion. The solution of the problem of national defense lies, therefore, in the provision of suitable land and sea forces and a due recognition of their coordinate relations.

After the navy, the next resource of any nation is assumed to be its coast-defense fortifications. To the average citizen these are indeed invincible, and to a certain extent that may be so. It has been questioned if the combined navies of the world could reduce the defenses of New York harbor and sail into the Hudson River — and it is certain that it will not ever be attempted, at least not while the open “back door” invites a comparatively small landing party to take these defenses from the rear, with little or no loss.

The defenses of New York, like all other modern seacoast defenses, are constructed upon the plan that they are for defense against attack from the sea alone — and that their rear and flanks will be protected by troops of, or detached from, the mobile army; or in other words, by infantry and certain of the auxiliary troops. Unless so protected, these forts are helpless to protect the cities or harbors which they defend. In many cases the large guns cannot be brought to bear on certain places open for land attack. When they can they are ineffective, not being designed for that purpose.

Furthermore, these fortified harbors represent

only a small proportion of the number of places on our various seacoasts at which an enemy could land. Not only are there numerous unprotected, if less important, harbors which afford suitable landing places, but there are miles of coast upon which a landing can be made, as was done by our troops when they landed from the open sea for the campaign of Santiago de Cuba.

Secretary of War Stimson, in his special report to Congress in December, 1910 — a document since known as the “suppressed report” because Congress refused to receive such a “horrible” statement of truth — indicated that there were several nations that might be expected to bring a force of from 100,000 to 200,000 men against the United States in a space of time varying from ten to thirty days, adding:

This country cannot, so far as land forces are concerned, be considered in readiness for defense or to repel invasion by any first-class power having the navy to protect and the shipping to transport her armed forces over the sea.

Such forces would have the choice of a number of points of landing whether on the Atlantic, the Gulf, or the Pacific coasts. As it could not be foreseen just where they would land, we should have to be prepared to defend a number of points at the same time. With this in view and acting on the assumption that it is likely that but one of our sea-

coasts would be threatened at any given time, the General Staff has estimated that at least 460,000 mobile troops (infantry, cavalry, field artillery, etc.), and no less than 52,000 coast artillery are absolutely necessary. This is for the United States alone. For the Panama Canal, Hawaii, the Philippines, etc., it is estimated that about 50,000 troops are required. Our total requirements, if we are to be prepared for war with any first-class power, is, therefore, at least 550,000 men.

To meet these needs, we have available the regular army and the organized militia, or National Guard. The Guard, by the way, though by no means an efficient body of troops, is a very different force from the militia of Washington's time, the latter resembling more closely the unorganized militia of today. For this reason what we have said about "militia" and "raw troops" does not fully apply to the National Guard; at least not to the extent that it did in the past. The comments of our experts did not mean that citizen soldiers could not become efficient under proper conditions. Some of these conditions have already been granted the Guard and caused some decided improvement. Ultimately it is hoped conditions will permit a really efficient citizen soldiery.

The Regular Army of the United States consists of about 80,000 men, of whom not more than 64,000 may actually be included in the fighting force

and which number of effectives probably would be still further reduced in case of war. Of the mobile troops, not over 32,500 are in the territorial limits of the United States and it is not unlikely that this number will be shortly reduced. The National Guard consists of about 120,000 men, of which it has been estimated not over 86,200 are effective. It is believed that the most advanced thought on the subject gives the National Guard a place in the first line, even though it be, at present, but illy prepared for such responsibility, and in spite of the fact that it is not unlikely that in most cases regular forces would take the field somewhat in advance of the Guardsmen. Even at full war strength, unless increased beyond what now seems to be reasonable hope, the Regular Army would be totally inadequate as a first line. We are, therefore, compelled to give the National Guard, or some similar force of citizen soldiery, the place in the first line that the Guard is so anxious to occupy, even though, in doing so, we anticipate the state of efficiency toward which the citizen soldier is struggling. Thus, by including the Guard, we may roughly estimate our first line at 150,000 effectives, of which only about 114,500 are effective mobile troops in the United States.

Hence it will be seen that there is a deficiency of at least 400,000 troops, or five times the present size of the Regular Army, and almost three times the size of the combined Army and National Guard.

"This is the *minimum* number of first line troops necessary; and to augment this force and replace its losses, we should have plans made for raising immediately an additional force of 300,000 men," says the General Staff.

It is these figures, at first sight rather startling, from which some pacifists and the anti-militarists derive their conclusions that the military authorities are demanding additional expenditures which, for the army above recommended, would be five times the present army appropriation, or about \$475,000,000 annually. It is from these figures that such men claim that the military authorities are urging a huge standing army. In this manner the anti-militarist enlists the support of both the "cash conservator," and those who fear the menace of large standing armies. When, however, one goes more carefully into the details of the army authorities' scheme, it is found that they ask neither greatly increased expenditures nor a large Regular Army. Such a study discloses the fact that the additional troops are to be secured, first, through a slightly increased Regular Army sufficient for peace duties in the United States and to garrison our colonial possessions; second, by an improved citizen soldiery; and third, by a system of reserves for both the regular and the citizen soldier forces. These facts throw an entirely different light on the matter. We find that the regular force is to be but slightly increased

at a minimum of additional cost; we find instead of a large standing army it is a citizen soldiery that is requested — men who perform all the duties of citizens, who are civilians about ninety-five-hundredths of the time, and soldiers the other one-twentieth, and who receive little or no pay for their services; and we find that a great part of both of these forces is to be permitted to return to the reserve when they can devote all their time to civil duties, only holding themselves in readiness to respond to a call when needed. Thus it is that the plan calls for efficiency, for organization, and for an available supply of trained soldiers without any material increase in our present organization.

Considering these changes in order, we find that the regular army at present is composed of thirty regiments of infantry, fifteen regiments of cavalry, five regiments of field and mountain artillery, one regiment of horse artillery, twelve companies of engineers, nine companies of signal corps, four field hospitals, four ambulance companies, and one hundred and seventy companies of coast artillery. Of these, the Philippines, Oahu, Alaska, Panama, and Porto Rico require for their defense fourteen regiments of infantry, three and one-third regiments of cavalry, three regiments of field artillery, four companies of engineers, six companies of the signal corps, three field hospitals, three ambulance companies, and fifty-two companies of coast artillery.

ORGANIZATION U. S. ARMY

INFANTRY

108-150 men—1 company (Captain)
 4 companies—1 battalion (Major)
 3 battalions—1 regiment (Colonel)
 3 regiments—1 brigade (Brig. Gen'l.)

CAVALRY

90 men—1 troop
 4 troops—1 squadron
 3 squadrons—1 regiment
 3 regiments—1 brigade

FIELD ARTILLERY

171 men (4 guns)—1 battery
 3 batteries—1 battalion
 2 battalions—1 regiment
 2 regiments—1 brigade

{ 3 brigades of infantry (9 regiments)
 1 regiment of cavalry
 1 brigade of field artillery (2 regiments)
 1 pioneer battalion of engineers
 1 field battalion of signal troops
 4 ambulance companies } sanitary train
 4 field hospitals }
 1 ammunition train
 1 supply train } parts of the smaller
 combat wagons } organizations
 field trains }

1 Division
 (Major General)

1 Field Army [Army Corps] (Lieutenant General)—2 or more divisions and auxiliary troops
 1 Army (General)—2 or more field armies and auxiliary troops

NOTE:

A Division is the great tactical and administrative unit. It is the smallest force composed of all arms. A Division consists of about 22,000 men, 7,500 horses and mules, and 900 vehicles. Marching in column of squads (*four's*), with its trains, it is fifteen miles long. There are also *Cavalry Divisions* in which cavalry rather than infantry is the main arm. The U. S. has no *complete Divisions*, Field Armies, or Armies.

This leaves only sixteen regiments of infantry, eleven regiments of cavalry, two regiments of field and mountain artillery, one regiment of heavy artillery, eight companies of engineers, six companies of the signal corps, one field hospital, one ambulance company, and one hundred and eighteen companies of coast artillery in the United States (Plate 7).

For the purpose of increasing the troops in the United States proper to a force which would be capable of defending it when supported by citizen soldiers, the General Staff asks for an increase of about fourteen regiments of infantry, five regiments of field artillery, one regiment of heavy artillery, one field company of the signal corps, two companies of engineers, eight field hospitals, and eight ambulance companies. This total increase in the regular establishment at the low peace strength at which they would be carried (except in our colonies where war strength would be maintained) would amount to about 25,000 or 30,000 men, and would bring our army up to a strength of 105,000 to 120,000 all told. To make these requirements moderate, this has been divided into five increments, it being clearly pointed out to Congress just what additions should be made in each of the five times that that body is requested to increase the army.

At the estimated average cost of \$800 per man, this increase would cost \$20,000,000 per year. In making this request, however, the General Staff points

out that by abandoning certain useless army posts which were formerly maintained for defense against the Indians and which are now retained merely to satisfy certain politicians, we could save \$5,500,000 per year. Thus the total additional expense at such date in the future after all five increments had been made would be about \$14,500,000 annually.

As a comparison for the sake of those who heed the anti-militarist's claim that 100,000 to 125,000 is an excessive standing army, we may state that the regular standing army of Russia is 1,200,000, that of Germany, 634,000, that of France, 634,000, that of Austria-Hungary, 327,000, that of Italy, 288,000, and that of England, 255,000, which makes the General Staff's request for a total of a little over 100,000 men seem very moderate (Plate 8).*


Estimating that this force of regulars, including the coast artillery, when at war strength, will provide about 200,000 of the 550,000 troops which are needed in the United States, the General Staff shows that there would be left about 350,000 to be furnished by the citizen soldiery. As has been pointed out by all military authorities, the fact that the National Guard consists of some fifty small military forces, only partially controlled by the Government, and subject to the whims of a half-hundred Govern-

* The latest reports of the General Staff give Russia 1,280,000, Germany 800,000, France 727,000, Italy 258,000, Austria 472,000. England's figures as given here include colonial troops.


STANDING ARMIES OF THE LEADING NATIONS

Peace Strength


*Russia—1,200,000 **




Germany—634,000




France—634,000




Austria-Hungary—327,000




Italy—288,000




England—255,000



Japan—230,000



U. S.—81,000



** Russia's Great and Turbulent Territory Greatly
Lessens the Number Available for War.*

ors, legislators, and Adjutants-General, presents a serious difficulty. Upton, in his *Military Policy of the United States*, gives as the third lesson of the Revolution:

That in proportion as the general government gives the states authority to arm and equip troops, it lessens the military strength of the whole people and correspondingly increases the national expenditures.

The General Staff of the United States Army, in its report of 1912, says:

Our traditional theory of a small Regular Army and a great war army of citizen soldiers is not yet embodied as a definite institution. The mobilization of our citizen soldiery today would not result in a well-knit national army. It would be an uncoordinated army of fifty allies, with all of the inherent weaknesses of allied forces, emphasized by the unusual number of the allies.

The National Guard as it exists is a very poorly balanced force. There is infantry for sixteen divisions, cavalry for six divisions, artillery for three divisions, and practically no sanitary troops. An army of this kind would be seriously handicapped, and this is thoroughly realized by the Federal Government. Owing, however, to the control of the National Guard by the various states, the War Department is powerless to secure a proper proportion of the various arms. Similarly, the troops of the different states, varying in size from a division

to a depleted battalion, differ equally in efficiency, and it is feared that the efficiency of the National Guard will always vary inversely as to the amount of state control.

It is for these reasons that all officers, from a military viewpoint alone, consider Federal control as essential. When certain political factors are considered, such a Federal force, though it becomes no less desirable, appears to have many obstacles in its path. National Guardsmen are in favor of Federal control, but politicians in the various states would probably oppose the relinquishing of authority over the state troops, as would the few, but powerful, Guardsmen who are in the service for parades and receptions alone. Therefore, though Congress has the power to provide for a Federal citizen soldiery, the General Staff recommends, as an immediate step, but partial Federal control, Federal pay, Federal assistance to secure more field artillery, cavalry, etc., and the more definite organization of the National Guard in tactical divisions. On paper, this divisional organization is already fully planned, but the shortage of auxiliary troops, and the sub-division into states, makes these divisions thus far only a paper force.

Captain William Mitchell, of the General Staff, U. S. A., however, has come out definitely with a suggestion for a Federal citizen soldiery. His idea appears to be practical, desirable, and economical,

and is one that will surely meet with approval among National Guardsmen. Furthermore, Captain Mitchell's theories are in harmony with the report of the General Staff Corps on the organization of our land forces, being an effective second step to the suggestions outlined therein.

Captain Mitchell believes that the Federal Government should take over the National Guard, and, resurrecting the famous and honored old Revolutionary term, name it the "Continental Army of the United States." This would be accomplished by taking advantage of the constitutional provision allowing the Federal government to "raise and support" armies and passing a Federal law authorizing the enlistment and organization of the Continental Army, permitting the present National Guard as organizations to enlist therein, wherever the state authorities would grant such permission. This force would then be organized in divisions by providing for the present shortage of cavalry, field artillery, and other auxiliary troops. In this manner, the National Government could secure a well-balanced force, and could make provisions for uniform training and standards of requirements for officers and men. The present lack of uniformity and efficiency would be eliminated. For local disorders, such as strike duty (which is a duty most distasteful to the National Guard) the bill provides that if other forces at the Governor's command could not maintain

order, the state executive could draw upon the Continental Army troops within his state. This would permit the entire elimination of any organized militia in all states which so desired it. Captain Mitchell offers a draft of a bill that, he believes, would bring about these ends.

Should we supply the 350,000 citizen soldiers, desired by the General Staff, the Continental Army at peace strength would have to number about 192,000 men. Such a force, at the rate of pay proposed for the present National Guard, and wisely using the present \$10,000,000 now appropriated by state and nation for the Guardsmen, would cost about \$42,000,000 annually.

Providing, however, that we secure the suggested 105,000 or thereabouts in the Regular Army and 192,000 Continental Army, or citizen soldiers, we would have a total of only 297,000 men out of the 550,000 men deemed necessary. Thus leaving about 255,000 men still to be provided for.

These, the General Staff recommends, should be provided for by reservists. At present there is a small, but poorly organized regular army reserve, serving without pay and, as yet, of little or no consequence. Under the proposed reserve system, every man in the Regular or Continental Army would enlist for a certain period of actual training with troops (color service). The balance of the time would be served as reservists, the men going

about their civil occupations, but holding themselves in readiness to bring their organizations from peace to war strength in case of necessity. Should this reserve receive no pay, it would cost practically nothing; should it be paid a small amount, say one-third that of the Continental Army's pay, it would cost \$12,500,000.

Even with pay, however, a reserve is an economy and a necessity. The organizations at peace strength number less than half of the proper war strength necessary for efficiency. Should we fill them to a war footing by enlisting untrained men our existing forces would be badly demoralized, and much of the value secured by previous expenditures on, and training of, our land forces would be lost. On the other hand, should we fail to bring the peace organizations up to war strength, not only would our first line be deficient in numbers but the units would be of a size that is both tactically absurd and ruinously expensive. In the Spanish War our regiments had no reserve with which to pass from a peace to a war footing, and no reserve to maintain the initial strength in the field by offsetting the losses due to sickness, battle, and desertion. Referring to statistics which have been most carefully compiled by Hon. John Q. Tilson, Member of Congress from Connecticut, it will be seen that 400,000 infantry maintained as war strength organizations by use of a reserve would cost *one hundred and sixty-nine*

million, six hundred and twenty-five thousand, nine hundred and twenty dollars less per year than would the same number of men maintained in regiments of the strength to which our lack of a reserve reduced us in 1898. As we might be called upon to put 1,200,000 or more men in the field in any serious war with a first-class power, it will be seen that for each year of such a war an adequate reserve would save an amount sufficient to pay the reserve for forty-five years. It is thus that a reserve is not only a necessity but an economy. In this manner would we raise the balance of the 550,000 men necessary for the first defense of the United States in any great war.

Finally, the 300,000 additional men which the General Staff states we should be prepared immediately to raise for the support of our other troops, we could secure through volunteers — which form of troops cost nothing until the time of need arrives. These soldiers, not being needed at first, could be trained and equipped before being called upon.

The total increase of expenditures provided above amounts to \$47,000,000 annually, and this, of course, according to the anti-militarist, is a tremendous sum. However, as we have previously stated, it should be compared not with one's own income, but with the other far greater expenditures of our government (Plate 9).

Furthermore, it should be considered that spend-

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GENERAL STAFF

PRESENT

[REDACTED]

Present Expenditures

\$110,000,000

[REDACTED]

Effective Strength Army and National Guard

150,000 Men

PROPOSED

[REDACTED]

*Proposed
Expenditures*

\$157,000,000

[REDACTED]

*Proposed
Effective
Army*

550,000 Men

INCREASE

[REDACTED]

\$47,000,000

[REDACTED]

400,000 Men


ing at the present time \$105,000,000 on our army and National Guard, we have available an effective first line of less than 150,000 men, about half of whom are only partially trained and hardly fit for war within three months' time. By adding less than half to our present expenditures, we can secure a well-organized, well-disciplined, and uniformed army of 550,000 men, or practically four times the present effective first line. The ratio of additional efficiency to additional expense is as eight is to one. This includes pay for citizen soldiers and reserves — which is not now available. Without the item of pay the cost would be reduced greatly, but pay is so essential to efficiency that it cannot properly be excluded.

Thus is reality an entirely different thing from the anti-militarist's cry that the authorities desire to increase our military expenditures fivefold, and to maintain a standing army six or eight times the strength of our present force. It will be seen that, by heeding the advice of the military authorities, the United States at comparatively small cost, can secure a trained force fully capable of defending the nation until such time as volunteers could be raised and trained if needed in a great war.


For those who think our suggested force excessive, we may point out that by similar methods of utilizing trained reserves Russia can mobilize 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 *trained* soldiers, Germany 4,610,-

000, France 3,000,000 to 4,000,000, Austria-Hungary 1,800,000, Japan 1,300,000, and England about 1,000,000 counting territorial and colonial troops. These numbers, in fact, should probably now be increased somewhat, owing to recent additions to foreign military forces. Furthermore, the only nation of these six which cannot mobilize a trained army at least three times greater than we ask for, balances the scale by maintaining the greatest navy on earth. We ask for approximately only one-tenth of Russia's force, one-eighth of the German's, one-fifth of France's, one-fourth of Austria's, one-third of Japan's, and one-half of England's (Plate 10).


NUMBER OF TRAINED SOLDIERS AVAILABLE
IN SEVEN OF THE GREAT NATIONS, BY USE
OF RESERVES, SHOWING ALSO THE NUM-
BER ASKED FOR BY GENERAL STAFF U. S. A.,
AND NUMBER ACTUALLY AVAILABLE IN U. S.




Russia—5,000,000




Germany—4,610,000




France—3,000,000



Austria-Hungary—1,800,000



Japan—1,300,000



England—1,000,000



U. S. Asked by General Staff—550,000



U. S. Actual—150,000

NOTE: Latest reports indicate even
larger forces in Russia and France.

CHAPTER XII

THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NAVAL BOARD

OUR navy, though at present ranking third and not, like the army, last among the military forces of the great powers, is, nevertheless, not what it should be at the present time in point of strength. It is not, moreover, the present, as much as the future condition of our navy which alarms the naval authorities. Like the recent report on the land forces by the General Staff of the army, the General Board of the navy, about ten years ago, made a report on the necessities of that service, and, unfortunately, like the army report, the advice of the naval experts received but little attention.

In considering our navy's needs we must consider that we have, unlike other great powers, two great coast lines, of our nation proper, with great cities and vast wealth bordering thereon. This nation is the only power on earth of which this is true. Even England with her vast colonial possessions has but a comparatively trivial and concentrated coast line of the kingdom proper to defend. The capture of England's greatest and most wealthy colony would be nothing as to the landing of a strong hostile force near London, nor would the

loss of the Philippines compare with the conquest of our Pacific Coast. Thus it is that a nation having two immense coast lines has additional need of a strong fleet, even if it is to be used only for defense, which is a serious error in naval warfare. A navy should be free to seek and destroy the enemy. By aggressive offensive action, if successful, it can quickly end a war; by defensive action it can but delay it.

On our navy depends much of the success of our foreign policies. We could not transport troops (if we had them) over any portion of the seas, unless our navy controlled those seas. Therefore our defense of the Philippines, Alaska, Oahu, the Panama Canal, Porto Rico, etc., depends greatly upon the navy. The Monroe Doctrine is largely "as strong as the navy." The open door in China, the neutrality of the Panama Canal, the protection of our citizens abroad, and all of the other foreign policies of the United States could not be enforced by the biggest army in the world were it confined to the territory of the forty-eight states, and unable to move on the sea. An army insures only the territory which it can control, and it cannot control overseas territory without the aid of a navy. Dislike it as we may, it may some day be desirable to enforce our views of right and wrong on some overseas nation. The navy, without the army, is by no means a capable weapon for such an end; but similarly, the

army without the navy is most ineffective. It is a proper understanding of the coordinate relation of these forces that will bring success.

The General Board of the navy proposed that we should build two battleships per year, and had this plan been carried out, it would have called for a total of forty-eight capital ships in 1920, in addition to four torpedo boat destroyers for each battleship. This program, however, has not been followed, and the result is that in order to make up for the deficiencies of the past, the General Board is now asking four ships quite regularly. It is thus that parsimony in regard to the navy has been responsible for the seemingly large demands of the General Board, which never intended originally to ask for anything but a standard building program of two ships per year. It is our failure to make these appropriations that has placed the United States in third place in naval power instead of in its former position as second among the great navies. Should we continue our so-called economy in this respect, France, Japan, and Russia will have superior navies within a few years, and the United States will then drop to sixth place. Most of these nations have regular building programs, which they follow out; and, through systematic expenditures, they confine their appropriations within any one year to reasonable amounts, instead of economizing on one occasion and being compelled to forfeit their standing, or to spend vast

sums, in the future. It is in this manner that Russia, whose navy was practically destroyed by the Japanese only a few years ago, will probably soon outstrip the United States, and take her place in the struggle for naval supremacy, among other great nations.


Much has recently been said in regard to claims that the navy officers were misrepresenting when they stated that a ship like the Oregon should be eliminated and not counted in the strength of our first-class fighting fleet. It has been assumed that the 13-inch gun on a ship like the Oregon was equal to the 12-inch gun of the modern super-dreadnaught, and that the older ship would be an addition to our fleet in battle. As a matter of fact, however, there are other elements to be considered. In the gun it includes initial velocity, trajectory, range, and penetrative power at various distances. The size of the bore of the rifle is only one of the elements to be considered. There were, for instance, 15-inch guns in the Civil War, but they were mere cumbersome toys compared with the modern rifles of the navy.

Furthermore, to place one of the slower and more obsolete ships in our fighting line is to impair the entire fleet. It would compel the fleet to sacrifice the additional speed which modern ships have attained in order to keep at the same speed as the old and slow ships. Were that not done, it would be necessary to allow the slow ships to fall behind and be at


DREADNAUGHT STRENGTH OF THE GREAT SEA POWERS

BUILT, BUILDING, AND AUTHORIZED


England—42 Capital Ships




Germany—26 Capital Ships



United States—12 Capital Ships




France—11 Capital Ships




Russia—11 Capital Ships



Japan—10 Capital Ships



Italy—9 Capital Ships



the mercy of superior force. Finally, a modern dreadnaught could probably entirely destroy a ship like the Oregon without even coming within effective range of the Oregon's guns. It could, as was said in the old navy, almost "sail rings around" the old style battleship, and could run or fight as it saw fit, keeping constantly out of reach of the old ship's rifles and at the same time within easy range for its own.

It is thus that the naval experts can conclusively prove to the most ignorant civilian, or to the greatest authority, the correctness of these reports and the soundness of their recommendations. At the present time, England has 42 capital (or dreadnaught) ships built, building, or authorized, Germany, 26, the United States, 12, Russia, 11, France, 11, Japan, 10, and Italy, 9. This fact shows clearly the narrow margin by which we now hold even third place and the importance of carrying out the desires of the General Board. Germany has a continuous ship-building program that calls for an eventual strength of 61 dreadnaughts — our recommendation, which Congress refuses to grant, calls for only 48 (Plate 11).

An erroneous impression of the value of the Panama Canal to the navy has been formed. Many believe that it doubles the effectiveness of the navy by making it available for both coasts. This is certainly not true. Though of immense value from

a naval viewpoint, it is questionable if the increased efficiency is anywhere near twice that of our navy without the canal. Our navy should be strong enough to meet any attack on either ocean and yet not have our interests unguarded on the other. Thus we should not count on transferring the entire fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific or the reverse, and for this reason alone the canal does not double our power.

Moreover, there is a possibility of its temporary destruction. Every precaution is taken, of course, to prevent this. The canal is to be guarded, it is fortified, and it is planned to allow the dense tropical vegetation to grow wild for some distance along each bank, making an almost impassable barrier. Colonel Goethals is quoted as saying that in order to disable a lock a charge would have to be placed in a certain position behind the gate, and that more dynamite would be necessary than one man can carry. To let the water out entirely by the destruction of the Chagres spillway in the center of the Gatun dam has been suggested as the most practicable form of attack. This, however, would require the possession of this part of the canal by a considerable party of men for about two days.

While neither of these situations seem probable, either is possible. Today, more than ever before, nations will strike first — and warn their enemy to be prepared afterward. Thus, as long as we have

disputes with any nation, a sudden attempt might be made to destroy the canal, by stealth or by force, previous to any declaration of hostilities, or diplomatic rupture that would place us on our guard. The Japanese action in the recent war with Russia affords an excellent example of this possibility.

Captain Harry S. Knapp, U. S. N., in a paper in the *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, concludes that without a canal the navy on each ocean should be capable of meeting the strongest probable opponent on that ocean. Such a navy he calls a "Two Ocean Standard;" the one fleet called the "Standard Atlantic Fleet" and the other the "Standard Pacific Fleet." Captain Knapp, after fully expounding the facts bearing upon the question, in which the matter of steaming distance, time, and available force figure largely, concludes:

When the canal is finished, our policy should be to have eventually, and as soon as possible, a total strength not less than that of the Standard Atlantic Fleet plus three-quarters that of the Standard Pacific Fleet. These so-called "standard" fleets are not fixed quantities, but will vary from year to year as foreign nations increase their own naval strength. The policy itself can, however, be fixed, and some policy should be established.

This seems not unreasonable, yet it is more than the General Board of the navy has yet asked for.

Our navy — or rather the modern navy, which

has come into existence after we lost our position as a commercial maritime power — has not had a real test against a first-class power. As with the army, we see in victory only excellence on our part, and overlook weakness on the part of our enemy. The easy naval victories of the Spanish War are responsible for the general opinion that the modern United States Navy is invincible.

Actually, however, the Spanish navy was unfit for action with a force of its own size. When we fought it we outnumbered it. The Spanish ships were poorly provisioned, short of ammunition, their bottoms were foul, and many of their guns useless. With such conditions it was but little credit to the American navy to win a victory and but little reflection on the bravery or skill of the Spaniards to lose. Our credit was that of doing well our part — almost as if simply practicing — against an enemy which could do but little to hinder us.

Said Admiral Cervera, speaking of his squadron, when ordered to sail for the West Indies to meet the American fleet:

It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return; while if it should remain in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation. . . . The *Colon* does not yet have her

big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, with the exception of about three hundred rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the *Colon* cannot be recharged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo. . . . But I will trouble you no more.*

Shortly after, Cervera added:

I will try to sail tomorrow. As the act has been consummated I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken! . . . With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice.†

Captain Villaamil, of the Spanish Navy, who was second in command, and who was killed in the naval battle of Santiago, made the following remarks in a private telegram sent to the Spanish premier:

In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you should know, through a friend that does not fear censure, that while as seamen we are all ready to meet an honorable death in the fulfillment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless in terminating the war if the representations repeatedly made by the Admiral to the Minister of Marine are not taken into consideration.*

* *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, by Colonel H. H. Sargent, A. C. McClurg & Co., Chicago.

† *Ibid.*

We should by no means consider our navy — ship for ship or man for man — as necessarily superior to that of any other first-class power. It is positively not an invincible force. Unless we so view it and heed the General Board of the navy we will some day meet disaster on the sea which will only be exceeded by the disaster on land that will follow neglect to consider the reasonable suggestions of the General Staff of the army.

CHAPTER XIII

DEMAGOGUE VERSUS STATESMAN

WE ARE not, in this work, expressing the theories of any one man, nor of any set of men; but we endeavor to express facts as they have been determined to exist by all those who actually make a thorough study of war, its possibilities, probabilities, and the consequent needs of the United States. The asininity of those who first form pacifist and anti-militarist opinions and then set out to seek some evidence which will corroborate their ideas, is, unfortunately, equaled by the money and resources which are at the disposal of these men, in order that they may spread broadcast their propaganda. Equally unfortunately, armies and navies afford an excellent chance for politicians to make a reputation for economy without, in most cases, appearing parsimonious to the direct interests of those constituents who are always so dearly thought of, and an equal opportunity is afforded by the military forces for eloquent and impressive oratory, which will inflame the country with the great, but economic, patriotism of their representatives.

There is no attempt on the part of the majority

of pacifists to ascertain facts — excepting in so far as these facts may be favorable to their own theories. This, of course, may be done in any controversy. Never has there been disagreement on important issues, unless there were facts that supported both sides. The coward, for instance, who deserted all his comrades and ran from battle, could easily argue that it took greater courage to face the inevitable scorn and ridicule of his fellow men than to face the bullets of the enemy. Probably such, in the opinion of those who remained, would actually be a fact, and, on the surface, the man who ran should be called a hero. The weakling, however, when he flew from danger was thinking of the present — giving no thought whatever to future scorn or ridicule or anything except the terrible hail of lead from the enemy's rifles. It is thus that the absolute fact that the man really faced the more horrible of the two alternatives — a life despised by his fellows — fails to relieve him of the charge of cowardice.

Similarly, many of the contentions of the pacifists and anti-militarists are founded upon truth, but they are not founded upon the whole truth, and the points in favor of the pacifists and anti-militarists are overshadowed by other facts which they either have not taken the trouble to learn, or, as we are reluctant to believe, that they conceal. The absurdity of some of the theories of those opposed to any-

thing recommended by a member of the army or navy, is frequently illustrated. Only recently it was suggested that our army and navy be "put to work," and that the United States employ no civilian laborers as long as there were soldiers who could be used either in army or navy. However, Mr. Taylor, one of the best known efficiency experts in the world, stated that he "found that more work and more efficient work was done, per capita, aboard a United States battleship than in any other known place where labor was employed." It is unfortunate that those who believe our military men are idlers cannot be required to serve an enlistment in the army to open their eyes; but these men, like other anti-militarists, first form their opinions and then seek only such facts as corroborate them.

The theory has also recently been advanced that army officers should not be permitted to write, publish, speak, or otherwise make public, any matter which attempts to show that the United States is unprepared for war. An advocate of this restriction said, in part:

I believe that anybody knowing the American Army, as I believe I know it, who casts reflections upon its efficiency or upon our preparedness for war ought to be criticized and dismissed from the service.

In this the gentleman is referring especially to the higher officers, including the Chief of Staff of

the Army. Whether or not he intends to include the Secretary of War in his displeasure, we cannot state, though it is certain that all men holding that office have recently dwelt at some length on the unpreparedness of the land forces of the United States.

We have no hesitation, whatever, in saying that the gentleman demonstrated thoroughly, in the course of his speech, that while anybody who knew the American Army as he "believes" he knows it, might be well informed indeed; those who knew it only as he actually does know it would have much to learn. For instance, he evidently does not know the difference between a number of well trained regiments of the various arms and an army. Exactly as a number of efficient individual soldiers do not form a good company until they are organized and can maneuver together as a unit, neither is an army efficient until it is trained in the field in the large units. Exactly as a company composed largely of men who commanded with skill and few who actually fought and fired a rifle, or entirely of privates and no officers, would be unbalanced, and therefore, inefficient, so is an army which is not composed of a proper proportion of infantry, cavalry, artillery and other auxiliary troops. Unfortunately, large unit training is a kind of which our army has had little, owing to our scattered possessions, and lack of large army maneuvers. Unfortunately, our army lacks an adequate, complete and well balanced tac-

tical organization. These things and the trivial size of our force, the gentleman believes, are of no importance. When he says "we have a splendidly trained militia," in spite of great admiration for the things that the National Guard has succeeded in doing, those knowing that service must actually laugh. As a matter of fact it would take about three months to put the most effective National Guard organization into real condition for war, and as for the worst, it is impossible to make an estimate.

Nor does the gentleman fail to insert the "eloquent and impressive oratory," which we have already referred to. He says:

For my part, I believe today it is the most efficient and best prepared army there is on the face of the earth, because it is composed of American citizens who are not afraid to fight and who are the superiors of any race of men on the globe.

Which, sentimentally, is fine, but, practically, is tommyrot. It does little good for an army to be "not afraid to fight" if it is unable to fight; less good to be morally, intellectually, or physically superior (*if we are*) if we are militarily inferior. Military superiority requires these things and much more.

We wonder if the citizens of the United States want the men who are trained as military experts at public expense, to keep all that they learn to them-

selves? Rather it would seem to us that it is their duty to allow the public to have the results of their study in the art of war. No business house would train employees to a great degree of expertness, and then prohibit them from making suggestions for the betterment of the business; nor would such suggestions when they were made be regarded as merely personal interest for the betterment of some particular employee's department. Rather do business houses encourage suggestions and criticism, and reward those employees whose recommendations are of value. We cannot believe that the American public desires that all of its military information should come through civilians.

We have previously quoted Doctor Jordan of Leland Stanford University, who represents well another type of anti-militarist and pacifist, when he says, "There is no nation that could attack us if it would, there is no nation that would attack us if it could." We have previously at some length considered that statement, and have found that it is either most maliciously or most stupidly false; that facts, and those best acquainted with them, show that several nations may at any time be so placed that they "would attack us if they could" and that the majority of these "could attack us if they would." The European War should silence such absurd talk for some time to come.

One of the favorite claims of those who advance

these absurd theories is well and, from the anti-militarist's viewpoint, conservatively expressed by the gentleman previously referred to when he says:

I do not believe that these officers ought to be permitted to give out these idle vaporings about the inefficiency of our army or about our unpreparedness for war. They are misleading and incorrect, and may at any time involve us in trouble, and I want to suggest in all candor that I hope that these officers will not permit themselves to give out more such gloomy statements—such misleading and improper statements.

This, of course, implies that the officers in question are either unanimously ignorant of the profession which they have spent a lifetime attempting to master, and that such men know less of the army and navy than the civilian in question does, or else that they are deliberately deceiving the public and Congress. It also implies that foreign governments do not know of our military weakness.

When we consider, however, the character and education of the men who agree with the so-called misleading and incorrect statements which are essential features of this book, it seems ridiculous for us to add our own theories in an attempt to show the absurdity of the opposition's claims. When one can quote Washington, Lincoln, Grant, Roosevelt, Wilson, and numerous of the great military and naval experts of the world, further addition is un-

necessary. When one reads foreign military writings, one finds that there need be no fear of "giving away" our weakness.

Each of our Secretaries of War for some time past has pointed out in one way or another our unpreparedness for war. Our Chiefs of Staff do so. The General Staff of the Army, the most expert body of military men in the country, certainly makes some such inference when it points out that we need 550,000 trained soldiers, and have available but about 150,000 all told; that both the Regular Army and National Guard are badly balanced organizations, in some respects poorly equipped and in no sense a unified fighting force. The General Board of the Navy does so when it shows that we are slowly but surely dropping down in the list of navies of the world.

It is an interesting comparison to place the United States in Germany's place, contending with the odds against which Germany struggles today. Were the United States in Germany's place, the war would be over by this time and the United States would now be in process of division among the victorious allies.

Rather than continue our own theories, it may be well to quote, first, President Roosevelt (a man who was awarded the Nobel peace prize a few years ago). In a speech at Norfolk in 1913 he said, in part:

We see before our eyes at this moment a great and populous empire, now a great and populous republic, China, which has suffered partial dismemberment purely because she has permitted herself to become impotent in war, so that she has no navy and not an adequate army.

In consequence, Russia, Japan, Germany, England, France, now hold Chinese provinces, some of them themselves the size of empires. If the American people deliberately choose to follow in Chinese footsteps doubtless some decades would pass before we would suffer to the extent of China; but long before that time had come we should have had to abandon all pretense of upholding the Monroe Doctrine, we should have had to abandon Panama and Alaska and every insular possession, and we should have had to surrender all right to say what immigrants shall and what immigrants shall not be admitted to our country, and the terms upon which they shall come here and become citizens or hold land. Remember that we should not be permitted to say what was to be done on these vital matters affecting even our most intimate home policies, unless we were able and willing to defend ourselves, by force of arms, if our right to decide these questions for ourselves was ever definitely and peremptorily challenged. It is a matter of vital concern to all our people, but above all it is a matter of vital concern to our wageworkers and farmers and small business and professional men to have the undisputed right to decide every such question for themselves; and our claim so to decide these questions would be treated with utter derision if we did not have an efficient navy and if we did not possess both the will and the power to back up our words by our deeds.

To advocate universal arbitration treaties, the arbitration

of questions of national interest and honor is folly so great as fairly to be wicked. We have the right to insist on the Monroe Doctrine; we have the right to insist that we, and we alone, are to decide as to what immigrants shall come to our shores and as to whether these immigrants shall become citizens or own land; these and other similar rights are not merely rights but duties.

President Cleveland in one of his annual messages to Congress said:

All must admit the importance of an effective navy to a nation like ours, having such an extensive seacoast to protect. The nation that cannot resist aggression is constantly exposed to it. Its foreign policy is, of necessity, weak and its negotiations are conducted with disadvantage because it is not in condition to enforce the terms dictated by its sense of right and justice.

The defenseless condition of our seacoast and lake frontier is perfectly palpable. The absolute necessity, judged by all standards of prudence and foresight of our preparation for an effectual resistance, is so apparent that I hope effective steps will be taken in that direction immediately.

President McKinley in his annual message of December 5, 1898, after the Spanish War, referring to the Regular Army, said:

There can be no question at this time, and probably for some time in the future, 100,000 men will be none too many to meet the necessities of the situation.

A glance at Chapter XI will show that the General Staff asks for a standing army of but a few more men on the active list; the balance of the 550,000 needed, to be citizen soldiers and reserves.

President Grant, in his fifth and sixth annual messages, said:

There are two things which I would especially invite you to consider: first, the importance of preparing for war in the time of peace. [And again], There is no class of Government employees who are harder worked than the army — officers and men; none who perform their tasks more cheerfully and efficiently.

President Wilson in a speech to officers of the New Jersey National Guard, by his references to that branch of our land forces, shows both his appreciation of the good qualities of the soldier and his knowledge of the importance of having a military force which is capable of taking the offensive at the outset, and conducting the campaign aggressively and skillfully to a successful and speedy end. President Wilson said:

This is the particular kind of public service in which a man cannot be selfish. He may harbor an ambition to attain a higher rank, but the end of it all is danger.

While I am among those who passionately love peace, I recognize that there is a business side to everything. No man in the ranks goes into war without knowing that there is nothing in it for him but danger. This ought to hearten

any man that goes into the National Guard. It is an act by which he shows an entire devotion to the public service. The principal part of your training is skill, and while it is not pleasant to contemplate the marks you might shoot at in war, still it is well to be prepared for it. The straighter you shoot the sooner the war will be over. The more men you kill right away, the fewer you have to kill in the long run.

Washington, of whom we hope none will question either the skill, knowledge, or honesty of purpose, described well the results of dependence on untrained troops. The militia of his day did not approximate the training received, even by the present National Guard; and, therefore, Washington's words should not be taken as applying to all classes of citizen soldiers. What we do apply them to is all untrained soldiers, whether militia, volunteers, or otherwise, and not to any force which has received a reasonable amount of training. He said:

To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed, superior in knowledge and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.

Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning

to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit in others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control cannot brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of any army, without which licentiousness and every kind of disorder triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination is not the work of a day, a month, or even a year. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by constant course of discipline and service.

I have never yet been a witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in a material degree, to so precarious a defense.

It was Washington, furthermore, who was the originator of the proverb, "In time of peace, prepare for war."

Finally, John Adams, the second president of the United States, tersely expressed the feeling of the majority of our leading statesmen, when he said:

National defense is one of the cardinal duties of a statesman. On this head I recollect nothing with which to reproach myself. The subject has always been near my heart. The delightful imaginations of universal and perpetual peace have often amused, but have never been credited by me.

We could continue indefinitely to quote our recognized American statesman; can the anti-militarist do

this? It is seen that Americans of all times too great to be charged with selfish interests, men who have themselves had opportunity to secure correct knowledge of the facts, are in accordance with the military authorities in the essentials of their requests and suggestions.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSIONS

CONSIDERING the foregoing facts, we conclude:

1. That an Army and Navy is not a burden during peace, but if properly maintained is but a paying business proposition.

2. That there is no cheaper substitute for trained military force.

3. That at the present time the United States is as likely as any other great power to be involved in war.

4. That, desirable as universal peace may be, there is no immediate prospect of such condition either through arbitration, disarmament, limited armament, financial or economic pressure, or otherwise.

5. That the European war offers no sound ground for belief that armaments will be reduced, owing either to German or allied success.

6. That the cost of war in lives, misery, and money has been exaggerated.

7. That there are many compensations for the "horrors" of war, and that much in excess of that lost has been gained in many wars.

8. That the character of the soldier and sailor is as good as any other class of men in corresponding stations of life.

9. That military force is not opposed to the interests of the "common people."

10. That our past wars show an urgent need for a definite military policy in the United States.

11. That the recommendations of the General Staff of the Army, and the General Board of the Navy are reasonable and wise.

12. That the men concurring in the ten previous conclusions are of a character which prohibits the charge of ignorance, or of self-interest, being made against them.

It is in view of these conclusions that we firmly believe and maintain:

That, while the United States should do all in its power to encourage peace among nations, avoid unnecessary wars, and assist in the education of the human race to a point that may, in the distant future, bring about the changes that will make possible universal peace, nevertheless, it is vitally important that the Government should take immediate steps to carry out the recommendations of the General Staff, United States Army, in regard to the land forces, and of the General Board, United States Navy, in regard to the naval forces of the United States.

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